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I. SCOPE OF INQUIRY
The modest pretension of this discussion is to collect the more im-
portant pronouncements of the United States Court of Military Appeals'
during its first two years of operation2 and of the Boards of Review3 on
the fundamental subject of jurisdiction. No attempt is made to review
the centuries-long development of foreign and American military court
jurisdiction 4 beyond the basic statement that Congress in enacting the
Uniform Code of Military Justice5 merely exercised once more its ex-
press constitutional power "to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces." 6  The considerable body of
textual7 and periodics material treating military jurisdiction in the era
* Visiting Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law, summer
session 1953; Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps, United States Army. This
article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not necessarily express
the views of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army nor of any
other government instrumentality.
1 The court of last resort in the system of military law as prescribed by Art. 67
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 STAT. 129 (1950), 50 U. S. C. § 654
(Supp. 1952).
'Although the Uniform Code became effective on May 31, 1951 pursuant to
PuB. L. No. 506, 81st Cong., § 5, c. 169 (May 5, 1950), the first decision by the
Court of Military Appeals was not rendered until November 8, 1951 in United
States v. McCrary, 1 CMR 1 (U. S. C. M. A. 1951). Accordingly, the actual
period of productivity to May 31, 1953 is slightly less than nineteen months. De-
cisions through October 1, 1953 are considered herein. For an excellent general
survey and analysis of the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals up to July
25, 1952, see Aycock, The Court of Military Appeals-The First Year, 31 N. C. L.
Rsv. 1 (1952). Mr. Aycock extends this scholarly analysis to the decisions ren-
dered by the Court of Military Appeals during its second year in an article appear-
ing in the January 1954 issue of the EmoRY UNInVRSITY JOURNAL OF Pt.Lic LAW.
Army, Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force Boards of Review are the interme-
diate appellate tribunals in the military justice system. They are provided for by
Art. 66 of the Uniform Code, 50 U. S. C. § 653 (Supp. 1952).
' For a brief treatment of the history of the jurisdiction of military tribunals,
see Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus, 49 MicH. L. REv. 493-505 (1951).
'Act of May 5, 1950, 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U. S. C. §§ 551-736 (Supp. 1952).
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. An Air Force Board of review has had occa-
sion to hold that the words "land and naval forces" in the Constitution refer not
only to the Army and Navy but equally to the Air Force. This was done in United
States v. Naar (ACM 4215), 2 CMR 739, 745 (1951) in rejecting the contention
of an Air Force lieutenant that since he was not in the land or naval forces he was
entitled under the Fifth Amendment to grand jury indictment before being brought
to trial. The same accused endeavored to raise the same issue by seeking an in-
junction to restrain the air force court-martial in a proceeding before a three judge
federal court. On May 22, 1951 the District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed this complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.
(Civil Action No. 2061-51).
The outstanding text is WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed.
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before the Uniform Code will not be surveyed. Pre-Code Board of
Review opinions9 dealing with jurisdiction are not extensively discussed.
No effort is made to consider all the facets presented in the Code's cluster
of some fifteen essentially jurisdictional Articles.10 The appellate juris-
diction vested in the Boards of Review by Article 66,11 and in the Court
of Military Appeals by Article 67,12 is not explored. The versatile
jurisdiction of military commissions to try law of war violations, 18 war
crimes,14 offenses under military government 1 and to sit as martial
law courts16 is beyond the ambit of this article. Also excluded, most
reluctantly, are the inviting international law problems concerning the
exercise of conflicting jurisdiction over members of visiting armed forces
stationed in or passing through friendly foreign countries."
At this juncture the reader may well cry out, "With what area of
jurisdiction are we here to cope?" The answer is, with the decisions of
jurisdictional matters by the Court of Military Appeals and the Boards
of Review' 8 under the Uniform Code and the salient United States
1920). See c. VIII, pp. 81-109 on jurisdiction. Also significant is DAVIS, A TREA-
TISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1915).' Representative of the best law review articles of that period is Underhill,
Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in the United States Over Civilians, 12 CALIF.
L. REv. 75, 159 (1924).
,In the thirty years before the Code, Army Board of Review opinions alone
ran into thousands of pages contained in some 141 volumes.
"o Arts. 2, 3, 5, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 56, which, respec-
tively, are 50 U. S. C. §§ 552, 553, 555, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 586, 587, 588, 589,
590, 591, and 637 (Supp. 1952).% 50 U. S. C. § 653 (Supp. 1952). For example, United States v. Bigger (No.
456), 7 CMR 97 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) holding Boards of Review have jurisdiction
to commute a death sentence when reducing the finding to unpremeditated murder.
The case of United States v. Washington (CM 362541, Docket 3451) where a
death sentence was similarly reduced without reduction of the finding has been cer-
tified to the Court and is now pending decision. See also United States v. Reeves
(No. 453), 3 CMR 122 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) and United States v. Weeden (No.
3338), 12 CMR 161 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) holding a Board of Review has power
to entertain a motion for reconsideration of a decision rendered by it.
1250 U. S. C. § 654 (Supp. 1952).
"Examined in the able opinion by Chief Justice Stone in Ev parte Quirin, 317
U. S. 1 (1942)." In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946).
1" Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U. S. 341 (1952).
"' Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866) ; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S.
304 (1945). Fairman, The Law of Martial Ride and the National Emergency, 55
HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1942).
"' This problem was first grappled with by Chief Justice John Marshall in
Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 7 Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812) in which he concluded
that members of the visiting force remained exclusively subject to the criminal and
civil jurisdiction of the sovereign by whom employed. It is case and treaty law
of this type which Congress had in mind in prefacing both paragraphs (11) and
(12) of Article 2, dealing with jurisdiction "without the continental limits of the
United States" with the language, "Subject to the provisions of any treaty or
agreement to which the United States is or may be a part or to any accepted rule
of internation law, . . " See United States v. Weiman (No. 1403), 11 CMR 216
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
" Board of Review opinions of the four services under the Uniform Code have
burgeoned in the first ten volumes of Court-Martial Reports into a total of more
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Supreme Court decisions in the field of military habeas corpus. That
is to say, the current case law from which the military bar19 must seek
its enlightenment and direction in matters of courts-martial jurisdiction.
It must be remembered that jurisdiction is the only aspect of a court-
martial proceeding which may be inquired into by the regular federal
courts, 20 this only by habeas corpus collateral attack and not by appeal,21
and then only after the petitioner has first exhausted all appellate and
new trial remedies within the military law system.22 The Supreme Court
has thus defined the test of jurisdiction to be applied to military courts:
"'The single inquiry, the test is jurisdiction' ... In this case
the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person of accused and the
offense charged, and acted within its lawful powers. The correc-
tion of any errors it may have committed is for the military au-
thorities which are alone authorized to review its decisions.
'23
Boards of Review and the Court of Military Appeals monitor courts-
martial jurisdiction in the exercise of their normal appellate functions.
In doing so they concern themselves with four questions: (1) Was the
court duly constituted? (2) Did it have jurisdiction of the person tried?
(3) Did it have jurisdiction of the offense charged? (4) Was the sen-
tence imposed within the prescribed maximum limit? It will be con-
venient to discuss the cases by classifying them under these headings.
II. WAS THE COURT DULY CONSTITUTED?
In civil life the court is taken much for granted. Rarely is the ap-
pointment or election of a judge contested and by a liberal construction
of de facto judicial powers it is even more rare to have purported judicial
acts declared void because the court was not duly constituted. The
judge is sworn in once for each term of office and enjoys a stabilized
status.
Courts-martial, unlike ordinary civil courts, do not possess any high
degree of permanence. They come into existence by express written
than 7100 pages and extend to hundreds of additional pages not yet published since
10 CMR includes decisions only through May 1953.
1" In addition to the officer lawyers of the four armed services who have become
members of the bar of the Court of Military Appeals, as early as November 1, 1952,
244 civilian attorneys had been admitted. Walker and Neibank, The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals-Its History, Organization and Operation, 6 VAND. L. REv. 228, 236
(1953). By June of 1953 this bar had grown to 1219 members, a third of whom
are civilian attorneys. Address, Judge Brosman, Army Judge Advocate General's
School, Charlottesville, Va., June 15, 1953.
2IJn re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 150 (1890).
2 Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 23 (1879).
2- Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137
(1953) ; McKinney v. Finletter, 205 F. 2d 761 (10th Cir. 1953).
" Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103, 111, rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 939 (1950),
cited with approval by Justice Minton in his separate concurring opinion in Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953), rehearing denied, 74 S. Ct. 3 (1953).
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direction of the convening authority24 who is normally a commanding
officer, and who so far as general courts-martial are concerned is usually
of general officer rank. In the Army and Air Force this is done by a spe-
cial order and in the Navy by an official letter addressed to the officer
who is to be President of the court. In either case the document spe-
cifically names and identifies by their service numbers the officers who
are to serve as members, trial counsel, defense counsel, assistant counsel,
and, for general courts, the law officer. For a summary court a single
summary court officer is appointed. Although a minimum of five mem-
bers is sufficient to constitute a general court and three to constitute a
special court,25 it is customary to name nine or more members in an
order appointing a general court and five or more for a special court
since members may be excused from attendance by the covening author-
ity to perform other military duties, and are subject to peremptory
challenge and challenge for cause.26 This principle of flexibility was car-
ried to extreme in a general court case in which the order appointed fifty-
one members, only seven of whom attended the trial.2 7 The Army Board
of Review, after condemning the administrative wisdom of appointing
so large a court, rejected a defense contention that this was a jurisdic-
tional defect pointing out that the minimum jurisdictional requirement
was the presence of five members. The Court of Military Appeals has
said that where the membership of a general court is reduced to less than
five: "This would constitute a palpable jurisdictional defect."
'28
The exigencies of combat,29 administrative transfer of units, and
orders transferring individual officers and enlisted men to new stations
all combine to make it unusual, even in peacetime, for any one court-
martial to be able to try cases for a period of as long as three months.
Members can be relieved and others added by amending orders, but to
curtail the number of orders pertaining to any one case it is administra-
tively desirable to appoint an entirely new court at frequent intervals.
Large "jurisdictions," that is commands with authority to convene
courts, often have several different general and special courts operating
"Arts. 22, 23, and 24, respectively, specify who may convene a general, special
and summary court-martial. 50 U. S. C. §§ 586, 587 and 588 (Supp. 1952).
- 2Art. 16, 50 U. S. C. § 576 (Supp. 1952).
- 8Art. 41, 50 U. S. C. §616 (Supp. 1952).
27 Holt (CM 357002), 8 CMR 360 (1953). See, however, United States v.
Moses (CM 363294) 10 CMR - (1953) where it was affirmatively shown that
the trial counsel failed to notify eleven members of a thirty-one officer court and
this was held to be prejudicial error.
" United States v. Padilla and Jacobs (No. 400), 5 CMR 31, 34 (U. S. C. M. A.
1952). See also United States v. Tobita (No. 710), 12 CMR - (U. S. C. M. A.
1953).
2 The discontinuance of a trial in its midst necessitated by enemy action in
Europe during the Battle of the Bulge and the later trial of the case by another
general court convened by another command was held not to constitute double
jeopardy in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 921 (1949).
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at the same time. Normally a given case is referred by written indorse-
ment for trial to a specified court identified by the number and date of
the special order appointing it. Unarraigned cases may be re-referred
to another court, this usually being done in the order appointing the new
court.
The foregoing practical considerations involved in convening a court-
martial, while routine to the military lawyer, are perhaps not so well
known to the bar at large. Possibly this fluid medium in which courts-
martial must operate is what repeatedly motivates Congress to require
members of general and special courts-martial, as well as counsel, the
law officer and the reporter, in each case, to take an oath "in the presence
of the accused to perform their duties faithfully. ' 30 The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has said:
"General courts-martial, being tribunals of special and limited
jurisdiction, must be convened strictly in accordance with statu-
tory requirements. . . . Members of a court-martial must have
been lawfully appointed thereto in order that they may enjoy
status as members."
31
This factual and legal background lends great importance in courts-
martial cases to the inquiry, "Was the court duly constituted ?"
A. Who Are Proper Court Members?
Students of jurisdiction are primarily indebted to the Navy for the
volume of current decisions dealing with the validity of courts-martial
organization. Since the Articles for the Government of the Navy re-
mained almost completely unchanged from 1862 until replaced by the
Uniform Code in 195132 it is not surprising that the vessel of naval
justice has pitched a bit in the heavy seas of transition. Definitely a
transition case was that of Seaman Apprentice Merritt 3 who was
charged with the offense of absence after leave committed before the
effective -date of the Uniform Code. On June 6, 1951, he was arraigned,
pleaded guilty and was sentenced before a navy summary court convened
under the old Articles for the Government of the Navy, but not consti-
soArt. 42(a), 50 U. S. C. § 617 (Supp. 1952). This elaborate swearing of the
various components of the court in each case is a time-consuming ingredient in the
administration of military justice.
" United States v. Padilla and Jacobs (No. 400), 5 CMR 31, 34 (U. S. C. M. A.
1952).
"2 Walker and Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals-Its History, Organiza-
tion and Operation, 6 VAND. L. REv. 228, 230 (1953). It was in the Navy case of
United States v. Pulliam (No. 2580), 11 CMR 95, 98 (U. S. M. C. A. 1953) that
the question certified was: "Did the special court-martial lose jurisdiction . . . be-
cause a junior member acted as president?" The court held: "... . the special court-
martial did not, as a matter of law, lose jurisdiction . . . because a junior member
acted as president. . . . there was no substantial prejudice to the rights of the
accused."
" United States v. Merritt (No. 53), 1 CMR 56 (U. S. C. M. A. 1951).
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tuted as required for a special court-martial, its successor equivalent,
under the Uniform Code. The Court of Military Appeals held that the
navy summary court lacked jurisdiction.
3 4
In the case of Ship's Serviceman Stephenson the special court which
tried the accused simply was not sworn. The Navy Board of Review
properly held:
"The entire membership of the new court and the personnel of
the prosecution and the defense not having been duly sworn, the
newly appointed court was without jurisdiction to try this case,
and such lack of jurisdiction was absolutely fatal to its proceed-
ings. (Dynes v. Hoover, 61 US 65, 83, 15 L Ed 278 .... )-"5
The other services have also contributed cases illustrative of juris-
dictional error in court membership. Corporal Heineman requested and
received the services of Lieutenant Gillespie as his individual counsel at
his Article 32 s35 pre-trial investigation. Thereafter Lieutenant Gillespie
was appointed and actually sat as a member of the court and was not
challenged by the accused. An Army Board of Review held Gillespie
was clearly incompetent to sit as a member of the court, that the proceed-
ings were therefore null and void, and that failure of the accused to
challenge the member could not operate as a waiver of the jurisdictional
defect.36 Similarly, it has been held that tainted court membership is
jurisdictional and cannot be waived where a member testified as a prose-
cution witness,3 7 or was the officer who signed the original of a morning
report placed in evidence, 38 or attested a record of previous convictions
8 At page 63 of United States v. Merritt, supra note 33, the Court said:
"The next question posed is whether or not the error was jurisdictional,
and we answer this in the affirmative .... The phases properly processed by
the court ended with the serving of the charges on the accused, as the trial
phase was clearly severable from the pre-trial proceedings .... The only act
which could have retained jurisdiction of the court to hear the trial phase
would have been an arraignment... A court qualified to act under the new
code should have been constituted by the convening authority.
" United States v. Stephenson (NCM 58), 2 CMR 571, 572 (1951). The mem-
bers of the special court assembled to hear the case were sworn and the accused
exercised a peremptory challenge which reduced the membership to two. The con-
vening authority instead of adding new members to the old court by amendment
elected to appoint a wholly new court composed of the same personnel as the old
court, including counsel, except for a member appointed to replace the one who had
been challenged. Only this replacement member was sworn when the newly ap-
pointed court proceeded to try the case. See also United States v. Anderson (CM
334145), 1 BR/JC 123 (1949).
...50 U. S. C. §603(a) (Supp. 1952).
" United States v. Heineman (CM 350672), 2 CMR 517 (1952). The court
relied on Article 25(d) (1) of the Code which provides: "No person shall be eli-
gible to sit as a member of a general or special court-martial when he is the accuser
or a witness for the prosecution or has acted as investigating officer or as counsel
in the same case."
"7 United States v. Grant (CM 259563), 38 BR 369 (1944).
"United States v. Beeks (ACM S-5398), 9 CMR 743 (1953).
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used in a case where the accused pleaded guilty. 39 However a member
of the Judge Advocate General's Corps may properly serve as an ordi-
nary member of a court-martial if he has not otherwise participated in
the case. 39 a
Airman Trent was convicted by a court, a member of which had
previously been appointed as assistant defense counsel of another court
to which Trent's case was originally referred for trial. Trent did not
challenge and the record did not disclose whether this member ever in
fact served as his counsel. The Air Force Board of Review applied a
Manual provision that under these circumstances a court member must
"Unless the contrary appears of record, . . . be 'deemed to have acted
as a member of ... the defense, '40 and reversed.41 The Board did not
call this situation jurisdictional error but elected instead to find in it a
probability of specific material prejudice to the substantial rights of the
accused. It said:
"It is difficult to envision any case where the membership...
during the trial includes an officer who was the accuser or a wit-
ness for the prosecution or has acted as investigating officer or as
counsel in the same case in which a 'probability of specific preju-
dice against the accused' . . . will not be found."
'42
The Board here placed reliance on the decision of the Court of Military
Appeals in the Bound case. 43 There a security watch officer on the
night of the offense made an investigation and later sat as a member
of the special court that tried the accused. An Article 3243" pre-trial inves-
tigation was never made, this not being a prerequisite to a special court-
martial trial. The Court pointed out that the Code does not define the term
"investigating officer" as used in Article 25 (d) (2), but that Paragraph
64, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, 'defines it as "a
person who . . . as an investigating officer or otherwise, has conducted
a personal investigation of a general matter involving the particular
offense," and then found "a probability of specific prejudice against the
accused. 44 The Court did not treat the situation as jurisdictional but
did hold that the prejudice was not waived by failure to challenge even
though the accused had pleaded guilty.
"' United States v. Morris (ACM S-5374), 9 CMR 786 (1953).
"'United States v. Glaze (No. 2078), 11 CMR 168 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
There is no requirement that the membership of a court-martial include personnel
of the same race as the accused, nor was it improper that the court was composed
of senior officers or "southerners." United States v. Bryson (CM 360557), 12
CMR. (1953).
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 6a, p. 10.
41United States v. Trent (ACM 5165), 5 CMR 574 (1952).
Id. at 576.
2United States v. Bound (No. 201), 2 CMR 130 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
11450 U. S. C. § 603(a) (Supp. 1952).
" United States v. Bound (No. 201), 2 CMR 130, 136 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
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These two different approaches to improper court membership may
be reconciled by saying that where the court composition clearly vio-
lates a Code provision, as in the Heineman, Grant, Beeks, and Morris
cases the defect is jurisdictional, but where the Manual elaboration must
be resorted to to work out a defect in composition, as in Trent and
Bound, then decision will rest on the "probability of specific prejudice."
Actually, reconciliation is perhaps not so simple. Probably the situation
reflects a lack of crystallization of thought as to precisely what is juris-
dictional, as distinguished from what constitutes "a probability of spe-
cific prejudice" or "general prejudice.
'45
B. Inter-Service Eligibility
A service self-imposed46 problem of court member eligibility is
whether a member of one of the services other than that of the accused
may sit. A unification-conscious Congress provided:
".... Any officer on active duty with the armed forces shall be
eligible to serve on all courts-martial for the trial of any person
who may lawfully be brought before such courts for trial."
47
The several armed forces, pursuing their monadic ways, prevailed in the
Manual8 in prescribing a policy drastically curtailing this eligibility.
Illustrative is the case of Army Private Caternolo who was tried by a
special court-martial whose president was an Air Force Lieutenant as-
signed for duty with the 1st Infantry Division. The Board of Review
reversed on another point, but said:
"While it is clear that the appointment of an Air Force officer
as a member of an Army court-martial is permitted by Article
25a, su pra, and is therefore not fatal to the court's jurisdiction, it
is equally clear that such action is contrary to the general policy
set forth in paragraph 4g(1), supra. Unless the convening au-
thority commands a joint command or exercises reciprocal juris-
diction (MCM, 1951, par 4g(2)), members of the Air Force
should not be appointed to an Army court-martial." 49
"United States v. Woods and Duffer (No. 1023), 8 CMR 3 (U. S. C. M. A.
1953) illustrates the deep division of the court as to whether there is any such thing
as "general prejudice." Chief Judge Quinn, writing the majority opinion, disposed
of the case in less than a page. Judge Brosman in a separate concurring opinion,
and Judge Latimer in a dissenting opinion, each eleven pages long, then proceeded
warmly, not to say heatedly, to discuss the merits and demerits, respectively, of the
doctrine of "general prejudice."
" See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee ons Armed Services on
H. R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 735, 754 and 1189 (1949) ; H. R. REP. No. 491,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1949) to accompany H. R. 4085; and SEN. REP. No. 486,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949) to accompany H. R. 4080.
't Art. 25(a), 50 U. S. C. §589 (Supp. 1952).
"8 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 4g (1), states in part:
"g.-Members of courts-martial should be members of the same armed force as the
accused."
"0 United States v. Caternolo (Sp CM 4057), 2 CMR 385, 386 (1952).
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The Board was undoubtedly correct in its conclusion that disregard of
the Manual restriction, superimposed on the clear Congressional grant,
was only procedural error and not a jurisdictional defect.
C. Enlisted Members
Article 25 (c) 50 permits the accused personally to request in writing
that enlisted personnel serve on the court, in which case they shall com-
promise not less than one-third of the total membership and may not
be members of the same unit as the accused. This particular aspect
of court membership has not yet engaged the attention of the Court of
Military Appeals. It has been ruled administratively that an accused,
if fully advised, may in writing insert into the formal proceedings at the
time of trial a withdrawal of a prior written request for enlisted mem-
bers. Short of thus eliminating enlisted members entirely an accused
may not waive the prescribed ratio of at least one-third of the member-
ship being enlisted where his original request stands.51 An Army Board
of Review has held that a soldier who is only "attached," as distinguished
from being regularly assigned, to the accused's unit may properly sit.52
An Air Force Board has held that a court was not legally constituted
where one of its members was an airman assigned to the same squadron
as the accused and that this -disqualification could not be waived.
5 3
D. Appointment of Court
A technical question which arises is whether a member is duly desig-
nated in the writing appointing the court. The Navy practice of con-
vening courts by official letter addressed to the officer who is to serve
as president has at least four times reached the Court of Military Ap-
peals for decision.54 These letters, in addition to the name of the ad-
dressee, contained a direction that the court be convened and an assign-
ment of four designated officers, other than the addressee, to serve as
members and designations of trial and defense counsel, but no reference
to the president except as addressee in the official form. The Court of
Military Appeals in upholding jurisdiction of courts so appointed said:
".. -courts-martial are tribunals of special and limited juris-
50 U. S. C. § 589 (Supp. 1952).
Ltr. JAG-J 1952 6970 (11 September 1952), cited in JAG CHRON. No. 40,
p. 179 (3 October 1952).
"United States v. Quimbo (CM 335865), 2 BR/JC 297 (1949).
":United States v. Chilcoat (ACM S-1285), 4 CMR (AF) 486 (1951). This
case involved Article of War 16 of the Act of June 24, 1948 [62 STAT. 630 (1948)]
which contained a requirement substantially the same as Art. 25(c), 50 U. S. C.
§ 589 (Supp. 1952).
"United States v. Beard (No. 1778), 8 CMR 144 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953);
United States v. Lawrence (No. 1732), 8 CMR 148 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) ; United
States v. Swain (No. 1779), 8 CMR 147 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953), all decided March
24, 1953. United States v. Lee (No. 2119) 11 CMI 109 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
These cases involve the construction of § 0102 e, Navy Supplement to MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951.
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diction, and must, therefore, be convened strictly in accordance
with statutory requirements. At the same time this admonition
should not be carried to the absurd length that matters of sheer
form take precedence over those of substance.
"It should not be-and is not-an unyielding condition prece-
dent to the lawful convention of a court-martial that the appro-
priate form be followed parrot-like in minute detail."5'
Where court members are added by amendment there is always the
possibility of administrative error.56 The Court of Military Appeals has'
held that technical error in this regard is not jurisdictional.57
A basic defect in the organization of a court, which destroys its
jurisdiction, occurs if a person not in fact detailed thereto participates
in its deliberations.
58
E. Law Officer Eligibility
Not only must the status of court members be scrutinized with care
but other components of the tribunal as well. The law officer must be
a member of the bar and also certified to be qualified for law officer duty
by The Judge Advocate General of the service of which he is a mem-
ber. 9 It has been held, however, that mere clerical error in describing
the law officer in the order appointing the court is not jurisdictional if
he is in fact a lawyer and certified.60 Failure of the record to show
" United States v. Beard (No. 1778), 8 CMR 144, 145 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
"Typical is United States v. Padilla (No. 400), 5 CMR 31 (U. S. C. M. A.
1952). The original court to which the case was referred for trial was appointed
by Special Orders No. 116, Headquarters 1st Infantry Division. Thereafter, Spe-
cial Order No. 124 appointed a new court and provided that all unarraigned cases
in the hands of the trial counsel of the court appointed by Special Orders No. 116
"be brought to trial before the court hereby appointed." Thereafter two new
members were appointed by Special Order No. 128 "to the General Court-Martial
convened by Special Order Number 116 . .. as amended by . . . Special Orders
Number 124. . . ." The two members so named actually sat. The convening
authority reversed and remanded, holding the court was without jurisdiction be-
cause these two officers were not in fact named as members of the court appointed
by Special Orders No. 124, and ordered another hearing as to both the accused
Padilla who had been convicted and his co-accused Jacobs who was found not
guilty. On appeal from the second hearing the Court of Military Appeals held the
first court was properly constituted and had jurisdiction, that jeopardy attached to
the acquitted accused Jacobs, and that as to Padilla the sentence imposed at the
second hearing could not exceed the first.
" At page 35 of United States v. Padilla, sitpra note 56, the court said:
"... This language, however, inartificial, indicates with clarity that the
user regarded the second court as a replacement for the first.... the language
is strongly persuasive of the existence of an intention to appoint the two cap-
tains to the court-martial created by Special Orders No. 124."
1 DIG. Op. JAG § 1351 (1912-30). Similarly, participation by an officer as
assistant trial counsel who was not on orders as a member of the prosecution, and
was not sworn, has been held by an Army Board of Review to constitute jurisdic-
tional error. United States v. Taylor (CM 338217), 4 BR/JC 235 (1949).
" Art. 26(a), 50 U. S. C. § 590 (Supp. 1952).
"°United States v. Hathaway (ACM 4183), 1 CMR 776, 778 (1951). It has
been held that technical error in an order appointing a new trial counsel and adding,
at the request of the accused, enlisted members to a general court already in exist-
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affirmatively that the law officer was sworn necessitates 'disapproval of a
conviction.
61
Where the same officer, as Acting Staff Judge Advocate, first wrote
a "detailed and painstaking" pretrial advice62 and then later served as
law officer at the trial of the case, an Army Board of Review ordered a
rehearing finding this to be error materially prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused. 63  Acting in this dual capacity is not prohibited
by Article 26(a), 64 which specifies who may be law officers, and prob-
ably is not jurisdictional. However, the decision that it constitutes
prejudicial error appears to be proper.
F. Counsel Eligibility
The Code provides that trial and defense counsel of general courts
must be bar members and certified as qualified to serve as counsel by
ence by mistakenly referring to the original court as a special court is not jurisdic-
tional. United States v. Barber (ACM 5097), 5 CMR 726 (1952).
1 United States v. Pino (ACM 5274), 6 CMR 542 (1952). Here the record
of trial stated: "the members of the court and the personnel of the prosecution and
the defense were sworn," but not that the law officer -was sworn. An Air Force
Board found "the expression 'members of the court' does not include the law offi-
cer," and although it expressly held that failure to swear the law officer did not
deprive the court-martial of jurisdiction ruled it was a "substantial error of pro-
cedure" requiring disapproval and rehearing. Since the Board did not examine
the record for specific prejudice to the accused presumably it relied on either general
prejudice or lack of "military due process." This Board appears to reflect the
rather wary attitude the Court of Military Appeals has adopted toward at least
some problems of jurisdiction. It is submitted on principle that failure to swear
the law officer as required by Article 42 of the Code [50 U. S. C. § 617 (Supp.
1952)] constitutes fatal jurisdictional error. If here the law officer was in fact
sworn, a certificate of correction could properly have been appended to the record
and jurisdiction thus established. Cf. Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11 (1921) and
McRae v. Henkes, 273 Fed. 108 (8th Cir. 1921).
A statement in the record that "The court was then sworn" is not sufficient to
show that the law officer, members, trial counsel and defense counsel were sworn.
If they in fact were, a certificate of correction will be required. JAGU (CM
361274), March 23, 1953, cited in 2 JAG CHRoX., No. 17, p. 74 (24 April 1953).
6 2 Art. 34(a), 50 U. S. C. § 605 (Supp. 1952) in part requires: "Before directing
the trial of any charge by general court-martial, the convening authority shall refer
it to his staff judge advocate or legal officer for consideration and advice."
"8United States v. Thorpe (CM 360188), 9 CMR .... (1953). Accord, United
States v. Hentz (CM 347839), 1 CMR 422 (1951) ; cf. United States v. Nelson
(CM 347000), 1 CMR 169 (1951) and United States v. Montez (CM 346677), 1
CMR 178 (1951); contra, United States v. St. Ours (CM 355349), 6 CMR 178
(1952). The problem has been treated as one of prejudicial error rather than juris-
diction.
"Art. 26(a), 50 U. S. C. § 590 (Supp. 1952) in pertinent part provides: "No
person shall be eligible to act as law officer in a case when he is the accuser or a
witness for the prosecution or has acted as investigating officer or as counsel in the
same case." Thus it has been declared prejudicial error for the trial counsel of a
general court to which a case of one of two joint offenders was referred to serve
later as law officer at the trial of the other joint offender. This is so even though
the law officer was relieved within four days in the first case and there was no
showing that he participated therein as trial counsel. In accord are United States
v. Tolbert (ACM 6751), - CMR - (1953) where the law officer had been
appointed defense counsel but did not participate in the previous trial of an accom-
plice, and United States v. Gemelli (ACM 6695), - CMR - (1953) where the
law officer had formerly been trial counsel of the same court-martial which tried
accused but was relieved as trial counsel and appointed law officer one day after
accused's case was referred.
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The Judge Advocate General of the service of which they are members. 5
Not only may counsel not change sides in a given case, but "no person
who has acted as investigating officer, law officer, or court member in
any case shall act subsequently as trial counsel, assistant trial counsel,
or, unless expressly requested by the accused, as defense counsel or
assistant defense counsel in the same case." '  The Court of Military
Appeals has held that an accuser, who made a preliminary investigation
in that capacity, was not an investigating officer within the meaning of
either Article 32 or Article 27(a) and that he was not disqualified from
thereafter serving as trial counsel in the case.
67
The Court has stated that it is only a custom of the service, and not
an express requirement of the Code, that military counsel be officers.
"(T)here is implicit in the Code the requirement of the Manual that
appointed counsel of inferior courts-martial be an officer."' 8 The Court
held it was not jurisdictional error, nor prejudicial to the accused, to
have appointed a non-lawyer noncommissioned pay clerk as trial counsel
of a special court-martial and observed, "it is not every provision of the
Code that reaches the level of a jurisdictional requirement."00  Though
this opinion appears to create a problem in order to solve it, the rule
seems to emerge that the appointment of military personnel other than
an officer as trial counsel of a special court is not in itself a jurisdictional
defect. The special court before which Navy Airman Hutchison7"
pleaded guilty had officers appointed to it as trial and assistant trial
counsel and defense counsel, and a noncommissioned warrant gunner as
assistant defense counsel. None were lawyers. The Court of Military
Appeals upheld jurisdiction, opining:
"Congress has not ... conferred upon an accused an explicit
and absolute right to have any assistant defense counsel appointed,
nor to have such counsel, if appointed, be an officer....
"There is here no violation of a mandatory requirement of the
Code, and therefore no jurisdictional defect.., nor.., any rea-
sonable possibility of prejudice under these circumstances."
71
"Article 27(b), 50 U. S. C. § 591 (Supp. 1952). Individual defense counsel,
whether military or civilian, does not have to be certified as qualified, nor need he
be appointed or otherwise designated in the order appointing the court. A ruling
by a law officer that such appointment was necessary which caused an accused to
withdraw his request for an officer, who was present, to be his individual defense
counsel was held by an Air Force Board to render the proceeding void. United
States v. Hanson (ACM 6062), 8 CMR 671 (1953).
"27(a), 50 U. S. C. § 591 (Supp. 1952). See United States v. Kelsey (ACM
5228), 6 CMR 522 (1952) and United States v. Borner (No. 1284), 12 CMR 69
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
; United States v. Lee (No. 200), 2 CMR 118 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
" United States v. Goodson (No. 424), 3 CMR 32 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
Id. at 34.
• United States v. Hutchison (No. 425), 3 CMR 25 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
Id. at 26, 27.. Compare with United States v. Ness (Sp CM 1770), 6 BR/JC
345 (1950) where an Army Board of Review held it was jurisdictional error to
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A general court case tried in May 1951 under the 1948 Articles of
War which raised the question of whether there must be equality of
experience between trial and defense counsel is of continued interest
because of its current applicability to special court cases.7 2  The trial
counsel who tried Private Bartholomew"3 was a college and law school
graduate with extensive legal experience in the Army, but not a lawyer
nor a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps. The defense
counsel was a high school graduate with no professional education and
relatively little Army legal experience. On appeal it was not contended
that this disparity was jurisdictional but that it was prejudicial to the
accused. Though charged with murder the accused was found guilty
of voluntary manslaughter only. The Court affirmed the conviction
saying:
". the disparity in legal qualifications of counsel disclosed in
the case now before us is inconsistent with the spirit although not
the letter, of the Articles of War....
".... we find here at least a literal and technical compliance
with the command of Congress....
". we find nothing whatever which would indicate that the
accused was not accorded full, fair and competent representation
by his counsel. This being the case, we cannot at all say that he
was materially prejudiced in any substantial right ....
"... the problem is in no sense an academic one... because of
the possibility of its recurrence under the Uniform Code . . .in
cases tried by special court-martial."7 4
This Bartholomew decision should not be pushed very far for even
though 'disparity of training of counsel is not jurisdictional, it is most
probable the Court in most cases would find wide disparity constituted
material prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused requiring
reversal.
An Air Force Board of Review has held a special court-martial
improperly constituted and its proceedings void where at the time of its
appointment both trial and defense counsel were lawyers but neither was
appoint a warrant officer as defense counsel of a special court-martial and permit
him to serve.
Art. 27(c), 50 U. S. C. § 591 (Supp. 1952), provides:
"Sec. 591. Appointment of trial counsel and defense counsel (Article 27)
"(c) In the case of a special court-martial-
(1) If the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-
martial, the defense counsel appointed by the convening authority shall be a
person similarly qualified; and
(2) If the trial counsel is a judge advocate, or a law specialist or a member
of the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, the defense coun-
sel appointed by the convening authority shall be one of the foregoing. .. ."
" United States v. Bartholomew (No. 166), 3 CMR 41 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).71 Id. at 44, 45, 46.
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certified and before trial the trial counsel only was certified by The Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force as qualified to act as counsel.",
Failure to swear an assistant defense counsel who participated in the
trial has been held to constitute jurisdictional error. An Air Force
Board of Review in reversing the conviction of Airman Nyman said:
"... the record shows the Captain Mayo, an assistant defense
counsel, entered the court room and seated himself at the defense
table after the members of the court, personnel of the prosecution,
and the other assistant defense counsel, Captain Wuhrman, had
been sworn (R. 3-4). The record does not show that Captain
Mayo was ever sworn, nor does it appear that he withdrew prior
to the conclusion of the case. Captain Wuhrman signed the
record as having examined it on behalf of the accused. The order
appointing the court listed Captain Mayo as first and Captain
Wuhrman as second assistant defense counsel.
"... we feel that by whatever name it be known, the error of
participation by unsworn defense counsel in a trial conducted after
31 May 1951 is one that is fundamentally prejudicial to the sub-
"' United States v. Kiug (ACM S-5219), 8 CMR 664 (1953). Where the duly
appointed defense counsel of a general court was relieved from that assignment and
his duties, with the consent of the accused, were taken over by the assistant de-
fense counsel who was also qualified and certified, but no amendatory order was
issued redesignating him as defense counsel, Boards of Review have disagreed as
to the effect. An Army Board held the absence of a duly appointed defense coun-
sel at the time of trial constituted error in violation of Article 27 but that this
error was neither jurisdictional nor prejudicial and affirmed the conviction. United
States v. McCarthy (CM 357972), 8 CMR 329 (1953). Under similar circum-
stances an Air Force Board held that a court-martial which technically had no
appointed defense counsel, as distinguished from assistant defense counsel, at the
time of trial was without jurisdiction and declared its findings and sentence void
even though the accused was also represented -by counsel of his own choice. United
States v. Butler (ACM 6164), 8 CMR 692 (1953). This same result was reached
by an earlier Army Board of Review in United States v. Watson (CM 337855), 4
BR/JC 157 (1949). These latter opinions appear to exalt form unduly and to
disregard substance. The Court of Military Appeals has not yet passed on this
question.
It has been held to be jurisdictional error for an officer not appointed as an
assistant trial counsel to sit at trial counsel table and assist the trial counsel. United
States v. Taylor (CM 338217), 4 BR/JC 235 (1949). To permit the investigating
officer to serve as assistant trial counsel is a jurisdictional defect which the accused
cannot waive. United States v. Mullen (Sp CM 2576), 7 BR/JC 359 (1950).
An investigating officer may not serve as either defense counsel nor assistant
defense counsel if the accused merely states that he has no objection, and such par-
ticipation constitutes reversable error. United States v. Nelson (CM 335048) 2
BR/JC 7 (1949) and United States v. Henry (CM 319176), 68 BR 181 (1947).
However, where from the record it affirmatively appeared that the accused ex-
pressly desired the investigating officer to serve as defense counsel and the accuser
to serve as individual defense counsel, permitting them so to serve was held to be
proper. United States v. Fleming (CM 320233), 69 BR 271 (1947). It is a ques-
tion of fact which should be fully developed in each case since Article 27(a) in
pertinent part provides: "No person who has acted as investigating officer, ... in
any case shall act subsequently... unless expressly requested by the accused, as de-
fense counsel or assistant defense counsel in the same case."
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stantial rights of the accused. Otherwise stated, whether the
error be termed a violation of military due process, a matter of
general prejudice, or failure to meet a jurisdictional requirement,
as those terms have been used by the Court of Military Appeals,
we conclude, under the universality of holdings on the participa-
tion of unsworn counsel, that such participation constitutes error
which is fatal to the legal efficacy of the findings and sentence ar-
rived at in these proceedings.
"... We are not prepared, particularly in view of the complete
unanimity of opinion hereinbefore referred to, to hold that this
accused has by his plea of guilty to Charge II and its specification
eliminated the necessity for compliance with this or any of the
other provisions of Article 42. Past interpretations as to the ad-
ministration of oaths appear to us to have been predicated upon
the fact that these requirements were jurisdictional in nature and
we see nothing in Article 42 as enacted which suggests a change
in the fundamental nature of the requirements." 76
Here the Board, though beset with legitimate doubts as to just which of
at least three different approaches the Court of Military Appeals might
take in reversing the case, at last manfully closed with the problem and
held it to be "jurisdictional in nature." The Board is to be congratulated
for so 'doing. Failure to swear individual civilian defense counsel has
been held not jurisdictional and not to constitute prejudicial error.
76a
G. Reference of Case to Court
Another court composition problem is whether a given case is
properly before the court which in fact tries it. As already indicated,
when a convening authority has determined a case should be tried the
charges are forwarded by indorsement to the trial counsel of a specific
existing court identified by the number and date of the special order
appointing it and the case is usually tried by that court. It not infre-
quently is necessary to transfer unarraigned cases from the court to
which they were originally referred to another court. This is usually
done either by general language in the order appointing the new court
to the effect that all unarraigned cases pending before the old court,
specifying it by order number and date, are referred to the new court,
or by transfer of individual cases from one court to another by an addi-
tional numbered indorsement to the charges so directing. The Code
itself does not prescribe any procedure for referral but the Manual sets
forth procedure for customary usage.77  In the case of Commissary
" United States v. Nyman (ACM S-3051), 5 CMR 598, 599, 601 (1952).
"rUnited States v. Danilson (ACM 6499), - CVfR - 1953).
"' See 33(j), MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951.
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Seaman Emerson7 which had been referred to one special court, but
was actually tried without re-reference by another special court convened
by the same convening authority, the Navy Board of Review held the
latter was without jurisdiction. The Court of Military Appeals reversed
the Board of Review, holding:
"A failure to follow the procedure set out in the Manual for
customary usage does not... constitute a 'defect of sufficient im-
port to deprive the court of jurisdiction.
'79
In doing so it followed the earlier Army Board of Review rule on the
point.80 The same result has been reached under the Code by Army
Boards of Review in two cases, each referred by the Commanding Gen-
eral of the 25th Division to a general court other than the one which tried
it, but which latter court he had also appointed. The decisions were
based on the ground that the action of the convening authority "approving
the sentence amounts to a ratification of the actual reference of the case
to the legally constituted court which tried it.' '81 This doctrine is safely
applicable only where the trial is by a court convened by the same com-
manding officer who referred the case for trial, or by his official stlccessor
in that command.
H. Personnel from Other Commands
Officers from other commands may properly be made available to a
convening authority for the purpose of sitting as members of a court-
martial. This was done in the trial of then Air Force Colonel Jack
Durant in the Hesse crown jewels theft case in order to convene a court
each member of which was senior to the accused. On habeas corpus
attack the federal courts held this court was properly constituted and
was proof against jurisdictional attack.
8 2
I. Convening Authority Competency
Still pursuing the question "Was the court duly constituted ?", we
turn now from the competency of the court or its component elements to
that of the convening authority which ordered the court into existence.
Even where the officer appointing the court is one authorized to do so
by Article 22 or 23 of the Code 3 there may be circumstances which so
"8United States v. Emerson (No. 77), 1 CMR 43 (U. S. C. M. A. 1951).
"' Id. at 45.
" United States v. Casey (CM 198108), 3 BR 159, 163 (1932) ; United States
v. Brandon (CM 232790), 19 BR 193, 207, 208 (1943) ; Cf. United States v. Ander-
son (CM 334145), 1 BR/JC 123 (1949). Also in accord see Hartley v. Malanophy,
81 F. Supp. 316 (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
8 United States v. Clements (CM 346741), 1 CMR 164, 167 (1951), and United
States v. Hofus (CM 348185), 4 CMR 356, 362 (1952).
8" Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N. D. Ga. 1948), aff'd, 177 F. 2d 373 (5th
Cir. 1949).
8"Arts. 22(a) and 23(a), 50 U.S.C. §§ 586, 587 (Supp. 1952) specify in con-
siderable detail who may convene general and special courts-martial respectively.
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contaminate him as to render jurisdictionally void, as to a specific ac-
cused, any court convened by him. The Code provides that when the
normal convening authority "is an accuser, the court shall be convened
by superior competent authority,"8 4 and defines an accuser as: "a person
who signs and swears to charges .... who directs that charges nominally
be signed and sworn to by another, . . . (or) who has an interest other
than an official interest in the prosecution of the accused.18 5  Private
Moseley8 6 broke into the home of the Commanding General of Camp
Campbell, Kentucky, larcenously took therefrom valuable property of
the general's son, pawned it, and then went absent without leave. The
General summoned Criminal Investigation Detachment agents, showed
them incriminating evidence found in his garage, and thereafter con-
vened the court which tried and convicted the accused. The charges
were actually signed by a junior officer. The Army Board held the
proceedings void and said:
"... the conclusion is inescapable that Major General Lem-
nitzer could not but have had an interest other than an official
interest in the prosecution. He was 'in fact' the accuser and
thereby precluded by UCMJ, Article 22, from appointing a court-
martial which could exercise jurisdiction over this accused.
' m
Confronted with a similar problem the Court of Military Appeals,
without reference to the previously decided Moseley case, reached the
same result by traveling a somewhat different road. Airman Gordon
8 8
at Bolling Field burglarized the house of Lieutenant General Edwards
and four days later attempted to burglarize the quarters of Brigadier
General Lee, the base commander. General and Mrs. Lee were inter-
viewed as part of the investigation. Who actually swore to the charges
does not appear. Ultimately the charge involving General Lee's quar-
ters was dismissed and the accused tried for the offense at General
Edwards' quarters by a court convened after the event by General Lee
as base commander. Conviction and sentence to a dishonorable discharge
and five years confinement was reviewed by General Lee as convening
authority and the period of confinement was by him reduced to two
years. The offense occurred in March of 1951 so that the applicable
law was Article of War 889 which contained language similar to that in
Articles 22 (b) and 23 (b) of the Code ° prohibiting an accuser from con-
vening the court. The Court of Military Appeals held that: "General...
84 Arts. 22(b) and 23(b), 50 U. S. C. §§ 586, 587 (Supp. 1952).
"5Art. 1(11), 50 U. S. C. §551 (Supp. 1952)."0 United States v. Moseley (CM 348127), 2 CMR 263 (1951).
87 Id. at 265, 266.
88 United States v. Gordon (No. 258), 2 CMR 161 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
8841 STAT. 788 (1920).
90 50 U. S. C. §§ 586, 587 (Supp. 1952).
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Lee was disqualified to act as convening and reviewing authority in this
case,"' and said:
".... reasonable persons would impute to General Lee at the
time he appointed the court a personal feeling or interest in the
matter....
"While General Lee reduced the sentence, who can say what,
if any, additional remission might have been made by one who had
no interest in the matter.
"... we find substantial rights of the accused were materially
prejudiced .... -92
judge Brosman, in a separate concurring opinion, wrote:
"I do not understand Judge Latimer to evaluate the error...
as jurisdictional ... I do understand him to have concluded that
the substantial rights of the accused were materially prejudiced.
... I prefer to bottom my concurrence on the concept of general
prejudice. . .. "93
The writer pauses to express preference for the forthright treatment
given to this problem by the Army Board of Review in the Moseley case
where it flatly held the defect to be jurisdictional. In view of the Court's
lively concern for congressional intent it is difficult to understand how,
having found that "General... Lee was disqualified to act as convening
and reviewing authority in this case," it was able to stop short of de-
daring this error to be jurisdictional. Brushing aside legal niceties,
commanding officers should be alert to refrain from convening courts to
try cases in which they, by possibility, may be "accusers" within the
broad meaning of that term.94 The point at which to draw the line
presents a difficult question of fact.95
"' United States v. Gordon (No. 258), 2 CMR 161, 168 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
02 Id. at 167, 168.
"Id. at 168.
,In United States v. Bergin (ACM 4374), 7 CMR 501 (1952), an Air Force
Board of Review held the Commanding General of Lackland Air Force Base to be
an accuser, and hence the court convened by him to be without jurisdiction. The
accused, the custodian of a consolidated base welfare fund, embezzled therefrom.
He had been appointed custodian by the General who himself was president of the
counsel for the Central Post Fund. The accused was under bond payable to the
General in event of defalcation, and such payment was in fact made to and re-
ceipted for by the General. The Board found the convening authority had "not
only an official, but more-a direct and personal interest and responsibility in the
funds and in the loss sustained as the result of the alleged theft of the accused."
It said, "The test should be whether the appointing authority is so closely connected
to the offense that a reasonable person would conclude that he had a personal
interest in the matter."
In United States v. Marsh (No. 1526), 11 CMR 48, 52 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953),
the court reversed as to both specifications because it found that as to one of them
the convening authority was in fact the accuser. It said "Congress concluded the
probability of harm to an accused was sufficient to deny to an accuser the right to
convene a court and if he elects to join specifications for trial all must fall as the
court is disqualified to try any."
OIn United States v. Sippel (ACM 5615), 8 CMR 698 (1953) an Air Force
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J. Reference Procedure Where Convening Authority Is Disqualified
What procedure is jurisdictionally acceptable where the normal con-
vening authority is disqualified? Articles 22(b) and 23(b) of the Code
provide: "When . . . (a) commanding officer is an accuser, the court
shall be convened by superior competent authority ... ." The Manual
states: ". . . superior competent authority ... will convene the court or
designate another competent convening authority to exercise jurisdic-
tion."9 06 A determination as to which of these divergent directions pre-
vails became necessary in the case of Hospitalmen LaGrange and Clay.97
These accused were charged personally by their commander, a Navy
Captain, of violating regulations by misusing barbiturates and the charges
were forwarded to his superior, the Commander, Naval Forces, Far
East, who in turn referred the case for trial by special court to a Navy
Commander commanding a naval base at Pusan, Korea. A commander
is, of course, inferior in grade to a captain in the Navy. The Court of
Military Appeals relying on the provision of Article 36 of the Code
which provides that, "procedure . . . prescribed by the President by
regulations... shall not be contrary to or inconsistent with the Code,"
ruled that only a "superior" could be a "competent convening authority"
as used in the Manual provision, adverted to Congressional intent to
adopt a procedure that would lessen command control, and held:
Board ruled that a convening authority, who had first recommended, upon the
advice of his staff judge advocate, the acceptance of a resignation for the good of
the service tendered by the accused, which tender was refused by higher authority,
did not thereby become an accuser, and properly convened the court which there-
after tried the accused. The Board found the action of the convening authority
was merely "a part of the necessary supervision which he must exercise over his
command in order to preserve discipline." It was also contended that the court
was without jurisdiction because the Staff Judge Advocate as well as the convening
authority was disqualified. As to this the Board said: "the actions and state of
mind of the convening authority and Staff Judge Advocate appear reasonable, dis-
passionate, and divorced from any personal interest in the matter." Accord, United
States v. Jewson (No. 532), 5 CMR 80 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; United States v.
Grow (No. 2050), 11 CMR 77 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). Apparently contra, United
States v Marsh (No. 1526), 11 CMR 48 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). See also, United
States v. Beeks (ACM S-5398), 9 CMR 743 (1953) and United States v. Huff
(ACM S-5455), - CMR - (1953). Boards of Review have distinguished
Marsh, supra, in United States v. Barnes (ACM S-6846), - CMR - (1953)
and United States v. Orso (CM 365475), - CMR - (1953).
In a case where the staff judge advocate of a command accompanied investi-
gating officers to Rome and from time to time gave them legal advice during the
course of the investigation the Court has held that this did not disqualify him from
subsequently reviewing the record of trial for the convening authority. United
States v. DeAngelis (No. 999), 12 CMR - (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). The Court
said: "Since a staff judge advocate is the administrator of military justice and dis-
cipline, it would be incongruous in the extreme were we to assume that he is unable
to function at all unless and until charges have been preferred and investigated....
His services were as necessary to the accused, as to the government, and in no way
disqualified him in performing his impartial task of reviewing the record of trial."
M ANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 5b (2).
"'United States v. La Grange & Clay (No. 313), 3 CMR 76 (U. S. C. M. A.
1952). Distinguished in United States v. Pease (No. 2349), 13 CMR - (U. S. C.
M. A. 1953).
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"The provisions with which we deal require a superior to con-
vene the court; and these provisions having been violated, the tri-
bunal designated was not authorized by law to try these accused
and render a judgment against them."08
The Court avoids the word "jurisdiction" itself, but paints a word pic-
ture adding up to lack of jurisdiction. The Court made it clear that the
officer to appoint the court in such cases must be superior in rank to
the accuser but does not squarely hold that he must also be superior in
the sense of commanding an organization of which the unit commanded
by the accuser is a component part. For example, suppose the com-
mander of the Pusan Base had been a rear admiral. Since the Base
and the ship commanded by the accuser both reported directly to the
Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, the Base would be a command
collateral, and not superior, to the accuser's ship. To avoid pitfalls
prudence would dictate that where this problem is present the convening
authority should be superior in both rank and command to the accuser.
An Air Force Board of Review confronted with substantially the
same problem relied on the LaGrange and Clay case but frankly de-
clared the defect to be jurisdictional. It said:
"... the convening authority in the instant case, being junior
in rank to the accuser and not in the chain of command, should
not properly have assumed jurisdiction over the charges herein.
... The defect being jurisdictional in nature, the proceedings are
a nullity and the findings and sentence must be set aside." 0
K. Pretrial Investigations
The United States Supreme Court has twice determined that neither
a substantial nor a complete failure to comply with the pretrial investi-
gative procedure required under former Article of War 7000 is fatal
error and has held such failure does not divest a court-martial of jurisdic-
tion.101 This rule has been perpetuated by Congress in the new Code
by adding to Article 32,102 the successor to old Article of War 70 as to
pretrial investigations, paragraph (d) which expressly states: "The re-
quirements of this article shall be binding on all persons administering
this code, but failure to follow them in any case shall not constitute juris-
dictional error."
L. Caveat
At least some of the foregoing may initially strike the civilian practi-
tioner as bordering on hair-splitting. Upon reflection, however, it should
8 Id. at 80.
" United States v. Burnette (ACM S-3033), 5 CMR 522, 524 (1952).
10041 STAT. 802 (1920).
.0. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U. S. 695, 700, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 934
(1949) ; Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103, 110, rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 937 (1950).
02 50 U. S. C. § 603 (Supp. 1952).
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be manifest that an active pursuit in military cases of the inquiry, "Was
the court duly constituted?" may lead astute appellate defense counsel
to legal pay dirt whether characterized as jurisdictional, or, simply,
prejudicial error. Though the cause may be tried again,10 3 as a practical
matter it is even more difficult in the military system, plagued with
worldwide distribution and constant personnel changes, to reassemble
witnesses, than is the case in the civilian administration of justice. The
clear caveat to those who must administer the system of military justice
is that not only must evil, but even the appearance of evil, be avoided
in the composition and convening of courts. A high degree of aseptic
administrative care must be given to precluding the possibility of actual
or constructive contamination of members, other component elements of
courts-martial, and convening authorities if jurisdictional error is to be
avoided.
III. DID THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION
OF THE PERSON?
The second jurisdictional inquiry, "does the court have jurisdiction
of the person," is similar to the first query already considered in that it
is much more likely to be remunerative to the criminally accused before
a military court than to one before a civilian court. With rare excep-
tions any person who commits any criminal offense within the geographi-
cal boundaries of a county or other judicial district of a state, or of a
federal court district, is subject to the jurisdiction of the court of that
district regardless of nationality, nature of employment or other status.
True Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution vests exclusive original
jurisdiction in the Supereme Court of all cases affecting ambassadors
and, normally, infants under seven are conclusively presumed to be in-
capable of crime, but such exceptions simply emphasize the general rule
in civil life that exemption from criminal jurisdiction cannot be predi-
cated upon the status of the person accused.
Under the civil rule usually the locus of the offense is all important,
the status of the accused not at all. Under military law quite the reverse
is true. The traditional unlimited geographical jurisdiction of courts-
martial'0 4 has not only received recent judicial approval' 0 5 but express
... United States v. Padilla (No. 400), 5 CMR 31, 34 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
"'WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 81 (2d ed. 1923). Chief Justice
Chase in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1867) said, "And wherever our Army
or Navy may go beyond our territorial limits neither can go beyond the authority of
the President or the legislation of Congress."
10. Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N. D. Ga. 1948), aff'd, 177 F. 2d 373 (5th
Cir. 1949). In this case the court-martial originally convened in Germany, recessed
and reconvened in Washington, D. C., recessed and again reconvened in Germany.
This was expressly held to be within the proper jurisdiction of the court. Also,
United States v. Solinsky (No. 594), 7 CMR 29 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) where the
accused was tried in the United States for forgeries committed in Germany.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
congressional sanction in Article 5 of the Uniform Code'016 which de-
clares, with amazing conciseness: "This code shall be applicable in all
places." This summary disposition of locus contrasts sharply with the
elaborate Code provisions as to what persons in what status at what
times are subject to military law.10 7
100 50 U. S. C. § 555 (Supp. 1952).
1 o0Art. 2, 50 U. S. C. § 552 (Supp. 1952) provides:
"The following persons are subject to this chapter:
(1) All persons belonging to a regular component of the armed forces,
including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of enlist-
ment; all volunteers from the time of their muster or acceptance into the
armed forces of the United States; all inductees from the time of their actual
induction into the armed forces of the United States, and all other persons
lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed
forces, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call or order to
obey the same;
(2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen;
(3) Reserve personnel while they are on inactive duty training authorized
by written orders which are voluntarily accepted by them, which orders
specify that they are subject to this code;
(4) Retired personnel of a regular component of the armed forces who
are entitled to receive pay;
(5) Retired personnel of a reserve component who are receiving hos-
pitalization from an armed force;
(6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve;
(7) All persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed
by a court-martial;
(8) Personnel of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Public Health Service,
and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces
of the United States;
(9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces;
(10) In time of war, all persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field;
(11) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the
United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international
law, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
without the continental limits of the United States and without the following
territories: That part of Alaska east of longitude one hundred and seventy-
two degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands;
(12) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the
United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international
law, all persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired
for the use of the United States which is under the control of the Secretary
of a Department and which is without the continental limits of the United
States and without the following territories: That part of Alaska east of
longitude one hundred and seventy-two degrees west, the Canal Zone, the
main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands."
Art. 3, 50 U. S. C. § 553 (Supp. 1952) states:
"Sec. 553. Jurisdiction to try certain personnel (article 3)
(a) Subject to the provisions of section 618 of this title, any person
charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to
this chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement of five
years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the
United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the District of Colum-
bia, shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason
of the termination of said status.
(b) All persons discharged from the armed forces subsequently charged
with having fraudulently obtained said discharge shall, subject to the pro-
visions of section 618 of this title, be subject to trial by court-martial on said
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Dangerously oversimplified, those persons subject to military law
are: all on active federal armed forces service regardless of component
or assigned duty; cadets and midshipmen; reserves on voluntary inactive
duty training under an order expressly so stating; retired regular per-
sonnel entitled to receive pay; retired reserve personnel receiving armed
force hospitalization; Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve per-
sonnel; prisoners sentenced by courts-martial and in armed forces cus-
tody; prisoners of war in armed forces custody; Coast and Geodetic
Survey, Public Health Service and other organization personnel when
assigned to and serving with the armed forces; without the continental
limits of the United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone and the
Hawaiian and Virgin Islands all persons serving with, employed by, or
accompanying the armed forces, or within an area under the control of
the Secretary of a Department; and, in time of war, all persons serving
with or accompanying an armed force in the field. From this hasty
glance it becomes apparent that status is all important and that in some
cases time and place are essential ingredients of status.
A. Military Personnel
Clarity will probably be promoted by discussing first judisdictional
problems regarding military persons only as distinguished from those of
civilians subject to military law. The latter will be considered separately.
As to military persons it should be remembered that in general they
continue to be subject to civil court jurisdiction for transgressions of
ordinary criminal law.'08 After prior trial by a court-martial former
jeopardy may be asserted only where later civil prosecution is by federal
authority'0 9 and not where later civil prosecution is by a state"10 except
where a state statute expressly so provides."' Our concern here is,
simply, does the court-martial have jurisdiction of the person, and need
not be complicated by determining whether such jurisdiction is exclusive
or concurrent.
(1) When Is Military Status Acquired?
A military person cannot be tried by court-martial for a criminal
offense committed by him before he acquired military status, even though
charge and shall after apprehension be subject to this chapter while in the
custody of the armed forces for such trial. Upon conviction of said charge
they shall be subject to trial by court-martial for all offenses under this chap-
ter committed prior to the fraudulent discharge.
(c) Any person who has deserted from the armed forces shall not be re-
lieved from amenability to the jurisdiction of this chapter by virtue of a sepa-
ration from any subsequent period of service.""" Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376 (1920).
... Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333 (1907).
1' State v. Rankin, 44 Tenn. (4 Cold.) 145 (1867).
... State ex rel. Cobb v. Mills, 82 Okl. Cr. 155, 163 P. 2d 558 (1945).
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the offense is one prohibited by military law.1 12  This necessitates a
precise rule for determining the instant at which a person ceases to be
a civilian and acquires a military status. The number of cases of re-
calcitrance by selectees under the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940,11 or crudely put, draft-dodging, while insignificant percentage-
wise, has caused this question to become one of more than mere academic
interest. Fortunately the Supreme Court supplied the answer in Billings
v. Truesdale."4 Billings, a teacher at the University of Texas, who
claimed to be a conscientious objector, was ordered by both his draft
board and appeal board to report for induction at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. He did so and the next morning was found physically and
mentally qualified whereupon he refused to take the oath of induction
and refused to submit to fingerprinting. For this latter refusal he was
tried and convicted by court-martial for wilful disobedience of a lawful
order. The Supreme Court on habeas corpus attack granted certiorari
and held the court-martial was without jurisdiction since Billings had
not taken the oath of induction and so had not been "actually inducted"
into the Army. It pointed out that Billings was subject to criminal
prosecution in the federal district court for a violation of the Selective
Training and Service Act in refusing to be inducted. This was wholly
consistent with a Supreme Court statement of 1890, "that the taking of
the oath of allegiance is the pivotal fact which changes the status from
that of civilian to that of soldier."" 5 The Court of Military Appeals
has applied the oath test in finding that a court-martial was without
jurisdiction to convict an accused of desertion." 6 In another desertion
.. United States v. Logan (CM 248867), 31 BR 363 (1944). In this case the
accused who first entered the service in 1942 was tried for a bigamous marriage
celebrated in 1934. It was held the continued illicit cohabitation did not make the
bigamy a continuing offense and that the court-martial was without jurisdiction.
1I 54 STAT. 894 (1940).
114321 U. S. 542 (1944).
n it re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 156 (1890). In re Grimley was cited as con-
trolling, in favor of jurisdiction, by a Navy Board of Review in a case in which
the accused admitted that he had taken the oath. United States v. Perry (NCM
36), 1 CMR 516, 517 (1951).
.JUnited States v. Ornelas (No. 446), 6 CMR 96 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
While not itself strictly a jurisdictional problem, the military lawyer can scarcely
pass by the procedural dilemma presented by the Court of Military Appeals in
Onielas and its companion case, United States v. Rodriguez (No. 365), 6 CMR 101
(U. S. C. M. A. 1952) decided the same day. In the face of the well-established
rule that the law officer shall rule on interlocutory questions, save on a motion for
a finding of not guilty or an accused's sanity, and that such rulings shall be final
and shall constitute the ruling of the court [Article 51(b), 50 USC § 626 (Supp.
1952) ] the Court in Ornelas, supra, at page 101 held:
'"Te conclude that where an accused raises a defense or objection which
should properly be considered by the court in its determination of guilt or
innocence, and which resolves itself into a question of fact, that issue must be
presented to and decided by the court pursuant to appropriate instructions.
But where the issue is purely interlocutory or raises solely a question of law,
it is within the sole cognizance of the law officer. It follows that the law
officer in this case erred in making his decision on the issue of jurisdiction
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case it extended the rule in affirming jurisdiction by holding that the
taking of the oath of allegiance was not necessary where the accused, a
Mexican citizen, without objection reported for induction and remained
in a military status for ten days before 'deserting.117 This decision finds
support in the federal courts ;118 in Army opinions ;119 in an Air Force
opinion ;120 and in a Navy Board of Review case which held a Canadian
citizen, who, under selective service, had filed an application for volun-
tary induction and had served in the Navy for over a year before de-
serting, was subject to naval jurisdiction for that offense.
1 21
As to officers, military jurisdiction commences from the time the
oath of office is taken accepting the commission.'
2 2
final. The accused was entitled to have the issue submitted to the court itself
and decided by them under appropriate instructions. We should add that it
matters not, in our opinion, whether the issue is submitted at the time the
motion is made or at the conclusion of the case when the court is required to
deliberate on the evidence."
In Rodriguez, at page 104, the Court said:
"The present case is readily distinguishable from United States v. Ornelas,
supra. In that case, Ornelas testified that he did not at any time participate
in an induction ceremony, and that he did not serve with the Army for any
moment of time. Instead it was his contention that he merely took the re-
quired physical examination and returned immediately to his home in Mexico.
Here, Rodriguez makes no claim that he did not participate in the induction
ceremony, but only that he did not take the oath of allegiance. He did not
object to service-in fact, he voluntarily entered upon the Army duty as-
signed. He proceeded to Fort MacArthur for basic training and remained in
a military status, apparently without objection, for some ten days. Under
such circumstances, he is in no position to claim that he was not lawfully
inducted."
While the ultimate result in each case appears to be correct, the distinction in pro-
cedure required by the court to be followed depending on whether a motion to the
jurisdiction "resolves itself into a question of fact" seems to impose upon the law
officer the obligation of a well-nigh super-human clairvoyance in outguessing the
Court. Clarification as to what is desired by the Court in this situation is essential,
and until it is forthcoming law officers and Boards of Review must proceed at their
peril in disposing of pleas raising jurisdiction. The Court in United States v.
McNeill (No. 1048), 9 CMR 13, 18 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) enlarged its position in
this matter saying: "In United States v. Ornelas, . . . we held that if there was
a factual dispute concerning jurisdiction which would have an effect on the ultimate
guilt or innocence of the accused, it should be presented to the court-martial for
determination. In the instance case there was no such question. The issue here
raised was predicated on testimony which was undisputed and, therefore, involved
only a question of law. When that is the posture of the case, the decision rests
solely with the law officer." It is probable that the last word on this problem has
not yet 'been spoken. See United States v. Grow (No. 2050), 1 CMR 77 (U. S. C.
M. A. 1953) which held the law officer alone properly passed on the interlocutory
factual question as to whether the convening authority was an "accuser."
11. United States v. Rodriguez (No. 365), 6 CMR 101 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
... Mayborn v. Heflebower, 145 F. 2d 864 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U. S. 854 (1945); U. S. v. Mellis, 59 F. Supp. 682 (M. D. N. C. 1945).
' DIG. Ors. JAG § 467, p. 384 (1912-40), and SPJGA 325.34 (July 18, 1942),
1 BULL. JAG 165, 166.
120 United States v. Patton (ACM 4272), 2 CMR 658, 662 (1951).
"' 1United States v. Barlow (NCM 113), 3 CMR 440, 445 (1952).
"'WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 89 (2d ed. 1920). Under Art.
20, 50 U. S. C. § 580 (Supp. 1952), summary courts-martial have no jurisdiction
over officers, warrant officers, cadets or midshipmen, nor, over objection, over any-
one who has not first been offered and refused to accept non-judicial punishment
under Art. 15, 50 U. S. C. § 575 (Supp. 1952).
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(2) When Does Military Status Terminate?
The time element again becomes a significant status factor when a
military person separates from the service. Reserve personnel who are
no longer performing duty but who are continuing to draw active duty
pay while in a terminal leave status remain subject to military jurisdic-
tion, and prior to the expiration of such terminal leave "may be recalled
to active duty for the sole purpose of standing trial.123  This is logical
since their service was not in fact terminated.
Courts-martial jurisdiction over all military and other persons subject
to the Code generally ceases upon termination of such status and, as to
offenses committed prior to such termination, is not renewed by re-entry
into the mililitary service or return to another status subject to the
code. 124 This well-established rule was given spectacular application by
the Supreme Court in Hirshberg v. Cooke125 where a Navy court-martial
was held to be without jurisdiction to try the accused for mistreating
fellow-American personnel while held by the Japanese as a prisoner of
war. This result was reached because the accused's period of enlistment
expired after his liberation and his offense did not come to light until
after he had re-enlisted. An Army Board of Review followed the Hirsh-
berg case in holding a court-martial without jurisdiction to try an accused
who had previously been given an undesirable discharge from the Army
based upon his conviction by a civil court for a criminal offense. 12 This
applied to two charges of desertion, one before the discharge, the other
alleged to have been committed after the discharge. The technical point
in issue was whether the discharge had become effective.
A striking application of this rule occurred in the case of former
Sergeant Lo Dolce1 27 where a confessed killer was permitted to go free.
The murder and robbery were committed in Northern Italy in 1944 when
that area was occupied by Germany as a hostile belligerent and after
Italy had entered into an armistice with the United States. The accused,
then on active duty as an American army sergeant, killed his command-
ing officer, an American major, and threw the body into a mountain lake.
The offenses were not discovered until long after Lo Dolce had returned
to the United States, been discharged and reverted to civilian status. No
attempt was made to try Lo Dolce by court-martial. The effort made by
. Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F. 2d 288 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S.
818 (1948) ; Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N. D. Ga. 1949), aff'd, 177 F. 2d
373 (5th Cir. 1949).
... MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 Ila, p. 14.
125336 U. S. 210 (1949).
.2 United States v. Santiago (CM 346819), 1 CMR 365, 368 (1951). Cf. Ex
parte Wilson, 33 F. 2d 214 (E. D. Va. 1929) holding that a former officer adminis-
tratively dropped from the rolls of the Navy by the President was not thereafter
subject to military jurisdiction."Il re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp 455 (W. D. N. Y. 1952).
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Italy to extradite was rejected by the federal district court upon dual
grounds. First, that since at the time of the crimes Italy had capitulated
and American forces were present as friendly visiting forces the rule of
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon128 vested jurisdiction of the offense in
the military authorities of the United States, and not Italy. Second,
that, following the rule of Coleman v. Tennessee,2 9 even if a state of
belligerency still existed between Italy and the United States, jurisdic-
tion over its own forces vested exclusively in the United States as a
hostile occupant. Since the exercise of this jurisdiction by the United
States was impossible due to Lo Dolce's fortutious change of status from
soldier to civilian, and because murder committed in Italy normally is
not punishable by any American civil court, federal or state, a complete
immunity bath emersion resulted for this confessed homocidist 29 a This
fantastic situation has arisen more than once. Several similar, but un-
publicized, homicides were committed in Italy during the last year of
World War II by merchant seamen employed on vessels chartered by
the military. Requests for extradition made after they had completed
their voyages, returned to the United States and been -discharged were
administratively denied.
Congress, most fortunately, has taken appropriate action to remedy,
in large measure at least, this glaring jurisdictional hiatus. Article
3 (a) 13 0 of the Code now provides:
"Subject to the provisions of article 43 [statute of limitations],
any person charged with having committed, while in a status in
which he was subject to this code, an offense against this code,
punishable by confinement of five years or more amd for which the
person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any
State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not
be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason
of the termination of said status."
Since under Article 43(a)1 31 the statute of limitations never runs on
wartime desertion or absence without leave, aiding the enemy, mutiny or
murder, offenders in these respects remain indefinitely subject to court-
martial jurisdiction where the offense is not triable in an American civil
court. Those committing other military or civilian type offenses not
triable in other American courts and punishable by confinement of five
years or more remain subject to military jurisdiction during the three-
"'7 Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812). 1" 97 U. S. 509 (1878).
"" Lo Dolce and a co-accused, Icardi, were tried in absentia for this offense by
the Italian Government. On November 6, 1953 they were found guilty of murder
by a trial court at Novara, Italy. Lo Dolce was sentenced to seventeen years con-
finement; Icardi, to life imprisonment. N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1953, p. 2 E.
... 50 U. S. C. § 553 (Supp. 1952).
1 50 U. S. C. § 618 (Supp. 1952).
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year period of limitation13 2 even though sooner separated from the serv-
ice. As to offenses the maximum punishment for which is less than five
years the jurisdictional hiatus still exists. Jurisdiction under Article 3 (a)
is not to be exercised without the prior consent of the Secretary of the
Department concerned. 13 3 The constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto applicability of law 3 4 precludes the use of this remedial legislation
in any case occurring prior to May 31, 1951.135
(3) Military Status Not Terminated by Desertion Nor
Absence from Trial
Within the wide ambit from oath to discharge a number of interesting
problems of status arise to complicate military jurisdiction. An accused,
otherwise subject thereto, may not terminate military jurisdiction by
his own wrongful act. Thus, the contention of a Coast Guardsman
accused that the expiration of the three-year period for which he enlisted,
occurring while he was in desertion, divested the military of jurisdiction
over that offense was rejected.13 6 This obviously correct result in effect,
applied to the Coast Guard the long-standing congressional requirement
that soldiers must make up time lost, or "bad time," and that the enlist-
ment extends until such time has been made good.
3 7
Similarly, where an accused, after being arraigned, voluntarily absents
himself from his trial the court-martial retains jurisdiction to complete
the trial, arrive at findings and sentence the accused in his absence.13
...Art. 43(b), 50 U. S. C. § 618 (Supp. 1952).
"3 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, ff llb, p. 15. The
case of Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 and 114 F. Supp. 468 (D. C. D. C. 1953)
testing by habeas corpus the validity of aa military arrest made under Article 3(a)
is now pending on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.
13, U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
133 PuB. L. No. 506, 81st Cong., c. 169, § 5, 64 STAT. 108 (1950).
13. United States v. Meyer (CGCM 9737), 1 CMR 562 (1951), citing f1 lid,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951. Accord, Ex parte Clark,
271 Fed. 533 (E. D. N. Y. 1921). See also, United States v. Klunk (No. 2433),
11 CMR 92 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
37 64 STAT. 145 (1950), 10 U. S. C. § 629 (Supp. 1952) continues in force old
Article of War 107 [41 STAT. 809 (1920)]. It provides:
"§ 629. Soldiers to make good time lost. Every soldier who in an existing
or subsequent enlistment deserts the service of the United States or without
proper authority absents himself from his organization, station, or duty for
more than one day, or who is confined for more than one day under sentence,
or while awaiting trial and disposition of his case, if the trial results in con-
viction, or through the intemperate use of drugs or alcoholic liquor, or
through disease or injury the result of his own misconduct, renders himself
unable for more than one day to perform duty, shall be liable to serve, after
his return to a full-duty status, for such period as shall, with the time he may
have served prior to such desertion, unauthorized absence, confinement, or
inability to perform duty, amount to the full term of that part of his enlist-
ment period which he is required to serve with his organization before being
furloughed to the Army reserve. June 4, 1920, c. 277, Subch. II, § 1, 41
Stat. 809; May 5, 1950, c. 169, § 6(a), 64 Stat. 145."
138 United States v. Hollings (Sp CM 1213), 5 BR/JC 465 (1950); MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, ff llc, p. 16.
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This rule, which applies to capital as well as non-capital cases, has re-
ceived the approval of the Court of Military Appeals in a rape case.'
39
This doctrine has been applied to a case where' after the court was sworn
the accused exercised his peremptory challenge, was arraigned, then be-
fore plea, requested and was granted a continuance, and thereafter
wrongfully absented himself. When the court reconvened not only was
the accused absent but two members of the original court who had been
excused by the convening authority. Two members of the court who
were not present at the first meeting were sworn and the proceedings of
the previous meeting made known to them. 1 40  The 'defense counsel an-
nounced he had no challenge for cause. An Army Board held the find-
ings and sentence imposed on the absent accused by this court-martial to
be valid.'
4 '
(4) Changes of Military Status Not Terminating Jurisdiction
The rigor of the discharge rule has long been tempered by limiting
it largely to those discharges occurring at the end of a full term of en-
listment. Thus it is necessary to examine the nature of a given honor-
able discharge to determine its effect on jurisdiction. Where prior to
the expiration of a term of enlistment an individual is given an honorable
discharge for "the convenience of the Government" for the purpose of
re-enlisting or accepting a commission jurisdiction is retained over of-
fenses committed during the previous foreshortened enlistment.1 42 The
... United States v. Houghtaling (No. 573), 8 CMR 30 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
At page 34 the court, with considerable perspicacity, observed: "Of necessity mili-
tary personnel are highly mobile, and on occasion are scattered to the four winds
within a matter of hours. In oversea theaters, and particularly in combat areas,
witnesses, both military and civilian, are exposed to uncommon hazards which
make their assembly for trial difficult always and too often impossible. Certainly
the degree of prosecution hardship sharply increases as the time of trial is delayed.
The capital offense escapee may thus gain great advantage, which will vary directly
with the length of time he is able to prolong his absence. This is, of course, true
in all areas of law enforcement, but it is greatly intensified in that of military
judicial administration. We discern no reason for impending (sic)-perhaps even
defeating-the prosecution of those who choose not to be present for trial, regard-
less of the offense with which they are charged. This would, we believe, be dis-
tinctly in derogation of the just claims of the military society, an interest often
disregarded in febrile evaluation of the rights of frequently undeserving individuals."
"... In the civilian community there is no rigid rule demanding that a convicted
man be sentenced only by the judge who presided over his trial. However, there
is no provision in military criminal law procedure for the imposition of any sort
of sentence save by the court which tried and convicted the accused. As a prac-
tical necessity, the court which convicts a man in absentia must have the power to
sentence him as well, otherwise the conviction will have gone for naught. It will
always be difficult, and usually impossible, ever to reassemble a court-martial-
and the longer the delay, the greater the difficulty and threat of impossibility."
..o This is required by Art. 29(b), 50 U. S. C. § 593 (Supp. 1952).
... United States v. Henkel (CM 356028), 9 CMR 172 (1952).
1 2 United States v. Aikens (CM 337089), 5 BR/JC 331 (1950). The offenses
involved were murder, robbery and assault. See also A MANUAL FOR CoURTs-MAR-
TIAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, 1928, 10; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES ARMY, 1949, 10; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951,
fllb.
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Court of Military Appeals, one judge dissenting, has subscribed to this
jurisdictional principle. It upheld jurisdiction to try in 1951 a postal
clerk sergeant for six money order forgeries and larcenies perpetrated in
1948, although the sergeant had been discharged in 1949 for "the con-
venience of the Government" to re-enlist for an indefinite period of
time.143 Here the discharge was delivered the following day after the
re-enlistment had been effected.
An Air Force Board of Review has upheld jurisdiction over larcenies
committed before a re-enlistment entered into in lieu of a one-year in-
voluntary extension of the prior enlistment under Executive Order 10270
of July 9, 1951.144 Jurisdiction has also been affirmed where the accused
in writing first voluntarily extended a one-year enlistment to three years
and later extended it for two more years without ever taking a new oath.
Accused performed military duty, wore an airman's uniform and ac-
cepted pay up until he deserted during the fifth year of this extended
service. Accused contended that since he had not taken a new oath he
was not in the service at the time he deserted. The Air Force Board
in rejecting this contention held that the extensions -did not constitute
either a reformation of the contract or a separate enlistment but a volun-
tary "holding over" in the military service effecting a constructive en-
listment.1 45  It should be noted this case did not involve the survival
after the extension of the enlistment of jurisdiction as to offenses pre-
viously committed, but was directed to jurisdiction of an offense com-
mitted after the second extension.
A complicated status situation was presented in the larceny case of
Airman Eaton,1 46 who originally enlisted for three years on October 25,
1946. On October 24, 1949, he voluntarily extended his enlistment one
year. Because of "bad time" his period of service continued until
April 19, 1951 and he was retained in service for one year thereafter
pending decision whether his enlistment was subject to involuntary ex-
tension for one year. The offense in question was committed in this
last year. The Board held the accused had not been officially discharged
and was, therefore, a person "awaiting discharge" within the provision
of Article 2(1) of the Code,14 7 and, hence, subject to court-martial trial.
On the question of sentence evidence of five previous convictions was
.. United States v. Solinsky (No. 594), 7 CMR 29 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). At
page 36 the majority of the court observed: "A momentary break in service does
not necessarily break court-martial jurisdiction. Chief Judge Quinn dissented
and would apply the Hirshberg case rule in all situations not expressly covered by
statute.
... United States v. Isidore (ACM 5625), 7 CMR 595 (1952).
... United States v. Patton (ACM 4272), 2 CMR 658, 662 (1951).
... United States v. Eaton (ACM S-3519), 6 CMR 675 (1952).
14750 U. S. C. § 552(1) (Supp. 1952). A similar result was reached by the
Court in the Navy case of United States v. Downes (No. 2544), 11 CMR 90
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
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introduced-one for an offense during the original enlistment, three
during the one year voluntary extension and one during the involuntary
holding over. The last four were held to be properly admitted, but the
first was ruled to be inadmissible since the voluntary extension started
the accused with a clean slate so far as prior convictions was concerned.
Jurisdiction exists over a person who fraudulently enlists and accepts
pay or allowances. Such a person may be tried by court-martial at the
same time for the fraudulent enlistment and for a subsequent desertion
therefrom. 148
(5) Jurisdiction Over Military Prisoners
A prisoner in the custody of an armed force though under an exe-
cuted sentence of dishonorable 149 or bad conduct' 50 discharge remains
subject to military jurisdiction not only for offenses committed while a
prisoner but for offenses perpetrated while in the service prior to such
discharge. The Court of Military Appeals has not had occasion to pass
upon this point.
(6) Effect of Service in Another Armed Force
Naval Reserve Fireman Hazeldine, while in the inactive naval re-
serve, enlisted in the Air Force and served therein for two months before
receiving an undesirable discharge. Thereafter he was ordered to active
duty with the Navy and was subsequently convicted of a series of four
absences without leave. Accused contended his Air Force service had
terminated his Naval status rendering him not subject to Naval juris-
diction. In rejecting this assertion the Navy Board of Review de-
clared :151
"The accused in this case, a naval reservist, was in and out of
another military organization and had not been discharged from
"'4United States v. Luce (ACM 4191), 2 CMR 734 (1951). At page 738, the
Board said: "The Board of Review concludes that the accused was properly tried
and convicted at one trial both for fraudulent enlistment and for desertion from
the period of service thereunder. His status as a person subject to military law
while serving under such enlistment was a fact which cannot, as to offenses punish-
able by court-martial committed during such period, be considered retroactively
terminated by a subsequent execution of the discharge adjudged. Such service is'void' in its civil aspect as to benefits for the accused, but it is not 'void' in its disci-
plinary aspect as to burdens of service imposed on him by virtue of his status
therein as a member of the armed forces."
... The last sentence of 11 llb, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
1951 in part reads: ".. . a dishonorably discharged prisoner in custody of an armed
force may be tried for an offense committed while a member of the armed forces
and prior to the execution of his dishonorable discharge." Presumably such a
person, if not confined, or if confined in a civilian detention institution, would not
continue subject to military jurisdiction other than in the exceptional cases provided
for in Article 3 of the Code [50 U. S. C. § 553 (Supp. 1952) ]. Military jurisdiction
over a military prisoner was upheld in Mosher v. Hudspeth, 123 F. 2d 401 (10th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 670 (1942) ; and Mosher v. Hunter, 143 F. 2d
745 (10th Cir. 1944).
180 United States v. Drummond (ACM 5243), 5 CMR 400 (1952).
181 United States v. Hazeldine (NCM 125), 4 CMR 429, 431 (1952).
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his de jure status in the Naval Reserve prior to reporting as such
reservist for active duty. He was, therefore, a naval reservist on
active duty at the time of the commission of the offenses alleged,
and a person subject to the Code and the court which tried him."
This decision appears to reverse sub silentio a 1951 opinion of the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy. 5 2 In this latter case the accused en-
listed in the Naval Reserve in 1946 for a four-year term, then in 1948
enlisted in the regular navy and in 1949 received a bad conduct discharge
therefrom. In 1950, prior to the expiration of his original naval reserve
enlistment, accused signed an agreement extending this reserve enlistment
an additional four years, later entered upon active duty thereunder and
thereafter received a bad conduct discharge for absence without leave.
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy said that the accused ceased
to be a member of the naval establishment when discharged from the
regular navy, stressed that he had not thereafter taken an oath of en-
listment, and held that even though he had entered upon and performed
active duty the accused could not be guilty of the offense of unauthorized
absence. This opinion was rendered prior to the decision of the Court
of Military Appeals in Rodriguez15 3 which held that the taking of an
oath was not indispensable to jurisdiction if the accused in fact volun-
tarily entered into service. Of these two Navy views, that expressed by
the Board of Review in Hazeldine seems to be the correct one under
present law.
(7) Selective Service Induction
Private McNeill who had previously served two years in the army
and three years in the enlisted reserve corps would have been exempt
from selective service induction if he had disclosed these facts. Accused
simply left blank the spaces provided on the form for showing prior
service and six weeks after reporting for duty deserted. Accused con-
tended that the law officer erred in overruling a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction on the ground that accused was not subject to selec-
tive service. The Court, relying on federal court authority,' 54 affirmed
jurisdiction and said:
"... when an accused fails to furnish a basis for an exemption
he is subject to military law .... When he ... does not appeal
from his classification, but on the contrary reports for duty he
cannot reverse the local board by concluding not to serve."'
55
..2 Op. JAGN 1951/22 (15 August 1951), digested in 1 DIG. Ors. JAG 143
(1951-52).
.. United States v. Rodriguez (No. 365), 6 CMR 101 (U. S. C M. A. 1952).
"" Harris v. Ross, 146 F. 2d 355 (5th Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Graham, 57
F. Supp. 938 (E. D. Ark. 1944) ; United States v. Mitchell, 248 Fed. 997 (E. D.
N. Y. 1918).
5 United States v. McNeill (No. 1048), 9 CMR 13, 16 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
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(8) Short Active Duty Tours by Reserve Personnel
Reservists ordered to short tours of active duty, as distinguished
from those on extended active duty, also come within the jurisdictional
purview of Article 2(1)156 in that they are "persons lawfully... ordered
... to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the 'dates they
are required by the terms of the ... order to obey the same." The Army
judge Advocate General has rendered an opinion that both officer and
enlisted reservists who fail to comply with orders to active duty for fif-
teen days or less, or who while engaged in such duty commit offenses,
may be punished by court-martial; that military jurisdiction fully at-
taches to such individuals if proceedings with a view to trial by court-
martial are commenced, such as by arrest or service of charges, prior to
expiration of the period of active duty; and that such proceedings may
then be prosecuted to their conclusion.'
57
(9) Member of Another Armed Force
Concerning military personnel, there remains for discussion the self-
imposed inter-service difficulties as to whether courts of one service may
try an accused of another service. Congress imposed no limitation what-
ever in this respect and expressly provided: "Each armed force shall
have court-martial jurisdiction over all persons subject to this code."' 58
Congress did, however, make possible the "segregation" which the serv-
ices have adopted by addings the proviso: "The exercise of jurisdiction
by one armed force over personnel of another armed force shall be in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the President."'159 In the
exercise of this authority the President approved the Manual provi-
sions :10o "In general, jurisdiction by one armed force over personnel of
another should be exercised only when the accused cannot be delivered
to the armed force of which he is a member without manifest injury to
the service," and: "Cases involving two or more accused who are mem-
bers of different armed forces should not be referred to a court-martial
for a joint or common trial." The only exemptions authorized are in the
case of "The commanding officer of a joint command or joint task force
who has been specifically empowered by the President or the Secretary
of Defense to exercise jurisdiction over personnel of another armed
15850 U. S. C. § 552 (Supp. 1952).
15TJAGA 1951/7487 (4 December 1951), reported in 1 DiG. Ops. JAG 138
(1951-52). In re Schulz (D. C. Ariz. April 30, 1953) digested in JAG CHRoN.
No. 22, p. 99 (29 May 1953), upheld military jurisdiction to try a former reserve
officer for an offense committed while on active duty, where his active duty ter-
minated and his commission had expired before the charges were served on him,
but after the charges had 'been preferred and referred to a court-martial for trial.
In denying the petition for habeas corpus the district court relied on Carter v.
McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365 (1902).
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force,' 61 and isolated commanders of small units who have first been so
authorized by the Secretary of the Department primarily concerned with
the concurrence of the Secretary of the other Department.162  Presi-
dential authority to so empower a joint commander was delegated to the
Secretary of Defense by Executive Order 10428 of January 17, 1953.103
The Judge Advocate General of the Army has rendered an opinion
that a member of the Marine Corps may not be tried by a court-martial
convened by an armed force other than the Navy where the accused can
be delivered to the Navy without manifest injury to the service.' 0 4 This
result definitely changed the rule prescribed by the Articles of War prior
to the Uniform Code that "Officers and soldiers of the Marine Corps
when detached for service with the armies of the United States by Order
of the President,"'165 were subject to army courts-martial jurisdiction.
An Army Regulation'6 6 cautions that Naval medical and dental officers
assigned for duty with the Army are not subject to Army courts-martial
or to non-judicial punishment under Article 15107 by an Army command-
ing officer unless the President or Secretary of Defense has specifically
so empowered the Army commanding officer. Where disciplinary action
is -deemed necessary a request should be made to the Chief of Naval
Personnel through the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, to
have the individual relieved from duty with the Army.
An Air Force Board of Review'0 8 has reversed a desertion conviction
of an Air Force private imposed by an Army court-martial holding that
its purported exercise of jurisdiction was "nugatory."' 1 The Air Force
Board said:
"... it was the Congressional purpose that the exercise of re-
ciprocal jurisdiction under Article 17 was conditioned upon com-
pliance with Presidential regulations and that purported exercise
of such jurisdiction without such compliance is nugatory. Ac-
cordingly, accused could not be tried by an Army court-martial
for the offense of desertion (Specification 2 of the Charge), in-
ception of which occurred after he had been transferred adminis-
tratively to the Air Force without specific authority to do so."'17
6 Id. at 14g( 2 ), p. 5. ... Id. at 4g(3), p. 6.
10318 FED. REG. 408 (1953).
'JAGJ 1952/2903 (25 March 1952), cited in JAG CHROX. No. 18, p. 75 (2
May 1952)."05Article of War 2(c), 41 STAT. 787 (1920) and Article of War 2(c) of 62
STAT. 628 (1948).
106 7, SR 605-145-25 (25 August 1952). .. 7 50 U. S. C. § 571 (Supp. 1952).
2" Art. 17(b), 50 U. S. C. § 577 (Supp. 1952) reads: "In all cases, departmental
review subsequent to that by the officer with authority to convene a general court-
martial for the command which held the trial, where such review is required under
the provisions of this code, shall be carried out by the armed force of which the
accused is a member."
... United States v. Mack (ACM 4920), 4 CMR 536 (1952).170 Id. at 542.
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A case which arose at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at
Camp Gordon, Georgia, resulted in an interesting application of the ad-
ministrative prohibition against cross-service trials. Six army prisoners
and one air force prisoner, all under courts-martial sentences including
dishonorable discharge, engaged in a common offense within the Army
operated confinement facility. The Code expressly provides that "all
persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a
court-martial"'171 are subject to its jurisdiction, and does not concern
itself with their source of origin. The Judge Advocate General of the
Army, in response to a pre-trial inquiry, rendered an opinion that pris-
oners confined at disciplinary barracks who at the time of their original
conviction were Air Force members, and who commit offenses while in
confinement, should be tried by an Air Force court-martial in the absence
of a showing of manifest injury to the service.172  Pursuant thereto
separate courts were convened, one by the Army'173 and one by the Air
Force.
174
In these cases where the accused is of a service other than that of the
convening authority it must be kept in mind that the impediment to the
exercise of jurisdiction is administrative and not congressional, and that
the administrative bar is to the exercise of existing jurisdiction and does
not destroy jursdiction itself. If and when the President should elect
to withdraw the administrative impediment, or the Secretary of Defense
expressly empowers a joint commander to exercise such jurisdiction,
the basic congressional grant thereof remains and could properly be
exercised. 174a The problem is not by any means wholly academic since
there are many occasions where small groups from one service must
perform duty with another of the services for extended periods of time.
For example, so common are such assignments for some army men
that their status has been officially alphabetized and they are charac-
terized an ARWAF and SCARWAF personnel. Translated, these mean
"Army with Air Force" and "Special Category Army with Air Force."
Prompt administration of discipline, when occasion arises, encounters
great administrative difficulty.
1171 Art. 2(7), 50 U. S. C. § 552 (Supp. 1952).
72 JAGJ 1952/8435 (5 November 1952) cited in JAG CHRON. No. 48, p. 211
(28 November 1952).1
7 United States v. Duggan, Mendiola, Fowler, Gomez, Comeaux and Simcox
(CM 361674) 10 CMR (1953).
17, United States v. Criswell (ACM 4815), 10 CMR - (1953).
17,4 The Secretary of Defense on July 20, 1953 elected under his delegated
authority to empower the commanding officers of three joint commands, one in
Greenland, one in Newfoundland, and one at Sandia Base, New Mexico, ".... to
refer for trial by courts-martial the cases of members of any of the armed forces
assigned or attached t6 or on duty with such command." Dept. of Defense Direc-
tive No. 5510.2 (20 July 1953), and companion directives.
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B. Civilian Personnel
Congress, with a lively concern for the basic principle of American
government of separation of powers, has in general consistently limited
the jurisdiction of military tribunals over ordinary civilians to situations
where the civil courts are not functioning' 75 or where no American civil
court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the cause. This continued concern
is evidenced by the limitation in Article 3(a) 176 upon the survival of
jurisdiction after the termination of military status to those cases where
"the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or of a
State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia," and by the
common provision in paragraphs (11) and (12) of Article 2177 which
limits the jurisdiction therein conferred over civilians to areas "without
the continental limits of the United States and without the following
territories: That part of Alaska east of longitude one hundred and
seventy-two degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main group of the Ha-
waiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands." Thus, where
American civil courts are available jurisdiction over civilians is reserved
to them except for the provision of paragraph (10) of Article 2178 that
"In time of war, all persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field" are subject to military jurisdiction. Only the above
cited paragraphs (10), (11) and (12) of Article 2 confer jurisdiction
over civilians, while the first seven paragraphs thereof are concerned
with defining military personnel for jurisdictional purposes. The global
nature of missions which during the past decade have been assigned to
the military establishment of the United States has been productive of
decisions which have enriched the law of military jurisdiction over
civilians.
Most of the decisions deal with former Article of War 2(d), 170 in
effect from 1920 to 1951, which subjected to military jurisdiction:
"All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or
serving with the armies of the United States without the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such
retainers and persons accompanying or serving with the armies of
the United States in the field, both within and without the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States, though not otherwise sub-
ject to these articles."
Most of these decisions continue to be of value in applying the current
" Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866). Duncan v. Kahanomoku, 327
U. S. 304 (1945).
... 50 U. S. C. § 503 (Supp. 1952)." 50 U. S. C. § 554 (Supp. 1952).18 Ibid. See, however, IV, C, post, p. 47.
941 STAT. 787 (1920) and 62 STAT. 628 (1948).
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jurisdictional provisions regarding civilians. Many of the cases prior to
1945 are collected in a published opinion of The Judge Advocate General
of the Army. 80
Of historical interest are Civil and Indian War rulings holding the
following civilians subject to military law: ambulance drivers employed
by the army ;181 guides for the army during warfare with Indians ;182 con-
ductor and engineer on a train running from Alexandria to Manassas ;183
pilots and crews employed in the "Ram Fleet" in western waters ;184
contract surgeons;185 teamsters employed by the Quartermaster;186
deputies appointed by district provost marshals ;187 paymaster's clerks ;188
civilian horse trader with the army ;89 and War Department employees
serving with the army in the Indian country.19 0
During World War I civilians in the following categories were held
to be subject to military jurisdiction: field auditor in Quartermaster
office at Camp Jackson, South Carolina;191 Port of Brooklyn storage
office chauffeur 9 2 and laborers ;193 laborers employed by civilian con-
tractors engaged in constructing facilities for the American Expedition-
ary Force in France ;194 cook employed by quartermaster at New Mexico
camp ;195 scout in Texas ;196 quartermaster civilian employee laborers on
docks at ports of embarkation'9 7 and at Camp Upton, New York ;198
civilian member of a labor unit in France ;199 stevedore employed by the
Army in France ;200 clerks employed by the Quartermaster overseas
201
180 SP-JGW 1945/4990 (23 June 1945 and 2 July 1945) published in 4 BULL.
JAG No. 6, pp. 223-229 (1945).
181 Record Book No. 9, p. 146 (May 1864).
18- Record Book No. 36, p. 435 (May 1875), DIG. Ops. JAG 49 (1880).
... Record Book No. 7, p. 116 (February 1864), DIG. OPs. JAG 38 (1865)..S Record Book No. 2, p. 570 (June 1863), DIG. Ops. JAG 107 (1865).
1.. Record Book No. 11, p. 493 (March 1865), DIo. Ops. JAG 11 (1866);
Record Book No. 12, p. 376 (March 1865); Record Book No. 13, p. 459 (March
1865).
18. Record Book No. 9, p. 111 (May 1864). DIG. Ops. JAG 38 (1865).
187 Record Book No. 8, p. 246, DIG. Ops. JAG 69 (1866).
188 Record Book No. 3, p. 269, DIG. Ops. JAG 92 (1865).
180 Record Book No. 7, p. 511 (April 1864).
180 14 Op. Aify GEN. 22 (1872) ; Record Book No. 32, p. 385.
101 Rines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 250 U. S. 645 (1919);
JAG 205.4 (15 October 1918), DIG. Oss. JAG § 359(9) (1912-40).
- CM 133361 (1919)."8 CM 133362 (1919) ; CM 133363 (1919).
10. JAG 250.4 (4 April 1948), Op. JAG 246 (1918), DIG. Ops. JAG § 359 (12)




107 JAG 250.4 (3 April 1918), DIG. Oss. JAG § 359 (9) (1912-40) ; CM 133364
(1919)1 8
o  117909 (1918), DIG. Ops. JAG §359(12) (1912-40) ; CM 117910 (1918);
CM 117911 (1918); CM 117912 (1918); CM 117914 (1918) ; CM 117915 (1918)
CM 118055 (1918); CM 118120 (1918).
CM 115773 (1918).00 CM 108605 (1918).
-01 CM 108116 (1917) ; CM 110496 (1918) ; CM 133032 (1919).
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and at Camp Meade, Maryland ;202 civilian passengers on an army trans-
port;203 Red Cross personnel serving with the Army overseas ;204 Cap-
tain of an Army transport in the Port of New York ;205 chief cook on an
Army transport carrying military cargo ;206 merchant seamen on Army
transports at sea or in English, French, or American ports ;207 telephone
operator employed by Army in France ;208 secretaries and other em-
ployees of the Young Men's Christian Association and Knights of Co-
lumbus in France ;209 the superintendent for the Quartermaster Corps in
Texas ;210 and a caretaker employed by the Army in France.211
World War II cases in which military jurisdiction was exercised over
civilian personnel were even more voluminous and included: employees
of the Board of Economic Warfare sent overseas at the request of a
Theater Commander to feed and clothe the civilan population ;212 de-
coding experts employed by the Signal Corps at installations in the
United States ;213 employees of civilian contractors in overseas areas ;214
discharged employees of a contractor with the Army awaiting transpor-
tation to the United States ;216 electricians employed by the Corps of
Engineers in the Caribbean Defense Command, 2 10 the British West
20 2 CM 132707 (1919).20 Ex parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
2 "JAG 080 (3 February 1919), DIG. Ops. JAG §359(14) (1912-40); JAG
250.4 (21, 29 December 1917), DIo. Ops. JAG 98 (April-December 1917); CM
128898 (1919) ; cf. United States v. Snyder (CM 330683), 79 BR 121 (1948).
2 r CM 110574 (1918).
201 EX parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D. C. N. 3. 1918).2
11 JAG 251 (5 February 1918) ; DIG. Op. JAG 79 (1918) ; and twenty-five
courts-martial cases cited in 4 BULL. JAG No. 6, pp. 227-228 (1945).
208 CM 120393 (1918).
200 CM 118327 (1918) ; CM 118333 (1918); CM 119135 (1918); CM 120639
(1918) ; CM 122855 (1918) ; CM 127502 (1919) ; CM 130005 (1919) ; CM 132387
(1919) ; CM 132407 (1919); CM 132607 (1919); CM 133387 (1919); CM 133818
(1919) ; JAG 000.51 (1 February 1919).
21 Ex parle Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (S. D. Tex. 1919).
21L CM 136620 (1919).
212 SPJGW 1943/230 (1 March 1943); SPJGW 1943/6250 (14 May 1943), 2
BULL. JAG 235.
213 SPJGW 1944/8675 (19 July 1944).
2 ' In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), 2 BULL. JAG 338
(occupied enemy territory) ; SPJGW 1943/14720 (4 November 1943) (airfield
overseas) ; SPJGW 1943/4722 (13 April 1943) (West Africa) ; SPJGW 1944/11096
(9 September 1944) (Alaska) ; SPJGW 1943/7941 (10 June 1943) (Alaska) ; CM
269448 (1944) (Alaska) ; the following in the Northwest Service Command: CM
245670 (1943) ; CM 247236 (1944) ; CM 248244 (1944) ; 31 BR 203, 3 BULL. JAG
58; CM 248722 (1944); CM 248725 (1944); CM 249973 (1944); CM 250124
(1944) ; CM 259249 (1944) ; the following at United States Military installations
on bases leased in British possessions: SPJGW 1942/5668 (1 December 1942), 1
BULL JAG 357; CM 218308 (1941) ; CM 221982 (1942) ; CM 228677 (1942) ; CM
230704 (1943).
21. Perlstein v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 123 (M. D. Penn. 1944) ; JAG 250.401
(27 December 1941) ; CM 254272 (1944). Distinguished in United States v. Guidry
(CM 357066), 7 CMR 305 (1952) where a discharged merchant seaman, not en-
titled to, and not awaiting, transportation to the United States, was held not subject
to military jurisdiction for offenses committed in Japan afer termination of his
employment.
210 SPJGW 1941/12887 (17 September 1943).
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Indies,217 and Alaska ;218 laborers, construction and maintenance person-
nel employed by the Army overseas ;219 mechanics at overseas bases ;220
USO Camp Shows entertainers with troops overseas ;221 American news-
paper correspondents overseas officially accredited to the Army ;222 em-
ployees of Psychological Warfare Branch, Office of War Information,
attached to the Army in Algiers ;223 civilian passengers on Army trans-
ports,224 commercial vessels operated under Army control carrying
troops and military cargo, 225 and on War Shipping Administration
vessels allocated to the Army carrying military personnel and cargo ;226
employees of post exchanges at camps in the United States ;227 Treasury
Department agents in North Africa on foreign fund control work ;221
firefighters at an air base within the United States ;229 Civil Service pilots
with Air Corps Ferrying Command and subject to military orders ;230
pilots of Civil Air Patrol who receive some of their orders from Army
theater commanders ;231 policemen and guards at installations in the
United States important to the prosecution of war 2 32 and at overseas
bases ;233 messman 23 4 and chief cook 2 3 5 on ships operated by private
shipping corporation carrying military cargo; civilian seamen serving
2 .17 CM 269484 (1944). 218 CM 243080 (1943).
21- SPJGW 1942/6245 (28 December 1942) (Engineer Corps workers on Pan-
American Highway in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, not normally resident there);
CM 279377 (1945) (caretaker at partially abandoned airfield in Costa Rica re-
cruited from Canal Zone) ; CM 267338 (1944) and CM 272817 (1945) (Northwest
Service Command); CM 254962' (1944) (laborer in Persian Gulf Command); CM
243309 (1943) (construction worker at leased base in a British possession) ; CM
241292 (1943) (engineer employed at base in British West Indies) ; CM 245662
(1943) (storekeeper) ; SPJGW 1943/12887 (17 September 1943) (Panama Canal
Department).
In United States v. Weiman (No. 1403), 11 CMR 216 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953)
two Polish nationals, members of a Labor Service Company brought to France for
service with United States forces there located, were convicted by court-martial.
In upholding jurisdiction the Court said: ".... we are here concerned with nationals
of a country other than the United States, present in a foreign country friendly to
the United States, solely as employees of the military forces of the United States.
We are not here concerned with nationals of a host nation, employed by our forces
within the borders of such a nation."22- CM 245165 (1943) ; CM 245661 (1943).221 SPJGA 1943/6116 (29 April 1943).
222 SPJGW 1942/4281 (17 September 1942) ; 1 BULL. JAG 212.
22- SPJGW 1944/977 (13 March 1944).
' Ex parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S. D. N. Y. 1917) (A World War I case).
-' SPJGW 1944/6511 (16 June 1944).
22' SPJGW 1944/9568 C18 August 1944).
27 CM 222383 (1942). A civilian employee of a post exchange concessionaire
on Okinawa is subject to military jurisdiction. United States v. Biagini (ACM
6341), - CMR - (18 May 1953).
2-8 SPJGW 1943/7335 (26 May 1943).
.- SPJGW 1943/9505 (12 July 1943).
2 2 SPJGW 1942/318 (30 January 1942).22 SPJGW 1942/1877 (8 May 1942), 1 BULL. JAG 12.
232 SPJGW 1943/9505 (12 July 1943) ; CM 248051 (1944) ; CM 276755 (1945).
233 SPJGW 1942/214 (21 January 1942), 1 BULL. JAG 12; CM 238012 (1943).
.. In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S. D. Ohio 1944), 3 BULL. JAG 135, 139.... McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. Va. 1943), 3 BULL. JAG 6.
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on ships under army control or with troops or army cargo aboard ;230 and
civilian employees of army transports and mine planters.23 7
The foregoing cases all arose either without the territorial limits of
the United States or in the field in time of war. Through all of the
former group runs a hard core of common sense thinking, shared in by
Congress, that those whose employment, either directly or indirectly for
military purposes, carries them beyond the territorial jurisdiction of state
and federal civil courts should be subject to the jurisdiction of the only
American courts which can reach them, namely, military tribunals. The
latter group of cases, confined to those who in time of war serve with or
accompany an armed force in the field, include some arising within the
United States as well as overseas. Normally this jurisdiction is sparingly
exercised in the United States and is reserved for cases where the indi-
vidual is not only serving with or accompanying the armed force in the
field but is also engaged in work essential to the war effort. The At-
torney General has ruled that the words "in the field" imply military
operations with a view to an enemy. The federal courts have held that
the question of whether an armed force is "in the field" is to be deter-
mined by the activity in which it is engaged at the time rather than by
the locality in which it may be. Thus a temporary training camp in the
United States is "in the field. '2 8  So also is a merchant ship and crew
engaged in transporting troops and supplies to a battle zone.2389
The Judge Advocate General of the Army has administratively de-
termined that the following classes of persons are not subject to military
law: laborers, mechanics or professional personnel at industrial establish-
ments in the United States ;240 employees of an independent contractor
engaged in construction work on the Inter-American highway super-
vised by a few Army Engineer officers but where no troops were pres-
ent ;241 War Department clerical employees in Washington or in a field
office in the United States not located at a military camp ;242 and, armed
civilian guards at an Office of Strategic Services installation in a foreign
country.2 48 The Attorney General in 1878 rendered an opinion that
clerks employed by the quartermaster in time of ,peace in the United
States were not subject to military law.
244
236 SPJGW 1942/2777 (30 june 1942); CM 226362 (1942), 15 BR 95, 1 BULL.
JAG 357; CM 260578 (1944) ; CM 276748 (1945). Cf. Forgione v. United States,
100 F. Supp. 239 (E. D. Penn. 1951).
""Weber v. Squier (W. D. Wash., May 31, 1945) (No opinion filed); 4 BuLL.
JAG 229 (June 1945).
23' Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28, 34 (4th Cir. 1919).
23 McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (S. D. Va. 1943) ; In re Berue, 54 F.
Supp. 252 (S. D. Ohio 1944) ; Ex parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
240 SPJGJ 1943/9505 (12 July 1943).
2, SPJGW 1943/2645 (12 February 1943).
SPJGW 1943/9505 (12 July 1943) and SPJGW 1944/5969 (22 May 1944).
s,' SPJGW 1944/12441 (19 October 1944).
" 16 Op. Arr'y GEN. 13, 48 (1878), DIG. Ops. JAG 49, 50 (1880).
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The Court of Military Appeals has as yet had little occasion to con-
sider military jurisdiction over civilians. It has affirmed the traditional
jurisdiction of the military over its civilian employees in overseas areas
in the case of Marker, a General Service-11, Department of Army civil
service employee, who was the superintendent of a tire plant operated
by the Army in Japan under a contract with a Japanese corporation. His
conviction by court-martial for forcing from officials of the corporation
substantial "gifts" and the construction of a residence for his personal
use was approved by the court.2 45
A civilian, subject to the Code, who has been placed in arrest for an
offense committed in an overseas area cannot by his own wrongful acts
of breaching such arrest and returning to the United States 'divest the
military of jurisdiction.
246
By way of dictum, the Court has indicated that military personnel
who are discharged and re-enlist in overseas areas continue subject to
military jurisdiction during the interim as persons "accompanying the
armed forces without the continental limits of the United States." It
said:
"If ...accused's status changed, we would be faced with this
factual situation. For an infinitesimal period of time the accused
became a civilian without the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. During this period he was housed, maintained, paid, and
otherwise serviced by the United States Army. He was trans-
ported overseas and he was returned to the United States by the
Army. Between these two events he was always a soldier. Under
these circumstances he would either be accompanying or serving
with the Armies of the United States from the moment he left
these shores until he returned. If, for a moment, he stepped from
his uniform into civilian clothes and then back again, he never
stepped into a category which was not subject to military
law. .. ."247
"' United States v. Marker (No. 281), 3 CMR 127 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952). At
page 132, the court stated: "Federal cases make it clear that . . .petitioner was
'accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States,' Perlstein v. United
States, 151 F (2d) 167 (C. A. 3rd Cir.), cert. dismissed, 328 U. S. 822, 90 L. Ed.
1602, 66 S. Ct. 1358; Greive v. France, 75 F. Supp. 433; Ex parte Jochen, 257 Fed.
200; U. S. ex rel. Mobley v. Handy, 176 F (2d) 491 (C. A. 5th Cir.), cert. den., 338
U. S. 904, 94 L. Ed. 556, 70 S. Ct. 306, Hines v. Mickell, 259 F. 28 (C. A. 4th
Cir.)."
"I United States ex rel. Mobley v. Handy, 176 F. 2d 491 (5th Cir. 1949). See
also, United States v. Biagini (ACM 6341), - CMR - (1953). However,
where an individual who was both a former officer and former civilian employee of
an officer's club had completely severed all connection with the military and had
been granted a permit to remain in occupied Japan as a civilian, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals held that he was not thereafter within the jurisdiction of the Uniform
Code when charges were finally preferred for an earlier offense. United States v.
Schultz (No. 394), 4 CMR 104 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
"'4United States v. Solinsky (No. 594), 7 CMR 29 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
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C. Dependents
The problem of jurisdiction over "dependents," that is principally
wives and children, of military and other personnel subject to military
law does not appear to have arisen until the close of World War II.
This is not surprising since such dependents while in the United States
are subject to ordinary civil jurisdiction and while at typical overseas
stations before World War II, such as Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone,
Alaska and the Philippines were triable in United States territorial
courts. Military attach6 personnel in foreign countries were carefully
selected, including close scrutiny of their families, and the question either
did not arise or was settled administratively. Only after World War II
were families in large numbers permitted to accompany, or to join,
military or civilian employee heads of families in foreign countries.
Where such dependents committed offenses in occupied enemy countries,
under the laws of war, they were subject to trial by military commission,
or other tribunals in the nature of military ,commissions, convened by
the occupying power in the 'discharge of its obligation under interna-
tional law to establish and maintain law and order in the occupied
area.
248
The Military Government Court solution was inapplicable to cases
arising in friendly foreign countries such as England, France and the
Philippine Republic after it acquired full sovereignty on July 4, 1946.
Executive agreements with friendly foreign countries even where they
accorded jurisdiction over dependents to the United States did not afford
a complete answer, since the problem still remained as to whether Ameri-
can military jurisdiction extended to dependents who were otherwise not
subject thereto. Of course, where a wife or grown child took civilian
employment with one of the United States armed forces, as many in fact
did, they thereby became subject to military jurisdiction. Still left in
question was the status of those who did not become so employed. The
judge Advocate General of the Army in 1947 made a policy decision
that military jurisdiction over such dependents would not be exercised
in spite of the fact that they were "accompanying . . . the armies of
the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. 12 49  Not until May 31, 1951 did the Congressional grant of
military jurisdiction over "all persons within an area leased by or
otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which
is under the control of a Secretary of a Department and which is with-
out the continental limits of the United States . . ." (and its terri-
tories) 250 become effective. This now covers all offenses committed by
2" Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U. S. 341 (1952).
2 Article of War 2(d), 41 STAT. 787 (1920).
2 'Art. 2(12), 50 U. S. C. §552 (Supp. 1952).
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dependents while on such leased bases but is inapplicable to off base
offenses.
Fortunately, it is probable that by a 'deft dictum, the United States
Supreme Court has approved a simple solution which will hereafter be
followed where dependents commit offenses in foreign countries, either
friendly or hostile. Yvette Madsen killed her American Air Force
lieutenant husband at their residence in Frankfurt, Germany in October
1949, was thereafter tried for and convicted of murder by a United
States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, and after
affirmance by the "Court of Appeals for the Allied High Commission
for Germany" was confined in the Federal Reformatory for Women at
Alderson, West Virginia, to serve a fifteen year sentence. She peti-
tioned for habeas corpus relief contending that she should have been
tried by a court-martial and that the tribunal which tried her was with-
out jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, upheld the
jurisdiction of the court which tried petitioner, denied relief and dis-
cussed petitioner's status an'd liability to trial by court-martial, as follows:
"Petitioner is a native-born citizen of the United States who
lawfully entered the American Zone of Occupied Germany in 1947
with her husband, Lieutenant Madsen of the United States Air
Force. In 1949, she resided there, with him, in a house requisi-
tioned for military use, furnished and maintained by military
authority. She was permitted to use the facilities of the United
States Army maintained there for persons in its service and for
those serving with or accompanying the United States Armed
Forces. In brief, her status was that of a civilian dependent wife
of a member of the United States Armed Forces which were then
occupying the United States Area of Control in Germany.
25'
".... Article of War 2(d) further defined 'any person subject
to military law' as including 'all persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States without the territorial juris-
diction of the United States . . .' . This included petitioner.
2 52
In this concise manner the high court has stated, what on principle
appears to be perfectly clear, that 'dependents overseas, "accompany"
the Armies of the United States and so, under present Article 2(11),25'
may be tried by court-martial.
In 1952 in occupied Japan, Dorothy Krueger Smith killed her Army
colonel husband in their military residence in Tokyo. An Army court-
martial convicted her of premeditated murder and imposed a life sen-
"" Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U. S. 341, 343 (1952).
2" Id. at 361.
2-- 50 U. S. C. § 552 (Supp. 1952).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tence which action was affirmed by a Board of Review.254 It was seri-
ously contended that the accused upon the death of her husband ceased to
be a dependent and so at the time of trial was not subject to court-martial
jurisdiction. In rejecting this contention, the Board, in part, relied on
the Madsen case, and said:
"... her status as a spouse or dependent ceased to exist upon
her husband's death; but ... she remained a person 'accompany-
ing' the armed forces of the United States within the meaning of
the Code and subject to the jurisdiction thereof for all purposes
herein considered. 255
A point not raised by the Smith case is whether a court-martial convened
by the Navy, Coast Guard or Air Force would have had jurisdiction.
A reading of the Code would seem to impel an affirmative answer.
Having in mind, however, the administrative ruling made as to the trial
of -dishonorably discharged military prisoners,256 it is probable that the
opinion of the respective Judge Advocates General on this point would
be that jurisdiction should be exercised only by the service of which the
dependent's sponsor is, or was, a member.
D. Miscelliaeous
There remain for discussion a few problems of status of the person
which do not fall within the three foregoing classifications. It should
be noted that Congress has expressly preserved military jurisdiction in
Article 3(b) over those who have fraudulently obtained their 'discharge
from the armed forces, and in Article 3(c) over undetected deserters
who have obtained a separation from any subsequent period of service.2 7
National Guard personnel, who have no other dual military status,
are not in the armed forces of the United States except when called into
the active federal service by direction of the President either as units or
as individuals. Thus, such National Guard personnel while attending
service schools in the United States under Section 99 of the National
Defense Act 2 r, have been held to be not subject to trial by court-martial
convened by the commanding officer of the service school.25 9 Similarly
',United States v. Smith (CM 360857), 10 CMR - (1953).
Id. p. 15 adv. op.
25 See note 172, supra. See, however, United States v. Biagini (ACM 6341),
- CMR - (1953) which held a civilian employee on Okinawa of a conces-
sionaire of the central exchange, an army activity, was subject to the jurisdiction
of an Air Force court-martial.
"7 The provisions of Article 3(b) and 3(c) are set forth in full in note 107supra.
25839 STAT. 207 (1916).
2"5DIG. Ops. JAG §359(5) (1912-40) and Letteir JAGJ 1953/2104 (4 March
1953), cited in 2 JAG CHRox. No. 14, p. 56 (April 3, 1953). See also Johnson v.
Sayre, 158 U. S. 109 (1895). See, however, Armed Forces Reserve Act of July 9,
1952, 66 STAT. 481 (1952), 50 U. S. C. A. §§901-1124 (Supp. 1952). Section 1001
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National Guard personnel on garrison duty or at summer encampments
while under state control, as distinguished from being in active federal
service, are not normally subject to trial by a federally convened court-
martial. While in a non-federal duty status such personnel are subject
to trial by state courts-martial where the law of the state makes separate
provision therefor. In a number of the states detailed legislative pro-
vision is made for all aspects of the government of the state militia or
national guard when not in federal service. 26 0  The propriety of the
exercise of such jurisdiction by the states was recognized by the Supreme
Court at least as early as 1820.261
To the reader who has persisted thus far it becomes apparent that
between those who obviously are and those who obviously are not sub-
ject to military jurisdiction there lies a large peripheral area containing
persons whose status is such as to require discriminating evaluation by
those charged with the enforcement of the military law, alert examination
by defense counsel and measured judgment by all who discharge judicial
duties within the system of military law.
IV. DID THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION
OF THE OFFENSE?
A. Offenses Punishable Are Purely Statutory
Although the authority for courts-martial does not stem from the
Third or Judiciary Article of the Constitution,262 courts-martial are
analogous to other federal courts in that the offenses to which their
jurisdiction extend are confined to those expressly denounced by Con-
gress in the punitive articles.2 6  This statement is subject to the quali-
fication that Congress by Article 18 has specified: "General courts-
thereof provides: "There shall be no discrimination between and among members
of the Regular and reserve components in the administration of laws applicable to
both Regulars and Reserves." Section 1112 thereof in substance provides that the
National Guard and Air National Guard of the United States shall consist of mem-
bers who in addition to their status as such are Reserves of the Army and Air
Force in the same grade they hold in the Guard. Section 1124 in part provides:
"For the purpose of . . .benefits . . . full-time training or other full-time duty
performed by members of the National Guard . . .or the Air National Guard of
the United States . . . for which they are entitled to receive pay from the United
States .. .shall be considered active duty for training in the Service of the United
States as Reserve members of the Army or Air Force . .. " and contains a similar
provision as to inactive-duty training. The impact of this legislation, if any, in the
area of federal courts-martial jurisdiction has not yet been tested. It might be
urged that this legislation places National Guard personnel in the same jurisdic-
tional status as other reserve personnel. On the other hand it could be argued that
Congress would not extend Article 2 jurisdiction by implication. It is probable
this question will ultimately engage the attention of the Court of Military Appeals.
200 Typical are CAL. MIL. AND VET. CODE §§ 450473 (Supp. 1949) and New York
Laws 1953, c. 617, approved April 8, 1953.
2.1 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 27 (U. S. 1820).
2" Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U. S. 1857).
202 Arts. 77 to 134 inclusive, 50 U. S. C. §§ 671-728 (Supp. 1952).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
martial shall also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law
of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal. .... -264 This derivative
jurisdiction from the law of war widens the horizon of general courts-
martial not only as to persons but as to offenses as well. As previously
stated, the ramifications of this derivative jurisdiction are beyond the
scope of this paper. It should be remembered, however, that this law of
war jurisdiction vests in general courts-martial, as distinguished from
military commissions, only because Congress has expressly so provided.
Courts-martial per se do not have any residual or common law juris-
diction as to either persons or offenses such as normally resides in state
courts of general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the investigation by -defense
counsel as to jurisdiction of the offense is in the military system poten-
tially more remunerative than is normally the case in state criminal pro-
ceedings.
B. Only Military Personnel Can Commit Certain Offenses
It should be observed that a few of the offenses denounced in the
punitive articles are strictly military offenses and so can be committed
only by military personnel, whereas the others are of such a nature that
anyone subject to the Code, either military or civilian, may commit them.
For example, desertion 265 cannot be committed by a civilian, nor can it
be commited by a military prisoner with an executed dishonorable dis-
charge.26  On the other hand, the Court of Military Appeals has 'de-
cided that a civilan employee overseas can commit under Article 134,
the general article, the offense of "conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces .... ,,267 There the specific conduct found to be
violative of the article was the coercing, from subordinate Japanese
civilian employees manufacturing tires for the military, of substantial
donations of both goods and services for the personal benefit of the
accused.
The offenses of desertion,268 absence without leave2 9 and the nine
separate offenses denounced under the collective heading of "Misbe-
havior before the enemy"2 0 can be committed only by "Any member of
20, 50 U. S. C. § 578 (Supp. 1952). Special and summary courts-martial do not
possess this derivative jurisdiction, nor do they have jurisdiction over any capital
offenses. Arts. 19 and 20, 50 U. S. C. §§ 579, 580 (Supp. 1952). However, a spe-
cial court may try non-mandatory sentence capital offenses if a general court-
martial convening authority has first directed that the case be treated as non-capital.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 15(a) (3), p. 19.
2 Art. 85, 50 U. S. C. §§679 (Supp. 1952).
.. United States v. Rushing (CM 272382), 46 BR 301 (1945). However, it
has been held that a military prisoner with an executed dishonorable discharge can
be guilty of the offense of assaulting a superior officer. [Art. 90, 50 U. S. C. § 684
(Supp. 1952)]. United States v. Scott (CM 252812), 34 BR 197, 201 (1944).
2.7 United States v. Marker (No. 281), 3 CMR 127 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
268 Art. 85, 50 U. S. C. § 679 (Supp. 1952).
2" Art. 86, 50 U. S. C. § 680 (Supp. 1952).
2" Art. 99, 50 U. S. C. § 693 (Supp. 1952).
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the armed forces ... ." The offenses of using contemptuous words
against certain government officials can be commited only by an officer.
271
Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman can be accomplished
only by an officer, cadet or midshipman.27 2  Insubordinate conduct to-
wards warrant officers, noncommissioned officers or petty officers can
be perpetrated only by warrant officers and enlisted persons.2 7 3  The
offenses of being drunk or sleeping upon his post, or leaving it before
being regularly relieved, can be committed only by a person who has been
posted as a sentinel or look-out.27 4 All of the other punitive articles,
presumptively at least, may be violated by any person subject to the Code
whether civilian or military.
C. Jurisdiction Unlimited As to Certain Offenses
There are three offenses for which a court-martial may try any per-
son, even though in all other respects such persons are not in any other
manner subject to the Code. These are aiding the enemy,
275 spying,270
and contempt of a court-martial by menacing words, signs or gestures
in its presence, or by disturbing its proceedings by any riot or dis-
order.27 7 This jurisdiction has been sparingly exercised, if at all. Where
civilians, who are American citizens, engage in conduct which constitutes
aiding the enemy, normally they are tried for treason 278 in a United
States District Court.2 7 9  Similarly, American civilians who engage in




D. Jurisdiction Is a Question of Fact, Not Pleading
Defects in pretrial procedure, not involving the composition of the
court, generally will not divest a court-martial of jurisdiction.281 Thus,
although Article 30(a)282 requires that, "Charges and specifications shall
be signed by a person subject to this code under oath before an officer
of the armed forces authorized to administer oaths . . . ," the Court of
Military Appeals has held that, where the accused -does not promptly
.. Art. 88, 50 U. S. C. §682 (Supp. 1952).M Art. 133, 50 U. S. C. § 727 (Supp. 1952).
7' Art. 91, 50 U. S. C. § 685 (Supp. 1952).
" Art. 113, 50 U. S. C. § 707 (Supp. 1952).
275 Art. 104, 50 U. S. C. § 698 (Supp. 1952).
Art. 106, 50 U. S. C. § 700 (Supp. 1952).
277 Art. 48, 50 U. S. C. § 623 (Supp. 1952).
218 18 U. S. C. § 1 (Supp. 1952) based upon the definition of treason contained
in U. S. CONsT. Art. III § 3 providing: "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United
States levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the United States or elsewhere is guilty of treason."
... Typical is United States v. Kawakita, 343 U. .717 (1952).
... United States v. Rosenburg, 195 F. 2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U. S. 838 (1952) ; rehearing denied, 344 U. S. 889 (1952) ; order dismissing petition
for new trial affirmed, 200 F. 2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952) ; motion to vacate stay granted,
346 U. S. 273 (1953).... United States v. Floyd (CM 229477), 17 BR 149 (1943).
2 50 U. S. C. § 601 (Supp. 1952).
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object, a trial on unsworn charges is valid. 2 3 Similarly, Congress has
confirmed previous decisions of the Supreme Court which held that
defects in, or the complete absence of, a pretrial investigation did not
divest a general court-martial of jurisdiction.28 4 It has also been held
that material changes made in charges after the investigation and without
a new investigation being conducted is neither jurisdictional nor preju-
dicial error.
28 5
Military pleading requires that the article, or articles, of the Code
violated be set forth in the "Charge" or "Charges1 28 and that the "Spe-
cification," or specifications should include the name of the accused, his
status subjecting him to the Code, where and when the offense was com-
mitted, and in simple concise language, the facts constituting the of-
fense.287 However, neither the designation of a wrong article287a in the
charge nor the failure to designate any article is ordinarily material, so
long as the specification states an offense subject to court-martial juris-
diction. Charging murder under the wrong article has been held on
habeas corpus attack not to constitute jurisdictional error.288 The Court
of Military Appeals has gone further and ruled it to be immaterial that
the charge recited a violation of Article of War 93,289 when in fact the
accused, having finally and completely separated from the service and all
connection therewith, was not subject to the Articles of War. The con-
viction was affirmed because the specification stated a violation of the
Japanese criminal code which had been continued in effect by military
order and which a court-martial could enforce by reason of its derivative
jurisdiction conferred by Article of War 12200 to try offenses against the
law of war. In upholding jurisdiction in the case the Court said:
"Jurisdiction is neither vested nor divested by the formalities
of pleading.... If a specification states an offense in violation of
the law of war, categorizing it as a violation of military law is not
a fatal error."12
9'
23 United States v. May (No. 241), 2 CMR 80 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952). Also,
United States v. Simpson (CM 310246), 61 BR 225 (1946). However, where prior
to entering a plea the accused objected to being brought to trial on unsworn charges,
it was prejudicial error for the law officer to overrule the objection. United States
v. Oliveri (ACM 6055), - CMR - (1953).
... See notes 100, 101 and 102 supra.... United States v. Hawkins (CM ETO 4570), 13 BR ETO 57 (1945).
. M ANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1127, p. 30.
-Id. at 1128, pp. 30, 31.
-" United States v. Deller (No. 1859), 12 CMR 165 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
Desertion with intent to shirk important service erroneously charged under Article
134.
..8 Johnson v. Biddle, 12 F. 2d 366 (8th Cir. 1926).
- 41 STAT. 805 (1920) (involuntary manslaughter).
28041 STAT. 789 (1920). The present equivalent provision is Art. 18, 50 U. S. C.
§ 578 (Supp. 1952).
"' United States v. Schultz (No. 394), 4 CMR 104, 115 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952),
affirming (ACM 3786) 4 CMR 574. Reliance was placed on Givens v. Zerbst, 255
U. S. 11 (1921). Accord, United States v. Fleming (CM 347931), 2 CMR 312
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The general rule as to the sufficiency of the wording of a specification
is that it must fairly inform the accused of the offense with which he
stands charged and must be sufficiently definite to prevent the accused
from again being tried for the same offense, but it need not be framed in
technical language nor with the exactitude of a common law indict-
ment.292 The Court has aptly observed in this regard, "Sight must not
be lost of the fact that the prosecution of crime-military or civilian-is
not a fox hunt, and that rather different ground rules should obtain."
29 3
E. Specific Offenses
With this enlightened approach it is not surprising that only a few
cases have reached the Court which challenge a specification as not stat-
ing an offense punishable under the Code. Article 121,294 which prolixly
combined common law larceny, embezzlement, and larceny by false pre-
tense into the single offense of larceny and collectively characterized all
three by the word "steals," has been examined. A specification drawn
thereunder was found to state an offense though it did not contain lan-
guage which would identify it as one of the common law offenses to the
exclusion of the others. The specification in question alleged that the
accused did "steal" specified sums of money from named individuals.
The Court of Military Appeals found this properly pleaded the elements
of this offense consisting of:
"... two elements: (1) that the accused obtained possession
(1951) (forgery), and United States v. Kaukoreit (CM 302791), 59 BR 7 (1946).
See Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382 (1897). See, however, United States
v. Bernard (ACM 6383) - CMR - (1953).
"z'United States v. Marker (No. 281), 3 CMR 127 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952);
United States v. Snyder (No. 409), 4 CMR 15 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952); United
States v. Aldridge (No. 686), 8 CMR 130 (M. S. C. M. A. 1953) ; United States
v. Johnson (No. 2097), 11 CMR 174, 176 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) ; United States
v. Field (No. 2210), 11 CMR 182, 185 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953); United States v.
Bunch (No. 2297), 11 CMR 186, 189 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) ; United States v. Sell
(No. 1939) 11 CMR 202, 206 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953); United States v. Cowan
(CM 364954), 11 CMR - (1953); United States v. Karl (No. 1904), 12 CMR
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953); United States v. Greenlee (No. 1930), 13 CMR
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
203 United States v. Aldridge, supra note 292, at p. 133.
50 U.S.C. 1 715 (Supp. 1952). Paragraph (a) thereof reads:
"Larceny and wrongful appropriation (article 121)
(a) Any person subject to this code who wrongfully takes, obtains, or
withholds, by any means whatever, from the possession of the true owner or
of any other person any money, personal property, or article of value of any
kind-
(1) with intent permanently to deprive or defraud another person of
the use and benefit of property or to appropriate the same to his own use or
the use of any person other than the true owner, steals such property and is
guilty of larceny; or
(2) with intent temporarily to deprive or defraud another person of
the use and benefit of property or to appropriate the same to his own use or
the use of any other person other than the true owner is guilty of wrongful
appropriation .. "
In a prosecution under Article 121 it is unnecessary to allege the false pretenses
by which the property was obtained, but they must be proved. United States v.
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of the property in question, of some value, (2) with an intent,
then or thereafter conceived, permanently to deprive the true
owner of its use and benefit."
295
The Court has upheld a specification under Article 132205a which in
essence alleged that the accused "did . . . by preparing a request for
commutation of rations for presentment to the commanding general ...
make a claim against the United States . . . which claim was false and
fraudulent ... in that he ... did not then intend to so subsist with his
family and was then known by the (accused) to be false and fraudu-
lent."2 96 Accused pleaded guilty to this specification but on appeal con-
tended that it did not state an offense. Article 132 in pertinent part
denounces as offenses, among others, the conduct of one "(1) who,
knowing it to be false or fraudulent-(A) makes a claim against the
United States . . . ; or (B) presents to any person in the civil or mili-
tary service thereof, for approval or payment, any claim against the
United States. . . ." Accused's appellate contention was that merely
the preparation of a claim was alleged and nothing which carried the
act of the accused beyond the preparatory stage. The Court pointed out
that by motion before or during trial the accused could have required a
more artful wording of the specification but that, as against jurisdictional
attack, the specification as drawn alleged that the accused "did... make
a claim," and that this stated an offense since it was "susceptible of an
interpretation that a voucher was prepared by (accused) and placed in
the hands of some individual who in the normal course of events would
present it to the general.
'297
In a Navy case the Board of Review reversed a conviction for missing
ship through neglect. This and the more serious act of missing ship
through design are both declared to be offenses by Article 87.208 The
evidence showed the accused on June 7, 1952 acknowledged in writing
the information that his ship was scheduled to sail for overseas duty on
July 7, 1952, and that the ship so sailed. Accused pleaded guilty to
Beasley (No. 2173), 11 CMR 110, 112 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). See also United
States v. Buck (No. 2330), 12 CMR 97 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
25 United States v. Aldridge (No. 686), 8 CMR 130, 132 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
It has been held that a specification alleging the larceny of "the property of the
Trailer Court Fund, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana" is good since the owner
need not be a legal entity. United States v. Wilkey (CM 358746), - CMR
(1953).
As to whether a larceny is single or multiple for the purpose of determining the
value of the property taken, see United States v. Florence (No. 207), 5 CMR 48
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
295k 50 U. S. C. § 726 (Supp. 1952). Forging a signature to a payroll and ob-
taining money thereby constitutes presenting a claim and is a fraud against the
government properly chargeable under Article 132. United States v. Field (No.
2210), 11 CMR 182 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
.9. United States v. Steele (No. 943), 9 CMR 9. 10 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
Id. at p. 5.
29850 U. S. C. § 681 (Supp. 1952).
(Vol. 32
1953] COURT-MARTIAL UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 51
unauthorized absence from June 17, 1952 until July 27, 1952. The
Board based its reversal on the absence of evidence establishing causal
connection between accused's neglect and the missing of the scheduled
movement. Upon certification of the case by the Navy Judge Advocate
General, the Court found this evidence established a prima facie case of
missing ship through neglect, reversed the Board, and said:
"Where a -definite movement date is set and known to the ac-
cused, who thereupon remains absent without authority beyond
the scheduled date of departure, we can see no necessity for any
special proof of causal connection. Assuming knowledge, the only
rational explanations are either deliberate avoidance or careless-
ness resulting in avoidance.
'299
There is a salty tang to the case of Seaman Simpson who, it was
alleged, " having knowledge of a lawful order issued by the Command-
ing Officer ... in part as follows: 'Liberty Uniform . . . white jumper
is mandatory,' an order which it was his duty to obey, did, while at...
Guam . . . fail to obey the same, to wit: not wearing the jumper."300
Simpson pleaded guilty to this offense under Article 92,301 but the Board
of Review conclude the failure to allege that the accused was on liberty
at the time the order was violated constituted a fatal defect. Upon cer-
tification the Court again reversed the Board, held the specification good
and said:
The accused could not disobey the order without being on
liberty. There could not be a disobedience unless the accused was
.. United States v. Thompson (No. 1673), 9 CMR 90, 94 (U. S. C. M. A.
1953). The accused need not be assigned to duty with the aircraft or ship involved
in the movement missed to constitute the offense of missing movement. United
States v. Johnson (No. 2097), 11 CMR 174 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
"'United States v. Simpson (No. 1938), 9 CMR 123, 124 (U. S. C. M. A.1953).150 U. S. C. § 686 (Supp. 1952). United States v. Snyder (No. 409), 4 CMR
15, 19 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) held evidence supporting a specification that accused
"... did.., violate a lawful regulation, to wit,... camp regulations ... 'Female
civilians will not be permitted to enter the barracks . . .'; in that he did permit
... to enter ... and did accompany... Gertrude Williams into... building num-
ber BB-12," properly established the offense under Article 92 of violating a lawful
general order or regulation. The court stated in substance that "general orders"
are what were formerly referred to in the services as "standing orders" and include'
post regulations. The Snyder case, however, is no longer law so far as the naval
service is concerned. After its decision the Naval Supplement to the MANUAL was
published which defines a "commander," as used in paragraph 171 (a) of the
MANUAL as "an officer of flag or general rank." Based on this definition, the Court
distinguished the Snyder case and held the allegation of the violation of a ship
order, issued by a navy commander commanding a destroyer, did not state a vio-
lation of a general order under Article 92(1). United States v. Bunch (No. 2297),
11 CMR 186 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
For a discussion of the limitation imposed on punishment of offenses charged
under Article 92 by the provisions of MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 1951, ff 127c, p. 221, n. 5, see United States v. Buckmiller (No. 492), 4
CMR 96 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). See also United States v. Sell (No. 1939), 11
CMR 202 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
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in that status as failure to wear it on other occasions would not be
a violation of the order. We -do not understand the rule governing
pleading to go so far as to hold that every self-evident fact must
be alleged. Neither do we understand that required implication
cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of a speci-
fication."
3 02
F. Offenses Under the General Articles
As might be expected, most attacks against the insufficiency of speci-
fications to state, or evidence to establish, cognizable offenses have been
launched in cases brought under the general Articles 133 or 134803 or
their predecessors. The punitive Articles from 80 to 132 inclusive,80 4
though many of them state more than one offense in a single article, all
deal with specific offenses the elements of which are precisely defined
therein. In addition to these, however, Congress has again seen fit to
denounce as offenses, in general terms in Articles 133 and 134, conduct
which traditionally from the foundation of the Government has been
prohibited by the Articles of War. 05 Thus under Article 133, "Any
officer, cadet or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct." What constitutes "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle-
man" is not defined by Congress. Article 134 may be violated by any
person subject to the Code. It provides for punishment of, "Though
not specifically mentioned in this code," (1) "all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces," (2)
"all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and"
(3) "crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this
code may be guilty." This Article defines three distinct classes of of-
30. United States v. Simpson (No. 1938), 9 CMR 123, 125 (U. S. C. M. A.
1953). Similarly, it has been held under Art. 108, 50 U. S. C. § 702 (Supp. 1952)
that ". . . destruction of government property through neglect appears to be a lesser
included offense of willful destruction of such property, whenever it is reasonably
raised by the-evidence without regard to its description in the specification." United
States v. Wright (No. 2653), 13 CMR - (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
0- 50 U. S. C. §§ 727, 728 (Supp. 1952).
30450 U. S. C. §§ 674-726 (Supp. 1952).
... The American Articles of War enacted by the Second Continental Congress
on June 30, 1775 contained these provisions:
"XLVII. Whatsoever commissioned officer shall be convicted before a
general court-martial, of behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner such as
is unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, shall be discharged
from the services."
"L. All crimes, not capital, and all disorders and neglects, which officers
and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline, though not mentioned in the articles of war, are to be taken cogni-
zance of by a general or regimental court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, and be punished at their discretion."
Reprinted in WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 957 (2d ed. 1920);
see discussion at page 720.
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fenses, 30° although Congress has not seen fit to set them off by number
or paragraphing, but leaves to custom and case law the determination
of precisely what specific acts constitute violations under each of these
prohibitions. Actually the type of conduct which will be charged as
violative of these general articles has become considerably rigidified. It
is unusual to proceed under the general articles unless the conduct is of
a type expressly classified thereunder in the Manual30 7 and for which
sample specifications are provided.308
"Crimes and offenses not capital" include acts, not made punishable
by another article, which are denounced as crimes by Congress or under
authority of Congress and made triable in the Federal civil courts.3 09
Examples of these are indecent assaults, assaults with intent to com-
mit murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, sodomy, arson,
burglary and housebreaking which are not embraced within Article 128;
counterfeiting; false swearing; bribery; offenses against the mail; and
misprison of felony. This list, which is by no means exhaustive, indi-
cates that Congress has been content to leave a number of offenses which
it has denounced in the United States Criminal Code 10 to be enforced
by military justice procedures, against those subject to the Code, under
the general articles rather than duplicating them in specific articles of
the Code. As to murder,31 ' manslaughter,3 12 rape,313 larceny,3 14 rob-
bery,3 1 5 forgery,3 1 6 maiming,31 7 sodomy,3 13 arson,3 19 extortion, 3 20 certain
assaults, 321 burglary,322 housebreaking,3 23 perjury,324 and making or pre-
800 See United States v. Snyder (No. 409), 4 CMR 15 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952);
United States v. Messenger (No. 310), 6 CMR 21 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; United
States v. Long (No. 464), 6 CMR 60 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; and United States
v. Frantz (No. 1114), 7 CMR 37 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
... MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951 111 212, 213, pp. 380-387.
... Id. App. 6c, pp. 488-495.
SOD Id. 1 213c, p. 383. Included are offenses denounced by state law, as to federal
reservations within any given state, as provided by the Assimilative Crimes Act,
18 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1952). This is true, however, only to the extent that such
state law does not conflict with federal law or regulation. Williams v. United
States, 327 U. S. 711 (1946) ; and see Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 321 U. S. 383
(1944) ; Air Terminal Services Inc., v. Rentzel, 81 F. Supp. 611 (E. D. Va. 1949);
Nash v. Air Terminal Services Inc., 85 F. Supp. 545 (E. D. Va. 1949).
"10 Title 18, U. S. C. (Supp. 1952).
""Art. 118, 50 U. S. C. §712 (Supp. 1952).
818Art. 119, 50 U. S. C. § 713 (Supp. 1952).
818Art. 120, 50 U. S. C. § 714 (Supp. 1952).
81 Art. 121, 50 U. S. C. § 715 (Supp. 1952).
1Art. 122, 50 U. S. C. § 716 (Supp. 1952).
81 Art. 123, 50 U. S. C. § 717 (Supp. 1952).
317 Art. 124, 50 U. S. C. § 718 (Supp. 1952).
31 Art. 125, 50 U. S. C. § 719 (Supp. 1952).
810 Art. 126, 50 U. S. C. § 720 (Supp. 1952).
820 Art. 127, 50 U. S. C. § 721 (Supp. 1952).
"I Art. 128, 50 U. S. C. § 722 (Supp. 1952).
Art. 129, 50 U. S. C. § 723 (Supp. 1952).
823 Art. 130, 50 U. S. C. §724 (Supp. 1952).
824 Art. 131, 50 U. S. C. § 725 (Supp. 1952).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
senting a false or fraudulent claim, 25 Congress has seen fit to duplicate
its prohibition in both the Criminal Code and in separate articles of the
Uniform Code. Generally, these offenses to which separate articles are
devoted are the more serious ones, but why Congress persists in using
both the method of express denunciation and incorporation by reference
in solving essentially the same legislative problem remains an inscrutable
Congressional prerogative. Perhaps the best answer is that each ap-
proach is a proper exercise of its power, "To make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. ' 20
The contention that the general articles are unconstitutional because
of uncertainty, and hence that an offense cannot be stated thereunder,
is a favorite one with defense counsel. It was urged upon the Court of
Military Appeals in the case of Marine Private Frantz, whom under
Article 134 it was charged "did . . . wrongfully have in his possession
with intent to deceive, an armed forces liberty pass... well knowing the
same to be false." The Navy Board of Review reversed a conviction
holding that an allegation of "intent to deceive" did not state an "intent
to defraud" which was required by 18 U. S. C. § 499 which renders
criminal the possession of a military pass "with intent to defraud." On
certification, the Court ruled that the Board erred in assuming that the
specification was laid under the "crimes and offenses not capital" part
of the Article and held that deceitful possession of a liberty card was
conduct "to the prejudice of good order and discipline," and that it was
unnecessary to decide whether it also was "conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces."327 Passing to the asserted unconsti-
tutionality of Article 134, the Court rejected this contention and said:
"Surely the third clause of the Article is not vague. However,
we cannot ignore the conceivable presence of uncertainty in the
first two clauses. Assuming that civilian precedents in the field
are applicable in full force to the military community, we do not
perceive in the Article vagueness or uncertainty to an unconstitu-
tional degree. The provision as it appears in the Uniform Code
is no novelty to service criminal law .... On the contrary it has
been a part of our military law since 1775, and directly traces its
origin to British sources .... It must be judged, therefore, not in
vacuo, but in the context in which the years have placed it....
That the clauses under scrutiny have acquired the core of a settled
and understandable content of meaning is clear from the no less
than forty-seven different offenses cognizable thereunder ex-
"r Art. 132, 50 U. S. C. § 726 (Supp. 1952).
12' U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
""United States v. Frantz (No. 1114), 7 CMR 37, 38 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
Accord, United States v. Tomes (ACM 6187), 9 CMR 679 (1953).
[Vol. 32
1953] COURT-MARTIAL UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 55
plicitly included in the Table of Maximum Punishments of the
Manual, . . . paragraph 127c, pages 224-227. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Article establishes a standard 'well enough
known to enable those within . . . (its) reach to correctly apply
them.' "328
WAC Sergeant First Class Long and other enlisted WAC's were
charged with and convicted of a violation of Article 134, "In that (they)
... did ... violate Title 18, Section 241, United States Code . . . by
commiting an assault and battery upon Private First Class Carol A.
Kierce, on account of her having previously attended and testified as a
witness in a court of the United States, namely a Summary Court-
Martial. '329 The contention was made that this allegation and proof
did not establish an offense under Title 18, Section 241 because a sum-
"mary court-martial was not a "court of the United States." The Court
affirmed the conviction and held it was unnecessary to decide this ques-
tion since in any event, the assaulting of a witness because she had testi-
fied before a military court would constitute a -disorder to the prejudice
of good order and discipline of the armed forces and, hence, an offense
under Article 134. As to the fact that the pleader patently had con-
sidered the offense not "a disorder," but rather an "offense not capital"
the Court said:
"The phrase in the specification which states 'violate Title 18,
Section 241, United States Code. . .' may be deleted and a sub-
stantive offense contrary to Article 134 is sufficiently alleged.
The quoted clause may, therefore, be considered redundant and
unnecessary."
38 0
The case of Navy Captain Schumacher involved Article I, Paragraph
1, Articles for the Government of the Navy,33 ' the naval antecedent of
general Article 134. Under it accused was charged with and convicted
of, among other things, that he did in violation of Section 311 of the
Penal Code of Guam, from on or about June 15, 1950 to on or about
August 1, 1950, expose his person and private parts to a young girl, who
was offended and annoyed thereby, and further that he did during the
same period take indecent liberties with a fifteen-year-old girl by placing
his hand on the leg and under the dress of the girl. The Court rejected
a contention that the specifications were defective in that they failed to
allege with particularity the time of the commission of the offenses speci-
fied and expressly approved the Manual provision that "When the
"' United States v. Frantz, i pra note 327, p. 38.
... United States v. Long (No. 1114), 6 CMR 60, 64 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
"'Id. at 66.
"'REv. STAT. § 1624 (1800), 34 U. S. C. § 1200 (1946).
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acts specified extend over a considerable period of time it is proper to
allege them as having occurred, for example, "from about 15 June 1951
to about 4 November 195 1. ' ' 32 In affirming the sentence of dismissal
the Court also rejected the contention that this evidence established no
crimes. It found that the indecent exposure violated the Guam Penal
Code and thus was an "offense not capital, and that the indecent liberties
taken by this commanding officer of a Naval Air Station constituted
scandalous conduct which tended to the destruction of good morals and
was also prejudicial to good order and military discipline.883
Naval Airman Messenger was convicted by a special court-martial
of impersonating an officer in violation of Article 134. The Board of
Review reversed because there was no evidence that by the impersona-
tion the accused gained some advantage to the prejudice of the person
counterfeited. In the absence of such evidence the Board felt the offense
was so minor that it should have been disposed of by trial by a summary
court or by non-judicial punishment under Article 15.334 On certifica-
tion the Court reversed the Board and declared that, except possibly in
a clear case of abuse, a Board of Review could not interfere with the
discretion of the convening authority in the selection of the type of court
to try a case and that here there had been no abuse in selecting a special
court. The Court further held that:
"The gravamen of the military offense of impersonation does
not depend upon the accused deriving a benefit from the deception
or upon some third party being misled, but rather upon whether
the acts and conduct would influence adversely the good order and
discipline of the armed forces.
'33 5
Marine Sergeant Snyder was charged with and convicted of three
different violations of Article 134 in that he "did at Camp Lejeune...
attempt to entice (three different military persons) to engage in sexual
intercourse with a female to be 'directed to him by . . . Snyder."880
... MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 7, app. 6a, p. 470.
.. United States v. Schumacher (No. 680), 7 CMR 10, 12 (U. S. C. M. A.
195 ! "50 U. S. C. § 571 (Supp. 1952).
"' United States v. Messenger (No. 310), 6 CMR 21, 24, 25 (U. S. C. M. A.
1952). Cited with approval were United States v. Miller (CM 266137), 43 BR
135 (1944) and United States v. Yaroslowsky (CM 316932), 66 BR 121 (1947).
See United States v. Gillispie (CM 360289) 9 CMR 299 (1953). Similarly, it has
been held that the unauthorized sale of blank pass forms constitutes conduct pre-
judicial to the Naval service and that an intent to deceive or defraud is not an
essential element of the offense. United States v. Karl (No. 1904), 12 CMR -
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
; United States v. Snyder (No. 409), 4 CMR 15, 16 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
It has been held that the mere act of a single man and single woman registering
as husband and wife and occupying a room together for the night with no other
circumstances shown does not amount to an offense in violation of Article 134.
United States v. Walters (CM 362540), 11 CMR - (1953) ; United States v.
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Apparently in all seriousness, appellate defense counsel urged that pan-
dering was not an offense under the Code and the Navy Board of Review
agreed. Again the Navy judge Advocate General certified the case and
the Court held that such solicitation even though not shown to have
been accompanied by an expectation of financial gain constituted the
offense of conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline under
the general article.
Navy Lieutenant Herndon was found guilty of a violation of Article
134 under a specification charging that he did at "Yokosuka, Japan,...
unlawfully receive about two hundred pounds of coffee, . . the property
of the United States Government, which property ... he ... then well
knew, had been stolen."'a The Board of Review assumed that the
specification intended to allege a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 641 and fell
short of doing so in that it failed to state that the receiving was "with
intent to convert to his own use or gain." For this reason it held the
proceedings fatally defective. The Navy Judge Advocate General cer-
tified the case and the Court, while agreeing with the Board that the
specification did not state an offense under Title 18, found it did define
an offense under Article 134 as a disorder and neglect to the prejudice
of good order and discipline, and that the knowing receipt of stolen
government property is such an offense regardless of the presence of an
intent to "convert it to his use or gain." Again the Board of Review
was reversed. It is perhaps appropriate to observe here that since dis-
missal is no longer mandatory upon a conviction under Article 133 and
may be imposed as a part of the sentence against an erring officer under
Article 134, and since Article 134 is considerably broader than Article
133, there is a current trend away from the use of Article 133 and to
Article 134 in officer cases. However Article 133 may still be used.3aa
Basic Airman Shores' conviction under Article 134 for being dis-
respectful in language to an air policeman while in the exercise of police
duties was upheld by an Air Force Board as a disorder to the prejudice
Prater (CM 339731), 5 BR/JC 221, 229 (1950); United States v. Martin (CM
317233), 66 BR 259 (1947). Apparently contra is United States v. Andrews
(ACM 6105), 9 CMR 667 (1953).
.. United States v. Herndon (No. 570), 4 CMR 53, 55 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
" In United States v. Gomes (No. 2165), 11 CMR 232, 236 (U. S. C. M. A.
1953) the Court held: ". .. an allegation that an officer of the armed forces who,
with intent to deceive, gives a known false statement to a special agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation making inquiry on acts touching upon the execu-
tion of his official duties while in the employ of the Government sufficiently charges
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman."
A specification alleging that the accused officer "did .. .wrongfully, corruptly,
and dishonorably solicit (Sgt K) to aid and assist him . . . to obtain from the
United States a jacket, field, wool, OD, and a pair of trousers, wool, OD, for his
own personal use, to which he . . . was not entitled" sufficiently alleges an offense
in violation of Article 133. United States v. Love (CM 365501), 12 CMR ....
(1953).
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of good order and discipline.3 38 It referred to as analogous, but not
controlling, Army Board of Review cases holding it to be an offense in
violation of Article of War 95, the predecessor of Article 133, for an
officer to be disrespectful toward a military policeman in the execution
of his duties.
3 39
It has been previously noted that a civilian employee of the military
in an overseas area who requires subordinate employees to donate goods
and services for his personal use thereby engages in conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces and may be convicted under
Article 134.340
From the foregoing collection of authorities it is apparent that the
persistent assaults of defense counsel against the general article have
been singularly unsuccessful.34 0 a There remains for consideration the
one small area in which their efforts have been rewarded with success.
Army Private Norris was charged with larceny of a vehicle under
Article 1213-1 and pleaded guilty to "taking without authority" in viola-
tion of Article 134. The law officer instructed the court that the accused
could not be found guilty of any offense other than larceny or wrongful
appropriation but failed to instruct as to the possible effect of intoxica-
tion on intent. The Court found the accused guilty of wrongful appro-
priation. The Board of Review held the law officer erred in both re-
spects and affirmed only a finding of wrongful taking under Article 134.
Upon certification, the Court affirmed the ruling that it was prejudicial
... United States v. Shores (ACM S-4378), 8 CMR 636 (1953).
... United States v. Grubb (CM 234008), 20 BR 213, 219 (1943) ; United States
v. Brandt (CM 253339), 34 BR 359, 363 (1944) ; United States v. Warren (CM
263080), 41 BR 181, 196 (1944); United States v. Rippey (CM 327522), 76 BR
131, 142 (1948).
"' United States v. Marker (No. 281), 3 CMR 127 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952). See
notes 245 and 267 supra.
"" The acts of operating a house of prostitution and misuse of assigned govern-
ment billets by permitting rooms therein to be used for the purpose of carrying on
illicit sexual relations, though both arising out of the same general course of con-
duct, have been held to constitute separate violations of Article 134 for each of
which punishment may be imposed. United States v. Butler (CM 363644), 12 CMR
.... (1953).
It has been held that the misappropriation of a government vehicle for the pur-
pose of transportation of a Korean prostitute constituted not only a violation of
Article 121 as charged, but also a separate violation of Article 134 as an act to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces under a specification
charging that the accused did ". . . wrongfully and unlawfully accept . . . the sum
of thirty dollars to transport a Korean female in a government vehicle." United
States v. Alexander (No. 2334). 12 CMR .... (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). In this
case it was found that this violation of Article 134 constituted the offense of "graft"
as listed in the Table of Maximum Punishments and hence would support a sen-
tence of confinement of up to three years.
341 50 U. S. C. § 715 (Supp. 1952). In pertinent part it provides: "Any person
who wrongfully takes .. . from the possession of ...any other person . . .
personal property ... with intent temporarily to derprive or defraud another person
of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate the same to his own use ... is
guilty of wrongful appropriation."
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error not to instruct on intoxication, but held there was no such offense
as wrongful taking without the specific intent either permanently or
temporarily to deprive another of the property. The Court said:
.. we are convinced that the general article.., embraces no
criminal conversion offense lesser than wrongful appropriation as
defined by Article 121....
".. . Article 134 should generally be limited to military of-
fenses and those crimes not specifically delineated by the punitive
articles.... We cannot grant to the services unlimited authority
to eliminate vital elements from common law crimes and offenses
expressly defined by Congress and permit the remaining elements




In a separate concurring opinion Judge Brosman pointed out the need
for a statutory offense of "wrongful taking" in the military service not
predicated upon a specific intent to deprive and in a later companion
case said:
"... under the Code as presently written, wrongful taking is
not an offense punishable under Article 134. The remedy for this
hiatus must rest with the Congress."
3 43
An Air Force Board of Review has held that simple negligence in
the operation of an automobile, thereby causing non-fatal injury to an-
other person, in the absence of other circumstances, is not conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces within the meaning of
Article 134, and is not an offense under the Code.3 44
From the very nature of the problem, and as a result of the small
encouragement to be drawn from the careful and correct decision in the
Norris case, it is likely that defense counsel will avidly continue to assail
the validity of offenses charged under the general articles. It is also
likely that their batting average in this effort will be unimpressive.
.. United States v. Norris (No. 1756), 8 CMR 38, 39 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
Followed in United States v. Haywood (No. 1852), 9 CMR 6 (U. S. C. M. A.
1953). See also, United States v. Holy Rock (CM 362791), 12 CMR - (1953).
''United States v. Hayw6od, supra.
... United States v. Eagleson (ACM 5666), 10 CMR - (1953). This must be
distinguished from the offense of negligent homicide which may be sustained by
evidence of simple negligence. The Court of Military Appeals has held that negli-
gent homicide is an offense under Article 134 and may be punished as conduct of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces or, alternatively, as a disorder
and neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces.
United States v. Roman (No. 191) 2 CMR 150 (U. S. M. C. A. 1952); United
States v. Clark (No. 190) 2 CMR 107 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952); United States v.
Kirchner (No. 654), 4 CMR 69 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
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V. WAS THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WITHIN THE
JURISDICTIONAL MAXIMUM?
A. The Framework of Authorized Punishments
The framework of legally authorized punishment in the courts-martial
system is somewhat more complicated than that prevailing in most
civilian penal systems. The basic jurisdiction to punish is prescribed by
Congress as an integral part of each of the punitive articles. The only
wholly mandatory sentence prescribed is that of death for wartime spy-
ing. 45  A mandatory alternative is imposed for premeditated murder
and murder committed "in the perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson," which
compels a sentence of "death or imprisonment for life as a court-
martial may direct. 83 46  Those convicted of wartime desertion or at-
tempted desertion,3 47 mutiny or sedition,348 misbehavior before the
enemy,3 49 compelling or attempting to compel a commander to surren-
der,850 improper use of a countersign,8 5 ' forcing a safeguard, 85 2 aiding
the enemy,3 5 8 misbehavior of a sentinel in time of war 5 4 and rape by
force355 "shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial
shall direct." This unlimited discretion is permitted only for the most
serious military offenses and forceful rape. All other offenses, no mat-
ter how trivial, so far as the basic provision in the punitive articles is
concerned, may "be punished as a court-martial may direct."8 58  The
effect is to permit up to life imprisonment to be imposed for any offense.
Congress traditionally has vested in the military this very broad discre-
tion so that it might adequately cope with the widely differing conditions
and considerations involved, depending on whether an offense was com-
mitted in peace or in war, at home or abroad, in garrison, in the field or
in combat 8
57
Also traditional in the system of military punishments is the drastic
"'Art. 106, 50 U. S. C. § 700 (Supp. 1952).
'"Art. 118, 50 U. S. C. § 712 (Supp. 1952).
'"7Art. 85, 50 U. S. C. § 679 (Supp. 1952).
'" Art. 94, 50 U. S. C. §688 (Supp. 1952).
"'Art. 99, 50 U. S. C. §693 (Supp. 1952).
Art. 100, 50 U. S. C. § 694 (Supp. 1952).
"'Art. 101, 50 U. S. C. § 695 (Supp. 1952).
Art. 102, 50 U. S. C. § 696 (Supp. 1952).
"3Art. 104, 50 U. S. C. § 698 (Supp. 1952).
3"'Art. 113, 50 U. S. C. §707 (Supp. 1952).
"r'Art. 120, 50 U. S. C. § 714 (Supp. 1952).
.. The only deviation from this language is found in general Art. 134, 50
U. S. C. § 728 (Supp. 1952) where the wording is: "shall be taken cognizance of
by a general or special or summary court court-martial, according to the nature and
degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court." This occurs
because of the express reference to the inferior military courts. As phrased, it
excludes from the power of a general court the death sentence only.
' Hearing of Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, H. R. REP.
No. 37, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1087-1089 (1949).
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curtailment of this power by the President in what is known as the Table
of Maximum Punishments. Congress has continued this practice, in
the Uniform Code, by expressly providing: "The punishment which a
court-martial may direct for an offense shall not exceed such limits as
the President may prescribe for the offense. '8 58 This permits curtail-
ment, but not enlargement, of the punishment authorized by the punitive
articles. The President liberally exercised this power in the Table of
Maximum Punishments, an integral part of the Manual, 59 prescribed
by Executive Order 10214, February 8, 1951.360 For example, a two-
day absence without leave which could be punishable by life imprison-
ment, dishonorable discharge and total forfeitures under the literal terms
of punitive Article 86, can under the Table of Maximum Punishments
not be punished more severely than by six days' confinement at hard
labor, forfeiture of four days' pay, reduction in grade and a reprimand.
361
The Table of Maximum Punishments in fact substantially curtails
authorized punishments for all offenses except mutiny, sedition, misbe-
havior before the enemy, compelling surrender, improper use of a coun-
tersign, knowingly forcing a safeguard, aiding the enemy, misconduct
as a prisoner, spying, murder, rape, and conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman.36 2 In dealing with general Article 134, the Table ex-
pressly sets forth some sixty-seven different specific offenses thereunder
and establishes maximum penalties for each, running from twenty years
for assaulting with intent to commit murder or rape, down to one month
for breach of restriction.
363
Under Article 56 the President may at any time change the provi-
sions of the Table of Maximum Punishments by executive order so long
as such change does not exceed the limit prescribed by Congress in the
punitive article itself. This power has been sparingly exercised. During
World War II the Table was suspended as to desertion, advising or
aiding desertion, absence without leave, and misbehavior of sentinels,36 4
but was promptly reimposed shortly after the termination of actual hos-
tilities.36 5 On August 8, 1950, the President again suspended the Table
"' Art. 56, 50 U. S. C. § 637 (Supp. 1952).
M.. ANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITE STATES, 1951, 1 127c, pp. 214-228.00 Id. at IX. TM1 Id. at 220.
21- Id. at 221-224...3 Id. at 224-227. The rule applicable to the other offenses chargeable under
the general article is stated at page 214 of the MANUAL, as follows: "Offenses not
listed in this table, and not included within an offense listed, or not closely related
to either, remain punishable as authorized by the United States Code (see, gen-
erally, Title 18) or the Code of the District of Columbia, whichever prescribed
punishment is the lesser, or as authorized by the custom of the service." Applied
in United States v. Long (No. 461), 6 CMR 60, 71 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
... Exec. Order No. 9048, 7 FED. REG. 775 (1942) and Exec. Order No. 9267,
7 FED. REG. 9221 (1942).
.. Exec. Order No. 9683, 11 FED. REG. 789 (1946) and Exec. Order No. 9772,
11 FED. REG. 9325 (1946).
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as to desertion, advising or aiding desertion, absence without leave, as-
saulting or disobeying a superior officer, insubordination to a noncommis-
sioned officer in the execution of his office and misbehavior of sentinels
thereafter committed. This suspension, however, applied only to these
offenses when committed in any area controlled by the Commander-in-
Chief, Far East.3 66 This limited suspension is still in effect. The auto-
matic suspension of the Table provided for by the MamnaJ30 7 "upon a
declaration of war" applies to soliciting either desertion, mutiny, sedition,
or misbehavior before the enemy,3 68 and to desertion,3 69 absence without
leave,370 missing movement,37 ' striking or wilfully disobeying an offi-
cer,3 7 2 misbehavior of a sentinel37 3 and malingering.37 4  Since there has
been no declaration of war after the Code became effective this provision
has remained inoperative.
There can be no doubt that the maximum punishments prescribed by
Congress in the punitive articles are jurisdictional and that any part of a
sentence which is in excess thereof is void and unenforceable. This does
not mean that the portion of an excessive sentence which is within the
authorized maximum is void or unenforceable. This result is clearly
contemplated by Congress in its legislative direction to the convening
authority that he "shall approve only . . . such part or amount of the
sentence as he finds correct in law and fact . . . ,,75 and to the board
of review that, "it shall affirm only ... such part or amount of the sen-
tence as it finds correct in law and fact. .... ,,36
An academic problem arises as to the effect of the limits imposed by
the Table of Maximum Punishments upon jurisdiction to punish. It
seems clear that these limitations do not destroy it since by subsequent
executive order, so providing, jurisdiction to punish may be exercised
up to the maximum authorized by Congress. It is probably accurate to
say that the provisions of the Table of Maximum Punishments impose
binding limitations upon the exercise of jurisdiction to punish, as dis-
tinguished from 'destroying jurisdiction itself. This question would be
reached for decision only in event all the military appellate tribunals
should approve a sentence which, while within the maximum prescribed
... Exec. Order No. 1049, 15 FED. REG. 5149 (1950).
.MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 127c, p. 217.'" Art. 82, 50 U. S. C. § 676 (Supp. 1952).
...Art. 85, 50 U. S. C. § 679 (Supp. 1952).
""Art. 86, 50 U. S. C. § 680 (Supp. 1952).
371 Art. 87, 50 U. S. C. § 681 (Supp. 1952).
3
" Art. 90, 50 U. S. C. §684 (Supp. 1952).37 3 Art. 113, 50 U. S. C. § 707 (Supp. 1952).
1' Art. 115, 50 U. S. C. § 709 (Supp. 1952).
7Art. 64, 50 U. S. C. § 651 (Supp. 1952).
3" Art. 66(c), 50 U. S. C. § 653 (Supp. 1952). This comports with the rule
in the federal civil courts that if the excess is separable from the residue the legal
portion of the sentence will remain undisturbed. McKinney v. Finletter, 205 F. 2d
761 (10th Cir. 1953).
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by Congress, was in excess of that authorized by the Table. On petition
for habeas corpus it would then be necessary to determine whether the
amount imposed in excess of the maximum prescribed by the Table was
void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Military Appeals has clearly
indicated that no case will be permitted to reach such a status, by its
declaration that, "The general provisions of paragraph 127b (of the
Manual) are limitations on punishment fully as much as are the specific
limits set out in the Table of Maximum Punishments,"3 71 and by its
further statement, "we -disclaim any intent to classify these (rights) as
jurisdictional . . . we can reverse for errors of law which materially
prejudice the substantial rights of the accused .... ,378 Relief would cer-
tainly be granted even if the error were held not to be jurisdictional.
B. Limited Powers of Inferior Military Courts
In dealing with problems of jurisdiction to sentence not only must
resort be had to the punitive articles of the Code and the Table of Maxi-
mum Punishments of the Manual, but care must be exercised not to
exceed the maximum punishment imposable by a summary or special
court where their sentences are under consideration. Congress has
provided:
"Summary courts-martial may, under such limitations as the
President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden
by this code except death, dismissal, dishonorable discharge or
bad conduct discharge, confinement in excess of one month, hard
labor without confinement in excess of forty-five days, restriction
to certain specified limits in excess of two months or forfeiture of
pay in excess of two-thirds of one month's pay."3
' 9
Affirmatively stated, a summary court may sentence to confinement at
hard labor for one month, or to forty-five days' hard labor without con-
finement, or restriction for two months, or to a proportional amount of
the three.38 0 For example, ten days' confinement, plus fifteen days' hard
labor without confinement, plus twenty days' restriction would be per-
missible. In addition to the above, the forfeiture of two-thirds of one
month's pay, a reduction in grade and a reprimand could also be im-
posed. As to noncommissioned and petty officers of the first three
" United States v. Murgaw (No. 1079), 8 CMR 169, 171 (U. S. C. M. A.
1953).
0' United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74, 78 (U. S. C. M. A. 1951). See
also United States v. Davis (No. 29), 2 CMR 8, 13 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
310 Art. 20, 50 U. S. C. § 580 (Supp. 1952).
"0 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 127c, p. 215; Table
of Equivalent Punishments. These equivalents may be applied to enlisted accused
by either a summary or special court so long as the sentence does not include a
punitive discharge.
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grades a summary court may not impose confinement, hard labor with-
out confinement, nor reduction except to the next inferior grade. 81
As to special courts, Congress has declared that they may:
"... under such limitations as the President may prescribe,
adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this code except death,
dishonorable 'discharge, dismissal, confinement in excess of six
months, hard labor without confinement in excess of three months,
forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds pay per month, or forfeiture
of pay for a period exceeding six months. A bad conduct dis-
charge shall not be adjudged unless a complete record of the pro-
ceedings and testimony before the court has been made."
8 82
So far as the Army is concerned, the exercise of the jurisdiction to im-
pose a bad conduct discharge has been prohibited in special courts by
the issuance of a regulation by the Secretary of the Army forbidding the
use of reporters in special court-martial cases, except with prior author-
ity of the Secretary.883 Such regulation is authorized by the Manual
and was consistent with a recommendation made by the Court of Military
Appeals and by The Judge Advocates General of the Army and Air
Force, but from which The Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
the General Counsel of the Treasury Department dissented.8 4 No such
administrative limitation has been imposed on special courts by any of
the services except the Army.
... Id. 1f 126c(2), p. 208."Art. 19, 50 U. S. C. § 579 (Supp. 1952). In United States v. Bancroft (No.
1139), 11 CMR 3 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) a Marine sentry was tried by a special
court-martial for sleeping on post during the Korean conflict. The officer exercis-
ing general court-martial authority had not declared the offense to be non-capital.
The Court of Military Appeals found that the Korean conflict, though not predi-
cated upon any formal declaration of war, did constitute "time of war" within the
meaning of the phrase as used in Art. 113, 50 U. S. C. § 707 (Supp. 1952), author-
izing a death sentence. Accordingly, it held the offense was capital and that a
special court-martial had no jurisdiction to try it.
In United States v. Whitman (No. 2168), 11 CMR 179, 181 (U. S. C. M. A.
1953) the record of trial in a navy special court case was in part a narrative sum-
mary and in part a verbatim account. The court said: "The punitive discharge
* * . cannot stand without the support of a verbatim record. This portion of the
sentence is, therefore, illegal."
Where a special court-martial imposed a sentence for bad conduct discharge,
reduction in grade, and restriction to limits for three months and the convening
authority suspended the bad conduct discharge, the Court has held it was proper to
impose restriction as a less severe type of restraint than confinement and this with-
out regard to the Table of Equivalent Punishments which is inapplicable where a
punitive discharge is imposed. United States v. Benson (No. 2482), 12 CMR 107
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
...Army Special Regulation 22-145-1 (1950), as amended by C-1 (March 6,
1952).
""'MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, f 7, p. 12; ANNUAL
REFORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND JUDGE ADVOCATES
GENERAL OF THE ARMED FoRcEs, 1952, p. 4.
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C. Miscellaneous Limitations on Punishments
General courts are subject to no limitation on punishment except
those contained in the punitive articles and the Table of Maximum Pun-
ishmentsas 4a One further exception is that where a convening authority
has directed that a non-mandatory capital case be treated as not capital
to permit the use of depositions by the prosecution a death penalty may
not be imposed. 8 5
No military court upon a rehearing or a new trial may impose a
sentence more severe than that originally adjudged by a lawful court in
the same case unless the sentence prescribed for the offense is manda-
tory.3 86 This restriction of course goes far beyond any principle or
requirement of constitutional due process.
3 8 7
181 Subject to certain limitations imposed by the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES, 1951 127c, § B, p. 228, a general court may, in addition to other
authorized punishments, impose a fine. In United States v. De Angelis (No. 995),
12 CMR 54 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953) the accused officer, convicted of larceny, was
sentenced to dismissal, total forfeitures, confinement at hard labor for five years
(the maximum confinement authorized by the Table of Maximum Punishments),
and a fine of $10,000," or further confinement until the fine is paid, but not ex-
ceeding two more years." Confronted with this interesting situation the Court
stated the problem and disposed of it as follows: "The sole question is, whether the
additional confinement provided in the event the accused fails to pay the imposed
fine is excessive. . . . The provision for further confinement was not made as
unishment for the offense, but merely as a means of coercing the collection of the
fne imposed. While the accused may suffer further imprisonment as a result of
this provision, it must be remembered that 'he carries the keys of his prison in his
own pocket.' In re Nevitt, 177 F. 448, 461."
Loss of promotion rights is not an authorized punishment, at least for Army and
Air Force personnel. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 126i,
p. 212. The inclusion in an Air Force sentence of a provision that the accused "not
be considered for promotion" for twenty-four months is "illegal." United States v.
Taylor (ACM 6458), - CMR - (1953).
"'Art. 49(f), 50 U. S. C. §624 (Supp. 1952). See, United States v. Gann
(No. 1425), 11 CMR 12 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
"' Art. 63(b), 50 U. S. C. § 650 (Supp. 1952) and MANUAL FOR COURTS-MAR-
TIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 109g (2), p. 179. See discussion preceding note 399,
post, p. 68.
The same rule applies to action taken on a sentence by a convening authority.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 88a, p. 147. Thus in United
States v. White (ACM S-7152), - CMR - (1953) where a special court, as
part of its sentence, imposed a forfeiture of sixty-five dollars per month for fifty-
six days and the convening authority, as to this part of the sentence, approved a
forfeiture of fifty-eight dollars per month for two months, the Board of Review
held that, although the forfeiture approved was less than that adjudged, the increase
in its duration increased the punishment and only a forfeiture of fifty-eight dollars
per month for one month and twenty-six days was approved. In United States v.
O'Shea (No. 3629), 12 CMR 190 (U.S.C.M.A. 1953) is was held that a convening
authority may properly reduce a sentence of confinement to hard labor for three
months to sixty days restriction. Accord, United States v. Austin (No. 3627), 12
CMR 189 (U.S.C.M.A. 1953).
The same prohibition against increasing a sentence also applies to a proceeding
in revision before the original court-martial. Art. 62(b) (2), 50 U.S.C. § 649 (Supp.
1952). See, however, United States v. Bates (CM 365561), - CMR - (1953),
a bigamy conviction in which the sentence announced by the court was dishonorable
discharge, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for "not to exceed six
months." The next day the court, on its own motion, convened in revision pro-
ceedings, the president stating that the previous announcement did not "correctly
reflect the sentence that was determined." The court then closed, reopened, and
announced the sentence as dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and confinement
at hard labor "for six months." Held: ". . . the correct announcement of the
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Executive Order No. 10214 promulgating the 1951 Manual expressly
provided,
"That the maximum punishment for an offense committed
prior to May 31, 1951, shall not exceed the applicable limit in
effect at the time of the commission of such offense."'88
The Court of Military Appeals has had occasion to apply this rule.
Lieutenant Colonel Downard was charged under Article of War 95889
with conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman which involved
assaulting and cursing his wife in the vicinity of the Fort Monroe Offi-
cers' Club. The acts involved occurred prior to May 31, 1951, but the
case was tried thereafter. The mandatory penalty upon conviction pre-
scribed by Article of War 95 was dismissal, whereas the successor
Article 133390 prescribed that punishment shall be as a court-martial may
'direct. The law officer instructed that dismissal was mandatory and the
court imposed that sentence. The Court of Military Appeals reversed,
held this instruction constituted prejudicial error, and stated that a
proper instruction would have been that the court might assess punish-
ment at its discretion, not in excess of dismissal. It pointed out that
anything in excess of dismissal would constitute an ex post facto appli-
cation of the new Code, but that the accused was entitled to the benefit
of the possibility of a lesser sentence under it.891 Jurisdiction was not
'directly involved since under proper instruction the court could have
imposed dismissal.
Another case raising essentially the same issue was that of Private
Murgaw who was, after May 31, 1951, tried and convicted of a desertion
committed before the effective date of the Code.3 92 Under the previous
law a general court could impose up to twelve months' confinement with-
out also adjudging a punitive discharge,8 9 whereas the present Manual
prohibited confinement in excess of six months unless the sentence also
included a punitive discharge. 94 In answer to a question by the court
the law officer advised that a sentence of confinement in excess of six
months could not be given without also imposing a punitive discharge.
The court imposed a bad conduct discharge twelve months' confinement
and partial forfeitures for twelve months. The convening authority not
only suspended the discharge but ultimately completely remitted it as
sentence in revision proceedings was not a modification of the sentence originally
determined nor an increase in the punishment."
"" See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 322 (1937).
... MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, p. IX.
3. 41 STAT. 806 (1920).
9050 U. S. C. § 727 (Supp. 1952).
" United States v. Downard (No. 266), 3 CMR 80 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
"'zUnited States v. Murgaw (No. 1079), 8 CMR 169 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
... MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, 1949, 1 117b.
"" MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 127b, p. 214.
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well as most of the confinement and forfeiture. The Court held remis-
sion of the discharge did not render the issue moot, since if improperly
imposed the accused was entitled to have that fact affirmatively appear
upon his service record. It then decided that the provision of the cur-
rent Manual was more stringent than its predecessor and, therefore, the
law officer should have instructed that confinement up to twelve months
could be imposed without a punitive discharge. With one judge dis-
senting, the Court then proceeded to cure the prejudicial error by setting
the bad conduct discharge aside. Again jurisdiction was not reached
since the sentence imposed by the court was permissible had it been
properly instructed.
In the case of Electrician's Mate Second Class Flood, a Navy general
court sitting under the Code sentenced the accused to a bad conduct
discharge, confinement for ten months, forfeiture of ten months' pay
and reduction to electrician's mate third class, having found him guilty
of absence without leave for a period commencing before the Code was
effective. The Court applied the rule that the sentence could not be
greater than that authorized by the current Manual and held that so
much of the sentence as extended to confinement and forfeitures in excess
of six months was "illegal." 395 Here the Court was dealing with a clearly
excessive sentence but simply characterized it as "illegal." As before
noted, it makes little practical difference whether the Court treats such
excess as jurisdictional or simply as prejudicial error so long as it grants
relief. In this same case it was held that since Navy regulations per-
mitted only one grade reductions where confinement was not in excess
of three months and required reduction to the lowest enlisted grade
where longer confinement was imposed the confinement must be further
reducted to not to exceed three months since the sentence imposed had
reduced accused only one grade. This result points up the necessity for
care by courts in imposing sentences all parts of which are consistent,
since any ambiguity will be resolved against the government and in favor
of the accused. Judge Latimer dissented and agreed with the view taken
by the Board of Review that the portion of the sentence reducing the
accused only one grade should be treated as a nullity.
D. Excessive Punishments Resulting from Other Errors of Law
Since all concerned with the functioning of the military justice system
are alert to prevent the imposition of unauthorized punishments it is not
surprising that practically all cases reaching the Court of Military Ap-
peals involving excessive sentences result from some collateral error of
law which caused the court, the convening authority and the Board of
Review to believe the sentence imposed was lawful. A number of such
United States v. Flood (No. 377), 6 CMR 114 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) citing
United States v. Emerson (No. 77), 1 CMR 43 (U. S. C. M. A. 1951) and United
States v. Brasher (No. 499), 6 CMR 50 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
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cases has arisen under what may be termed "the military habitual crimi-
nal act." This phrase, however, is misleading in that it is only as to
relatively minor offenses that the proof of prior offenses increases per-
missible punishments. This authorization stems not from the Code but
from Section B of the Table of Maximum Punishments which relaxes
its other limitations so that:
"If an accused is found guilty of an offense or offenses for
none of which dishonorable or bad conduct discharge is author-
ized, proof of two or more previous convictions will authorize
bad conduct discharge and forfeiture of all pay and allowances
and, if the confinement otherwise authorized is less than three
months, confinement at hard labor for three months. In such a
case no forfeiture shall be imposed for any period in excess of the
period of confinement so adjudged."' 96
The Navy has made considerable use of this provision in imposing bad
conduct discharges. In a number of these cases the data as to the prior
convictions was simply read to the court by trial counsel and the records
themselves were neither marked for identification nor offered in evidence.
The Court of Military Appeals held this state of the record did not
constitute proof of prior convictions, found sentences imposed in re-
liance thereon excessive and remanded for rehearings. 97 The Court
said, "That an excessive sentence is prejudicial is apparent,"398 thus
treating the problem as one of prejudicial error rather than jurisdiction.
A variant of the above situation arose in the trial of Fireman Ap-
prentice Chapman for being absent without leave for twenty days. Of
the three prior convictions admitted in evidence two, due to technical
defects, were inadmissible. Upon rehearing the prior convictions were
... MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITD STATES, 1951, 1 127c, p. 228. Under
this provision a summary court is authorized to sentence an accused to not to ex-
ceed thirty days confinement at hard labor upon a showing of two previous convic-
tions when the maximum punishment for the offense of which the accused was
convicted is less than thirty days. Letter, JAGJ 1953/3857 (5 May 1953).
To constitute an admissible "prior conviction" both the date of commission and
the date of conviction must precede the date of commission of the offense being
tried in the proceeding in which it is offered. United States v. Henson (ACM
S-6725), 11 CMR - (1953). See also, United States v. O'Shana (ACM
S-2859), 6 CMR 816 -(1952). The court approved section B in United States v.
Prescott (No. 812), 6 CMR 122 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
"" United States v. Carter (No. 159), 2 CMR 14 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952);
United States v. Zimmerman (No. 261), 2 CMR 66 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; United
States v. Trimiar (No. 413), 2 CMR 169 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; United States v.
Schabel (No. 440), 3 CMR 9 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; United States v. Adams
(No. 452), 3 CMR 9 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; United States v. Hand (No. 450),
3 CMR 35 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952); United States v. Pruchniewski (No. 489), 3
CMR 62 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952) ; United States v. Deweese (No. 633), 3 CMR 134
(U. S. C. M. A. 1952); United States v. Townsend (No. 597), 4 CMR 33
(U. S. C. M. A. 1952). See United States v. Parker (No. 731), 13 CMR -
(U. S. C. M. A. 1953). United States v. Kautz (CM 362116), -. CMR - (1953)
holds falsely altering a military pass to be an offense under Article 134.
.8 United States v. Carter (No. 159), 2 CMR 14, 20 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
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proved by competent evidence and the sentence imposed was a bad con-
duct discharge, confinement for three months and forfeiture of $36.00
per month for three months. Accused contended before the Board of
Review that since sixty days' confinement was the maximum sentence
properly imposable by the first court this could not be exceeded by the
rehearing sentence. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy certified
this question and the Court upheld the sentence announcing that where
error extends to sentence only, the second court is not restricted by the
error affecting the sentence of the first.3 99
Due to the express provision in Section B of the Table of Maximum
Punishments that where prior convictions are necessary to the imposition
of a bad conduct discharge "no forfeiture shall be imposed for any period
in excess of the period of confinement so adjudged, ' 40 0 the Court of
Military Appeals held that a sentence imposed by a Navy special court
for a two-day absence without leave of a $36.00 forfeiture and a sus-
pended bad conduct discharge, but without confinement, was as to the
forfeiture "excessive and therefore illegal."401 The Court approved the
suspended bad conduct discharge but did not make clear whether under
these circumstances it would approve a forfeiture of two days' pay for
each day of absence as provided by Paragraph 127c of the Manual. In
civil life police court fines are not safeguarded with such elaborate appel-
late procedures. Perhaps it is cases of this kind which have evoked the
recommendation of the Court of Military Appeals that the power to
impose bad conduct discharges be denied to special courts-martial.
40 2
Another provision of the Table of Maximum Punishments which has
presented sentencing problems is the requirement that:
"If an offense not listed in the table is included in an offense
which is listed and is also closely related to some other listed of-
fense, the lesser punishment prescribed for either the included or
closely related offense will prevail as the maximum limit of pun-
ishment."
403
... United States v. Chapman (No. 1001), 7 CMR 14 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
Pursuant to Article 44(b) until a prior conviction has been finally approved on
appeal or review it is prejudicial error to offer it in evidence in another case.
United States v. Drummon (ACM 5243), 5 CMR 400, 403, 404 (1952) and United
States v. Engle (No. 1971), 11 CMR 41, 45 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
" MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 127c, p. 228.
.0. United States v. Watkins (No. 834), 8 CMR 87 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
402 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES, 1952, p. 4.
40 IMANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, ff 12 7c, p. 214. The
closely related" rule was applied where a specification under Article 134 alleged the
accused ". . . a married man, did . . . wrongfully cohabit with . . . a woman not
his wife." The law officer instructed that the sentence might be the same as that
authorized for adultery. In rejecting a contention that the sentence could be no
greater than that for a simple disorder under Article 134, the Board of Review held:
... . if the offense here charged is not adultery, then it is so similar that the offense
designated in the Table of Maximum Punishments by that name should control the
punishment." United States v. Bailey (CM 365023), - CMR - (1953).
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Army Private Beach, a unit mail clerk, pleaded guilty to negligently
permitting some three hundred pieces of mail to accumulate over a period
of eight months without delivering it in violation of general Article
134.404 The Board of Review approved a sentence of dishonorable dis-
charge, total forfeitures and confinement for two years. On certification
by The Judge Advocate General of the Army, the Court of Military
Appeals 405 rejected the contention of the government that this offense
was punishable as lesser included to that of obstructing the mail, which
under the Table would authorize a dishonorable ,discharge and five years'
confinment,40 6 and found instead that this offense was "closely related"
to a dereliction in performance of duty under Article 92.407 Since this
latter offense was punishable by a maximum sentence of only three
months' confinement and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for three months48
the Court held that portion of the sentence imposed in excess of these
limits to be "illegal."
The opposite conclusion was reached in applying the "closely related"
rule to the case of Marine Private Stewart who had pleaded guilty to
desertion in violation of Article 8 of Articles for the Government of the
Navy.40 9 A Board of Review found the specification as worded stated
only a desertion from "command" to the prejudice of good order and
discipline and not desertion "from the Naval service." The absence had
been for nearly three years and the sentence imposed was a dishonorable
discharge and three years' confinement, the maximum authorized by the
Table for a desertion terminated by apprehension.410 Accused contended
that his offense, as approved by the Board of Review, was "closely re-
lated" to simple absence without leave, the maximum punishment for
which is dishonorable discharge and six months' confinement. 41' The
Court of Military Appeals affirmed the sentence and said:
"Patently, his absence from command for almost three years
is hardly closely related to mere absence without leave. Thus,
having concluded that the offense alleged here is at least included
within desertion of a type other than to avoid hazardous duty or
to shirk important service, and that it is not 'closely related' to
another enumerated offense, the punishment for the former must
govern. 412
50 U. S. C. § 728 (Supp. 1952).
.. United States v. Beach (No. 1036), 7 CMR 48 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
"oo MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 127c, p. 226.
407 50 U. S. C. § 686 (Supp. 1952).
"'MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, ff 127c, p. 221.
13 4 U. S. C. § 1200 (1946).
,"' MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 127c, p. 220.
'L Ibid.
"'United States v. Stewart (No. 679), 8 CMR 121 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). A
similar problem is presented by footnote 5 to the Table of Maximum Punishments
at page 221 of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, It pro-
vides that the punishment prescribed for failure to obey a lawful general order
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In the case of Corporal Grossman the question presented was what
maximum controls where the offense proved by the evidence is more
serious than the one charged in the specification. There the accused
was charged, in addition to other offenses, with drunken driving under
Article 111413 with no allegation of personal injury resulting therefrom.
The evidence in fact established such injury. The maximum provided
by the Table for drunken driving resulting in personal injury is dis-
honorable discharge and one year's confinement but for drunk driving
alone is bad conduct discharge and six months' confinement. Here the
Court of Military Appeals found it was prejudicial error for the law
officer to have instructed that the larger penalty might be imposed and
said: "A sentence is limited by the facts alleged in the specifica-
tion .... "414
A final example of excessive sentencing resulting from error of law
as to another point occurred in the case of Private Cooper who, with his
co-accused, was charged, among other things, with the offense of robbery
and assault with intent to commit robbery. The evidence established
that these two separate specifications each pertained to the same robbery
but the law officer in effect instructed that each might be considered as
separate offenses for sentencing purposes. The Manual provisions state
that:
"The maximum authorized punishment may be imposed for
each of two or more separate offenses arising out of the same act
or transaction .... An accused may not be punished for both a
principal offense and for an offense included therein .... ,,415
The Court of Military Appeals declared the instruction as given was
prejudicial error, and opined:
"does not apply in those cases wherein the accused is found guilty of an offense
which, although involving a failure to obey a lawful order, is specifically listed
elsewhere in this table." Pursuant thereto it has -been held that carrying a con-
cealed weapon in violation of a post regulation though prosecuted under Article 92,
cannot be punished more severely than is authorized under Article 134 for the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon. United States v. Amato (CM 360145),
9 CMR 416 (1953). Accord, United States v. McGovern (CM 363388), 10 CMR
(1953) ; United States v. Yunque-Burgos (CM 362134), 10 CMR - (1953).
50 U. S. C. § 705 (Supp. 1952).
414United States v. Grossman (No. 796), 9 CMR 36 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
""MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 76a(6), p. 123. It
has been held that absence without leave upon a change of station from Brooklyn,
New York to Newport, Rhode Island, which conduct also violated an express
lawful order of a commanding officer to report to Newport, constituted two sepa-
rate offenses for sentencing purposes. United States v. Larney (No. 775), 10 CMR
- (U. S. C. M. A. 1953). Likewise the offenses of making a forged instru-
ment and uttering that same forged instrument, even though occurring substantially
in one transaction, are separate and the maximum punishment may be imposed for
each. United States v. Parr (ACM 6326), 10 CMR - (1953). The offenses of
desertion with intent to remain away permanently and desertion with intent to avoid
important service embody separate and distinct elements, each requires proof of a
fact not required in the other, and the maximum punishment may be imposed for
each when the two arise out of one transaction. United States v. Greer (CM
366411), - CMR - (1953).
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"Where, as here, the assault with intent to commit a robbery
constitutes the force and violence laying (sic) at the core of the
robbery charge, the former certainly is a lesser crime included
within the latter.... The maximum punishment for each is ...
ten years.... This is the maximum which might be adjudged in
this case under the two specifications here in question.
'4 1
E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Article 55 of the Code, in part, provides that "cruel or unusual
punishment, shall not be adjudged by any court-martial .... ,,417 How-
ever, Article 15(a) (2) (F) thereof expressly permits,
"if imposed upon a person attached to or embarked in a vessel,
confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for a period
not to exceed three consecutive days.
'418
The Manual purported to prohibit Army and Air Force courts from
imposing bread and water punishment and to authorize Navy and Coast
Guard courts to adjudge confinement on bread and water for not to
exceed thirty days,419 in keeping with unbroken Navy practice. In the
case of Marine Private Wappler, shore-based at Camp Pendleton, Cali-
fornia, a special court in an absence without leave and missing move-
ment case, as part of its sentence included a bad conduct discharge and
thirty-day confinement on bread and water with a full ration every third
day. This set the stage for one of the more spectacular decisions ren-
dered by the Court of Military Appeals. It held confinement on bread
and water was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Article 55
and that accordingly that part of the sentence "was illegal and void.1
4 20
It further held that since confinement on bread and water was included in
the Table of Equivalent Punishments421 it could in no event be imposed
as part of a sentence which also included a punitive discharge. The
Court stated:
"Although we do not believe that the proscription against
punishments of this nature contained in the Constitution's Eighth
Amendment-if applicable-would bar the punishment adjudged
here, it is to be noted that the Amendment does not necessarily
define the limits of 'cruel and unusual' as used by Congress in
Article 55. Use of the phrase by Congress, therefore, raises a
problem of legislative rather than constitutional construction. Cer-
tainly Congress intended to confer as much protection as that af-
" United States v. Cooper (No. 708), 8 CMR 133, 138 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
50 U. S. C. § 636 (Supp. 1952). ,8 50 U. S. C. § 571 (Supp. 1952).
411 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 1 126a, p. 206. Medical
certificate, that serious injury to health would not result, was required, and a full
ration could not be deprived for more than three consecutive days.
... United States v. Wappler (No. 1457), 9 CMR 23 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
"" MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, ff 125, p. 215.
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forded by the Eighth Amendment.... we believe it intended to
grant protection covering even wider limits. Accordingly, we
think Article 55 quite broad enough to bar confinement on bread
and water, except to the extent permitted by Article 15.
"In the interest of clarity, a summary of our views is perhaps
required. They are simply these: (1) No court-martial-Navy
or otherwise-may adjudge confinement on bread and water for
personnel other than those 'attached to or embarked in a vessel,'
but (2) a court-martial of any service may impose confinement
on bread and water in cases involving personnel 'attached to or
embarked in a vessel' for a 'period not to exceed three consecu-
tive days.' To the extent to which paragraphs 125 and 127c of
the Manual are in conflict with this construction of the Code, they
are without sanction of law and must fall.
".... where punitive discharge is imposed, the court may not
additionally sentence the accused to confinement on bread and
water even though the latter course may otherwise be open to it
under the view we have taken earlier in this opinion.
"... The instant case . . . is quite unlike United States v.
Flood.... Here the bread and water confinement aspect of the
sentence was void in toto. Striking it thus leaves the punitive
discharge effective in an entirely legal sentence, and certainly
places the accused in no worse position than when the sentence
left the court-martial."
422
This decision no doubt came as a considerable shock to many a ward
room. Something which for over one hundred and seventy-five years
had not been "cruel and unusual," suddenly became so. Though some
old salts may view the decision as an evidence of effete decadence its
practical impact upon Navy discipline is likely to be minuscule. Com-
parable, would be the removal of most of a small benign wart from an
inconspicuous portion of the anatomy of a healthy individual. After
such minor surgery the patient might look a trifle better but his general
health would not be affected one way or the other.
A curious consequence of the Wappler decision was promptly em-
phasized in the case of Seaman Apprentice Wyatt who was tried aboard
the U. S. S. Bon Homme Richard and sentenced to a bad conduct dis-
charge, twenty days' solitary confinement on bread and water and for-
feitures for four months. The Court held since the accused was attached
to a vessel three days of confinement on bread and water was proper,
but that this punishment and a bad conduct discharge could not be ap-
proved in the same sentence. It then proceeded to declair "void" all
" United States v. Wappler (No. 1457), 9 CMR 23, 27 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
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that portion of the sentence in excess of three days on bread and
water.423 Some may feel that somewhere between Wappler and Wyatt
logic and common sense parted company.
F. Permissible Punishment for a Violation of the Law of War
The Court of Military Appeals has had occasion to pass upon the
extent of punishment that may be imposed by a general court-martial
while in the exercise of its derivative jurisdiction under Article 18424
to punish violations of the law of war. American civilian Schultz was
tried and convicted for the offense of negligent homicide in occupied
Japan and sentenced to one year of confinement and $1,000 fine. The
conviction was upheld since the conduct of the accused was a violation
of the Penal Code of Japan which in turn, by virtue of an order of the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the Far East, was a vio-
lation of the law of war. Accused contended, since the maximum sen-
tence authorized by the Japanese Penal Code for this offense was a fine
of $140 at the prevailing rate of exchange, that to the extent the sentence
imposed exceeded this amount it was illegal. The Court approved the
sentence and said:
".... SCAP Circular No. 17... provides that a military com-
mission in Japan may impose any sentence up to death, including
fines in any amount or imprisonment up to life .... Under the
law of war, General MacArthur had the power... to determine
punishment policies for military tribunals. The sentence here
does not exceed the limitations set out by him .... The sentence
is therefore legal.
'425
This case simply recognized the well-established rule of international
law that any violation of the law of war may, so far as jurisdiction is
concerned, be punished by death by a military commission. 420  This
result, in the proper setting of Article 18,427 is undoubtedly correct. It
is hardly necessary to add that this law of war rule would never be in-
voked to support the punishment jurisdiction of a general court-martial
when proceeding under any other article.
G. The Approack of the Court of Military Appeals to Problems
of Jurisdiction to Punish
The Court has defined what agencies in the military justice system
may take what action with regard to sentences. Thus it has held that
a court-martial may not suspend a sentence; that such action may be
"' United States v. Wyatt (No. 1140) 10 CMR - (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
,2, 50 U. S. C. § 578 (Supp. 1952).
.2 United States v. Schultz (No. 394), 4 CMR 104, 122 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
"Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942); WAR DEPARTMENT FiELD MANUAL
27-10, Rules of Land Warfare 1357, p. 89 (1940).
42750 U. S. C. § 578 (Supp. 1952).
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taken by a convening authority ;427a that a Board of Review, although it
may entirely remit, may not suspend, a punitive discharge ;428 and that
Boards of Review have power, in a proper case, to commute a death
sentence to life imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. 429 It has
repeatedly held that under Article 67(d) the Court itself "shall take
action only with respect to matters of law,14 0 and so may not modify
sentences, but may return cases for rehearings or remand them to Boards
of Review for appropriate sentence action consistent with directions as
to matters of law given by the Court. This -method of remand has been
used even in dealing with void sentences.
431
The Court of Military Appeals does not speak of jurisdiction in
dealing with excessive punishments but uses instead the prejudicial
error approach and talks of "illegal" sentences. Since the vast pre-
ponderance of questioned punishments exceed only the Table of Maxi-
mum Punishments limits and not the maximums precribed by Congress
in the punitive articles, it is in such cases technically correct for the
Court to refrain from considering the problem as jurisdictional. In
Wappler, where the Court found the "imposed confinement on bread and
water, was illegal and void," it characterized a jurisdictional 'defect with-
out using the word.
It seems clear that a punishment in excess of that authorized by
Congress would, as to the excess, be treated by the United States Su-
preme Court as jurisdictional.
432
VI. CAN DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS BECOME
JURISDICTIONAL?
There remains the interesting question whether procedural errors
committed in trials before military courts can ever, either individually or
collectively, reach the stature of a jurisdictional factor. On direct ap-
peal within the military justice system it is unnecessary to decide this
point since long before procedural error could conceivably be sufficiently
aggravated to become jurisdictional it would certainly be "materially
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused," and for this reason
would require reversal by either a Board of Review or the Court of
Military Appeals. Within the framework of the Congressional limitation
imposed upon it, that "A finding or sentence of a court-martial shall not
27'United States v. Marshall (No. 1670), 8 CMR 142 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
A convening authority may also disapprove a sentence and order a rehearing.
United States v. Freeman (No. 1650), 11 CMR 71 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
'"'United States v. Simmons (No. 940), 6 CMR 105 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952).
.2 United States v. Bigger (No. 456), 8 CMR 97 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
42050 U. S. C. § 654 (Supp. 1952).
... United States v. Wappler (No. 1457), 9 CMR 23 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953);
United States v. Wyatt (No. 1140), 10 CMR - (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
..2 United States v. Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 23 (1879) ; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.
163 (U. S. 1873).
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be held incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless the error
materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused, '433 the Court
of Military Appeals has in substance said that as it conceives military
due process, certain procedural omissions or commissions will per se con-
stitute "error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the ac-
cused."43 4 This, of course, is quite a different thing from treating such
procedural error as divesting a court-martial of jurisdiction. Reversal
for prejudicial error fully protects the rights of the accused without ever
reaching an issue of jurisdiction and the Court of Military Appeals has
gone to some pains to point out that it distinguishes due process from
jurisdiction.
43 5
In collateral attack by habeas corpus procedural errors may not be
considered,436 nor may the evidence be reviewed to ascertain the guilt
or innocence of the accused. 43 7 The inquiry has always been limited to
whether the military court had jurisdiction. 43 8 Traditionally this in-
quiry has been confined to the four fundamental questions previously
examined in this article. In recent years petitioners' counsel in military
cases have repeatedly urged, by analogy to federal court habeas corpus
review of criminal cases arising in state jurisdictions, that procedural
error may be so gross as to deprive an accused of due process as guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendement and, thus, become a jurisdictional defect
which may be reached and remedied by habeas corpus. In a few in-
stances inferior federal courts have tired, without success, to approve
this concept.439 If accepted, the next question raised is: "What kind of
due process does the Constitution provide for those subject to military
law, and what violates it?" The answer the Supreme Court has always
"" Article 59, 50 U. S. C. § 646 (Supp. 1952).
3, United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74, 78 (U. S. C. A. 1951). For a
discussion of the views of the Court of Military Appeals regarding military due
process see Wurfel, Military Dice Process, What Is It? 6 VAND L. Ray. 251 (1953).
In its most recent consideration of due process the court affirmed a death sentence
murder case saying, "the accused was convicted without there being any error
which materially prejudiced his substantial rights." United States v. Vigneault
(No. 2432), 12 CMR 3, 14 (U. S. C. M. A. 1953).
"" United States v. Davis (No. 29), 2 CMR 8, 13 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952);
United States v. Bartholomew (No. 166), 3 CMR 41, 45 (U. S. C. M. A. 1952)
""Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103, 111, rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 939 (1950).
""Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 25 (1942); Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U. S. 695,
696, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 934 (1949); Whelchel v. McDonald, 176 F. 2d
260, 262 (5th Cir. 1949), affd, 340 U. S. 122 (1950), rehearing denied, 340 U. S. 923
(1951).
"" Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103, 111, rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 939 (1950);
In re Grimley, 137 U. 5. 147 (1890) ; Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 23 (1879).
"' Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F. 2d 61 (3d Cir. 1948), reV'd sub nom. Humprey v.
Smith, 336 U. S. 695, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 934 (1949) ; Hiatt v. Brown,
175 F. 2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U. S. 103, rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 939
(1950) ; Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Schita v. King, 133
F. 2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943), second appeal, 139 F. 2d 971 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied
sub nor. Schita v. Pescor, 322 U. S. 761, rehearing denied, 323 U. S. 810 (1944).
In both Innes and Schita the courts found due process had not been violated.
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given to this is, "To those in the military or naval service of the United
States the military law is due process."
440
The Supreme Court in recent years has had at least three different
opportunities in military cases to put at rest this 'due process contention,
but has not dealt with it conclusively. In both Humphrey v. Smith 41
and Hiatt v. Brow-.,442 the Supreme Court reversed the courts of appeal;
set forth an array of alleged procedural errors; held that they did not
deprive the accused of due process although the courts of appeal had so
found; and denied habeas corpus relief. In Burns v. Wilson,443 the high
Court again set forth some six specific allegations of procedural error
which petitioners contended constituted a denial of due process; found
that all these assignments of error had been passed upon and rejected by
the military tribunals during the course of the appellate review of the
case within the system of military courts; concluded that these same
issues should not be reviewed by a civil federal court; and affirmed the
orders of the district and circuit courts denying habeas corpus relief. In
arriving at this result the Court split four ways. Six judges concurred
in the denial of relief although only Justices Reed, Burton, and Clark
joined in the opinion of the Court written by Chief Justice Vinson.444
Justice Minton wrote a separate concurring opinion adhering to the
," Creary v. Weeks, 259 U. S. 336, 344 (1922) ; French v. Weeks, 259 U. S.
326, 335 (1922) ; Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U. S. 296, 304 (1911).
4" 336 U. S. 695, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 934 (1949).
442 339 U. S. 103, rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 939 (1950).
448346 U. S. 137 (1953), rehearing denied, 74 S. Ct. 3 (1953).
""Id. at 139. The opinion of the court in part, read:
"... But, in military habeas corpus the inquiry, the scope of matters open
for review has always been more narrow than in civil cases. Hiatt v. Brown,
339 U. S. 103 (1950). Thus the law which governs a civil court in the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction over military habeas corpus applications cannot simply
be assimilated to the law which governs the exercise of that power in other
instances. It is .id generis; it must be so, because of the peculiar relationship
between the civil and military law.
"Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and
apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. This
Court has played no role in its development; we have exerted no supervisory
power over the courts which enforce it; the rights of men in the armed forces
must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the
precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly en-
trusted that task to Congress.
"Indeed, Congress has taken great care both to define the rights of those
subject to military law, and to provide a complete system of review within
the military system to secure those rights. ...
"The military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities
as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his constitu-
tional rights. In military habeas corpus cases, even more than in state habeas
corpus cases, it would be in disregard of the statutory scheme if the federal
civil courts failed to take account of the prior proceedings--of the fair de-
terminations of the military tribunals after all military remedies have been
exhausted. Congress has provided that these determinations are "final" and
"binding" upon all courts. We have held before that this does not displace
the civil courts' jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus from the
military prisoner. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950). But these pro-
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traditional view of the Court that the sole test is jurisdiction.445 Justice
Jackson concurred in the result reached by the Court. Justice Frank-
furter cast no vote, feeling the case should be set down for reargument,
but even so, wrote an opinion to the effect that due process in military
courts is quite different from due process in civil courts.440  Justices
Black and Douglas dissented, asserting that the 5th Amendment due
process clause is applicable and probably had been violated by the im-
proper admission in evidence of a questioned confession. Earnest law-
yers who have wrestled with the problem, while they will not find in this
performance of the Court an absolute to which to cling, should draw
solace from this striking testimonial to the highly divisive propensity of
the legal enigma presented by the effort to isolate, identify and define
the concept of due process applied to military law.
visions do mean that when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with
an allegation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil court
to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence. Whechel v. McDonald,
340 U. S. 122 (1950).
"These records make it plain that the military courts have heard peti-
tioners out on every significant allegation which they now urge. Accordingly,
it is not the duty of the civil courts simply to repeat that process-to re-
examine and reweigh each item of evidence of the occurrence of events which
tend to prove or disprove one of the allegations in the application for habeas
corpus. It is the limited function of the civil courts to determine whether the
military have given fair consideration to each of these claims. Whelchel v.
McDonald, supra. We think they have.
"Petitioners have failed to show that this military review was legally in-
adequate to resolve the claims which they have urged upon the civil courts.
They simply demand an opportunity to make a new record, to prove de novo
in the District Court precisely what they failed to prove in the military
court. We think, under the circumstances, that due regard for the limitations
on a civil court's power to grant such relief precludes such action. We think
that although the Court of Appeals may have erred in reweighing each item
of evidence in the trial record, it certainly did not err in holding there was
no need for a further hearing in the District Court. Accordingly its judg-
ment must be affirmed."
"' The forthright approach of Justice Minton is the one which the Supreme
Court has heretofore consistently taken in military habeas corpus cases and pos-
sesses the old fashioned virtue of clarity. In part, in his separate concurring opinion
at 147, he said:
"... Due process of law for military personnel is what Congress has provided
for them in the military hierarchy in courts established according to law. If
the court is thus established, its action is not reviewable here. Such military
court's jurisdiction is exclusive but for the exceptions contained in the statute,
and the civil courts are not mentioned in the exceptions. 64 STAT. 115, 50
U. S. C. (Supp. V) Sec. 581.
"If error is made by the military courts, to which Congress has committed
the protection of the rights of military personnel, that error must be corrected
in the military hierarchy of courts provided by Congress. We have but one
function, namely, to see that the military court has jurisdiction, not whether
it has committed error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
"The rule was clearly stated in the early case of In re Grimley, 137 U. S.
147, 150, . ..
. . . The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction."
"' Id. at 148. Justice Frankfurter, in part, wrote:
"... if imprisonment is the result of a denial of due process, it may be
challenged no matter under what authority of the Government it was brought
about. Congress itself in the exercise of the war power 'is subject to appli-
cation of constitutional limitations.' Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.,
1953] COURT-MARTIAL UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 79
From the Burns case, a new rule seems to emerge for military cases.
It is that federal civil courts in habeas corpus may look only to determine
whether a military petitioner has received full and fair consideration of
his contentions by the appellate tribunals of the military justice system.
If so, the civil courts are closed to him, not only for -direct appeal but for
collateral habeas corpus relief as well. This rule seems to shift the in-
quiry along from, "Was the accused accorded due process by the court-
martial?" to "Was the accused accorded a full and fair hearing by mili-
tary justice appellate agencies either on appeal or on separate motion for
a new trial ?" It appears to infer that if the answer to the last question
were "no," then habeas corpus relief might be granted even though
jurisdiction were not involved. The rule certainly neither states nor
infers that due process considerations are jurisdictional. The same Court
has clearly ruled that all remedies within the military system must first
be completely exhausted as a prerequisite to seeking habeas corpus relief
in the civil courts. 447 This, of necessity, means a petitioner must have
been heard in extenso by all military appellate tribunals before he may
even seek a hearing in the federal civil courts. Since error in decision
cannot be reached by habeas corpus, 448 it would follow that only provable
wilful dishonesty of decision, either committed or approved, by the Court
of Military Appeals, or its refusal to consider at all a case properly
submitted to it under its appellate jurisdiction, would fit the test of a
failure to afford the petitioner a full and fair consideration of his con-
251 U. S. 146, 156. It is therefore not freed from the requirements of due
process of the Fifth Amendment. But there is no table of weights and meas-
ures for ascertaining what constitutes due process. Indeed, it was common
ground, in the majority and dissenting opinion below, that due process, in the
language of Judge Bazelon, is not 'the same in a military setting as it is in a
civil setting.' 202 Fed. at page 352.
"I cannot agree that the only inquiry that is open on an application for
habeas corpus challenging a sentence of a military tribunal is whether that
tribunal was legally constituted and had jurisdiction, technically speaking,
over the person and the crime. Again, I cannot agree that the scope of in-
quiry is the same as that open to us on review of State convictions; the con-
tent of due process in civil trials does not control what is due process in
military trials. Nor is the duty of the civil courts upon habeas corpus met
simply when it is found that the military sentence has been reviewed by the
military hierarchy, although in a debatable situation we should no doubt at-
tach more weight to the conclusions reached on controversial facts by mili-
tary appellate courts than those reached by the highest court of a State.
... I believe this case should be set down for reargument."
This "opinion," not backed by a vote in the case either way, is something of a
legal oddity. To borrow partially from the words of Justice Frankfurter, "there
is no table of weights and measures for ascertaining" its legal effect. It does make
clear that the Justice feels that military due process and civilian due process are not
by any means the same commodity.
See, however, the further views of Justice Frankfurther expressed when the
Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing in the Burns case, 74 S. Ct. 3 (1953).
,,' Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950) ; Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U. S.
122 (1950), rehearing denied, 340 U. S. 923 (1951). Followed in McKinney v.
Finletter, 205 F. 2d 761 (10th Cir. 1953).
.. See notes 436 and 437 supra.
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tentions by the appellate tribunals of the military justice system. While
conceivable, such conduct is improbable almost to the point of impos-
sibility. More within the realm of possibility would be a failure to pass
upon a material issue raised in a case. However, in view of the vigorous
activities of assigned appellate defense counsel in all cases this, too, is
most unlikely. The rule, very properly, makes narrow the way and
straight the course of the military petitioner seeking habeas corpus in
the civil courts.
In any non-capital case not certified to it by a Judge Advocate Gen-
eral the Court of Military Appeals is authorized by law to deny the
petition of an accused for a hearing by that court.449 This petition
jurisdiction of the Court of Military Appeals is analogous to the cer-
tiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and is carefully exercised.
4 0
In testing to determine whether the military had in a certain case given
full and fair consideration to the contentions of the military habeas corpus
petitioner, what, if any, significance the Supreme Court may attach to
the fact that a petition for hearing was denied by the Court of Military
Appeals, must await the pronouncement of the high Court itself.
451
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court, since the Burns
case, would hold that a petitioner, who was not at all within the juris-
diction of military courts but whose case had been, on the jurisdictional
issue, fully and fairly, but erroneously, decided against him by the Court
of Military Appeals, was thereby wholly debarred from civil court relief.
It is highly unlikely this case will arise. If it should, the Supreme Court
probably would approve federal civil court habeas corpus intervention
under its traditional doctrine, espoused in the Burns case by Justice
Minton, that "the single ... test, is jurisdiction." 452
The Court of Military Appeals has said that due process considera-
tions are not jurisdictional in nature.45 3 The Supreme Court has ada-
mantly refrained from saying that due process compliance in a military
case is an element of jurisdiction. It is significant that in the only recent
case in which the Supreme Court approved civil court habeas corpus
relief for a military petitioner the clear ground was lack of jurisdiction
of the person and due process was not an issue. 454 It seems safe to
.. Article 67(b), (c), 50 U. S. C. § 654 (Supp. 1952).
... For authoritative accounts of the process by which the Court of Military
Appeals exercises its petition jurisdiction see Latimer, "Good Cause" in Petitions
for Review, 6 VAND. L. REv. 163-168 (1953) and Walker and Niebank, The Court
of Military Appeals-Its History, Organization and Operations, 6 VAND. L. REv.
228, 232 (1953).
... Such pronouncement is not likely to be either brief or simple, if it should
follow the lead of the 118 page Supreme Court decision setting forth the effect of
its own previous denial of certiorari upon habeas corpus litigation by civilian
prisoners. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443"(1953). This problem evoked no less
than five separate opinions from the Justices.
452 See note 445 supra.
,c See note 435 supra.
... Hershberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949). The same was true in Billings
v. Truesdale, 321 U. S. 542 (1944).
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conclude that the according of civil due process is not, per se, an essen-
tial element of military jurisdiction. This is not meant to imply that
courts-martial do not scrupulously adhere to all of the provisions of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice which is the military "Law of the
Land." They, in fact, earnestly endeavor to do just that. Where errors
occur, in the exercise of granted jurisdiction, which materially prejudice
the substantial rights of an accused,45 5 they are corrected by the military
appellate tribunals by granting rehearings, new trials, or other appro-
priate relief.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to define the limits of courts-
martial jurisdiction. That jurisdiction derives from strict compliance
with the expressed will of Congress in constituting courts-martial. It
extends only to those persons specified by Congress, and then only as to
offenses affirmatively denounced by Congress. Jurisdiction to sentence
is confined to the limits imposed by Congress and the exercise thereof
is further restricted administratively. Other factors may be productive
of reversible error, subject to correction by appellate military courts,
but they are not jurisdictional.
The principles are clear. Their applications are frequently produc-
tive of substantial legal complications. Possibly those newly approaching
military law may profit from this statement of its jurisdictional principles.
""Article 59(a), 50 U. S. C. § 646 (Supp. 1952).
